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The Sociology of Social Class: Recovering the Contributions of the Women Founders

By

Joyce E. Williams and Vicky M. MacLean

Abstract

This paper examines primary writings and a smaller number of secondary sources to assess the early contributions of women to the sociology of social class and social inequality. Using the analytical framework of the politics of erasure, the authors examine the works of Jane Addams, Charlotte P. Gilman, and Florence Kelley as they formed a distinctive approach to research and action during the Progressive Era (approximately 1890-1920). These decades were also the developmental period of sociology in the United States. Addams, Gilman, and Kelley were members of the American Sociological Society, published in professional journals, including the *American Journal of Sociology*, and were recognized in their day as sociologists. These women worked outside of academia and in social settlements to develop a distinctive approach to sociology grounded in the standpoint of women and of the working poor. We consider the literature purporting to provide a history of the treatment of the concept of social class in American sociology as incomplete because there is no discussion or reference to the work of any female sociologist despite the availability of their publications. Charles Page focuses on the developmental history of sociology in the United States. Page's work examines the treatment of class in the works of six "founding fathers" and serves as a canonical reference for examining the treatment of social class in the works of Addams, Gilman, and Kelley.

Keywords: Social Class, Stratification, Inequality, History of Sociology, Women and Sociology, Forgotten Sociologists

Introduction

Few concepts are more strategic to the study and practice of sociology than that of social class. Whether used as an analytical tool or as a social location, we often forego a definition of social class and assume a kind of native understanding. Typically, class is operationalized by indicators of access to resources such as income, occupation, and education. Entire courses are taught on the overlapping topics of social class, inequality, or stratification, and no sociology courses are taught without some reference to social class. Introductory textbooks typically devote at least one chapter to the topic and course materials on subjects such as family, deviance, criminology, aging, or racial-ethnic groups break out differences by social class. In fact, the importance of the concept of social class is more self-evident than its definition, and the history of sociology suggests that class as a concept has been with us from the beginning although that history, as written, is incomplete because it is a history void of the contributions of women. The present work attempts to fill an important gap in the diverse history of sociology by restoring some of women's contributions to the sociology of social class.

A Politics of Erasure

In a pioneering work, Lengermann and Niebrugge-Brantley (1998) used the phrase "politics of erasure" to describe a process of canonization that excluded, minimized, or distorted women's early contributions to the discipline of sociology. This process begins with how one person is present to or known in consciousness to another as in face-to-face interactions. Drawing on the work of Schutz (1967, 1973), this knowledge is labeled as the "thou orientation" and once a person is no longer physically present, it becomes a "contemporary relation." When a person dies, he or she becomes a predecessor, and when all who knew that person die, only the artifacts of the predecessor remain. In the case of sociologists these artifacts exist in the form of writings, lectures,

or speeches that are publicly accessible. Such artifacts continue for posterity to the degree that they are deemed important enough to be preserved and passed on in a disciplinary canon. Works are canonized as they are reprinted, cited in publications, and are assigned for student readings.

Some early women sociologists were known and respected by male contemporaries some of whom were collaborators. This was especially true of the women associated with Hull House in Chicago and their male contemporaries at the University of Chicago (Deegan 1988). However, as male sociologists who knew the women in face-to-face interactions or as scholarly collaborators died, they were replaced by a new generation dedicated to making sociology a neutral, value-free science dissociated from social reform and religion that characterized its early history (Williams and MacLean 2012). Without regard to quality, a politics of gender came to dismiss women's work as reformism or social work rather than as scientific scholarship. The fact that much of the work done by women was in settings outside of academia also contributed to another dimension of the politics of erasure—a lack of academic professionalization (Lengermann and Niebrugge 2007).

This paper examines primary writings and a smaller number of secondary sources to assess the early contributions of women to the sociology of social class and social inequality. We examine the works of Jane Addams, Charlotte P. Gilman, and Florence Kelley as they formed a distinctive approach to research and action during the Progressive Era (approximately 1890-1920). Addams, Kelley, and Gilman were members of the American Sociological Society (now the American Sociological Association), published in professional journals, including the *American Journal of Sociology* (AJS), and were recognized publicly in their day as sociologists. All three were prolific writers and have been established as sociologists in the recovery works of Deegan (1988, 1991), Lengermann and Nieubrugge-Brantley (1998, 2007), and Williams and MacLean (2015) among others. The works of Addams, Kelley, and Gilman, however, have been excluded or erased from sociology's canon despite the availability, quality and quantity of their publications, including those dealing with social class. These women worked in social settlements rather than in academia and developed a distinctive approach to sociology grounded in the standpoint of women and of the working poor.

The History of Social Class as Recorded for Posterity

Three authors (Page [1940] 1969; Gordon 1950; and Grimes 1991), covering different time periods, purport to provide a history of the treatment of the concept of social class in American sociology. None of the three authors discusses or references any female sociologist despite the availability of their works. Page (1940) focused on the development of sociology in the United States by examining the treatment of class in the works of six male founders: William Sumner, Lester Ward, Albion Small, Franklin Giddings, Charles Cooley, and Edward Ross. Page concluded that social class was not given high priority in the works of these founders; rather, they gave voice to the "classlessness" of American society (p. 250). Page, nevertheless, serves as a canonical reference as the three women whose work we examine were contemporaries of the "founding fathers" included in his history. Gordon (1950) and Grimes (1991) build on Page's work, thus compounding the incomplete history. Gordon takes up where Page left off. Focusing on the period from the mid-twenties to the mid-fifties, Gordon ([1950]1963: 8) asserts that American sociology entered its "second generation." At that time, class was established as a necessary sociological concept but one with little research in progress, a minimum of theoretical consideration, and "practically no recognition of the class framework as a major area of investigation within the discipline." Drawing from Weber's multidimensional treatment of social class, Gordon focuses on conceptual clarification and efforts to measure social class. He recognized what have become the canonized works of Chicago ecologists, the Lynds' Middletown studies, the works of W. Lloyd Warner, and the functionalists, particularly Davis and Moore. In the latest history, Grimes concludes that, while sociologists in the first two generations did give some attention to social class, this concept was not a dominant subject matter (1991:40). He identified the "classics" of Page and Gordon as our "collective knowledge" (1991:19) of social class that he purposed to update to the 1990s with extensive treatment of conflict theory (missing in Page and Gordon) and the work of neo-Weberians and neo-Marxists.

Calvert (1982) gave no recognition to the contributions of women scholars in his chronicle of the concept of class beginning with its "prehistory" and going beyond discipline and geography. Scholarship more recent or limited in scope has added to the history of social class but not to its inclusivity (Gurney 1981, Mouser, 2012, Pease, Form and Rytina 1970). These works also fail to mention any contributions of women sociologists, and

the only black sociologist discussed is W.E.B. DuBois (Mouser 2012). A work by historian Mark Pittenger (2012) focuses on studies of the poor by "down and outer" social scientists, journalists, and novelists who went undercover to investigate and understand the lives of the poor. Such works were similarly labeled "underdog" sociologists by Becker (1967). Pittenger (2012:16-17) did cite works by women, crediting, for example, Jane Addams with early study of the poor and for devising a method for such study.

In sum, the disciplinary history of the strategic concept of social class is largely that told by, and about, male sociologists and reflects agreement that early sociologists in the United States gave little attention to social class before the Lynds' *Middletown* studies (1929, 1937) where class was treated largely as an occupational division. Late recognition of social class as a real phenomenon is attributed primarily to the belief that the United States was a "classless society" or, if not classless, so open that classes were fluid with upward mobility or evolutionary progress possible for those who earned it. Page ([1940]1969: xi), for example, concluded "the person who speaks of 'class' is moving outside the boundaries of American culture, or indicating an allegiance to the 'foreign' doctrine of Marxism," a conclusion Gurney (1981) reinforced. By contrast, some of the women who practiced sociology during its developmental period demonstrated awareness of class differences as well as the systemic structure of inequality that was becoming noticeably solidified in this "classless society." Their writings reveal not only an awareness of class inequality and potential class conflict but also faith in democracy accompanied by a pragmatic understanding that ideals like free competition and equal opportunity will not close the gap between classes. Their working paradigms combined theory and action aimed at structural interventions such as labor organizing, worker cooperatives, legislative regulation, use of the boycott and consumer buying power.

Social Class as Known and Told by Women Founders

Jane Addams (1860-1935)

Jane Addams is best known as the founder of Chicago's Hull House, one of the earliest social settlements in the United States. Addams envisioned social settlements as bridging the gap between the classes as residents, largely college-educated and middle class, and the working poor developed common interests and learned from one another. However, Addams quickly came to realize that neighborliness through visitation, cultural exchanges, and Hull House programs was not enough to change the structure of inequality. As a sociologist, Addams developed an approach to neighborhood research in which she observed the lives of the poor first hand through a method of study combining sympathy and fact, embryonic of what is known today as participant observation and "feminist standpoint theory" (Harding 1987; Hartsock 1983). Addams' (1895[2004]: 3-23) *Hull-House Maps and Papers* was an early product of this methodology.

It is clear that the Hull House residents who gathered, analyzed, and reported data, drawn from nationality, wage, and density surveys, were aware that they were doing sociology and that their work would be of interest to "the constantly increasing body of sociological students more widely scattered" (Holbrook [1895]2004:11). DuBois' *The Philadelphia Negro* (1899) was modeled after *Maps and Papers* in method and paradigm for change through community action research. Both works preceded *Middletown* (1929) by more than three decades. Yet Gordon ([1950]1963:63-65) credits the Middletown studies with turning sociologists' attention toward social class, thus ignoring the Hull House research and other settlement ethnographies' (e.g., Woods 1898). Gordon's omission is particularly obvious given that methodology was a focus of his work and the methodology of *Maps and Papers* is a first and important part of the overall presentation.

Addams and other Hull House residents were early advocates of labor unions and were known for organizing unions and for arbitrating strikes and labor disputes. One of Addams' earliest references to social class was about "sweaters working in the home sewing industry"[1] because Hull House was located in the midst of "a neighborhood largely given over to the sewing trades." Women represented a significant portion of these workers, a reason Addams became an early advocate of women's labor organizing. Addams argued that industrial organization must be part of the general reorganization of society and that "individuals" representing banks and railroads, arguing for "equal opportunity" and "free competition" offered no real solution to urban problems. Addams wrote and spoke

1 The sweating system was used by a number of industries but especially the clothing industry. The system eliminated the cost of rental space by hiring workers to cut and sew in tenement rooms where they and their children lived. These spaces were crowded, poorly lighted and inadequately ventilated. Sometimes the entire family worked at this trade in the one or two rooms of their dwellings. Diseases were often present in such conditions and were spread in the garments cut and stitched by the sweaters.

of class in Marxian terms, referring to capitalists such as railroad baron George Pullman as "the power holding class."[2] Unlike Marx, however, Addams believed that settlements and unions could play a role in peaceful arbitration between capitalists and workers. Neither naïve nor a sentimentalist, Addams took a positive, pragmatic view of the future, expecting that labor and capital would ultimately act on "behalf of universal kinship." She declared class warfare to be a threat when workers and capitalists divide into two camps of "right" and "wrong" (Addams [1895]2004:200).

More than a decade after *Maps and Papers*, at an annual meeting of the American Sociological Society, Addams served as a discussant for a paper by John Commons of the University of Wisconsin. Responding to the question of whether class conflict was increasing and was inevitable in the United States, Addams began with an admission that she could argue both sides. In support of class conflict, and providing evidence from her own experience, she pointed out that during a strike the "fair-minded public" disappears as they take sides, thus increasing the likelihood of polarized class conflict. On the other hand, Addams viewed class conflict as temporary and not likely to increase in the United States. Drawing again on Hull House experience, she pointed to the mixing and integration of immigrants coming to this country to join the labor force where they found commonality due to forced proximity and experience. Addams argued that immigration was a deterrent to class conflict, "bringing in its own education," as workers with diverse nationalities, religions, and languages find mutuality and brotherhood in the United States. Addams (1908:771) concluded that "It requires less effort to be friends with your employer than . . . with your alien fellow employee. . . ."

Another reason for a lack of class conflict, according to Addams, was the growing role of managers in industry. Neither capitalists nor proletarians, workers saw managers as "in the same box with us" because someone is driving managers. They are held accountable "for the actual condition. . .until it reaches the stockholders" (Addams 1908:772). Here Addams offered an early version of what Erik Wright (1997:254-255) later theorized and labeled as "contradictory class locations," workers who fill the gap between classes and perhaps prevent a Marxian class polarization. Further, Addams seemed to anticipate the organization of industries that would make the employer subordinate to the corporate trust of stockholders. Ultimately, Addams (2002) advocated for an inclusive social democracy where the class division between capitalists and proletarians would evolve into a democratic whole as laborers and capitalists came to know and understand each other's interests. Addams wrote and spoke in an effort to bring sociological facts to bear on solutions to social problems. She was recognized as a sociologist at the time of the publication of *Maps and Papers* in 1895 (Williams and MacLean 2015:96-97) but obituaries and eulogies at the time of her death in 1935 reveal a transitory identity with some referencing her as a sociologist and some as a social worker-humanitarian (Williams and MacLean 2015:87-88). Today, Addams is more likely to be known as a social worker or peace activist than as a sociologist.

Included in the discussion of Commons' paper at the 1908 ASA meeting, was an addendum provided by Charlotte P. Gilman. Gilman, apparently a member of the audience, but recognized as a sociologist by her peers, made a spontaneous comment deemed important enough to publish. In retrospect, she provided an early gender-defined conceptualization of class by reminding those present that Commons and the discussants had overlooked an important class: "one which I consider to outnumber or at least to equal any of these classes mentioned, that is the women" (Commons 1908:781).

Charlotte P. Gilman (1860-1935)

Gilman's many writings are filled with facts, particularly those drawn from history. She was, however, a theorist who believed in the ameliorative power of theory to change the status of women in a gender-stratified society. While today contemporary sociologists take for granted the importance of gender as a social construct and have expanded its significance to intersections of race/ethnicity and class, it was Gilman who first introduced the concept of a gender-defined social class. Author of *Women and Economics* (1898), Gillman was a founding member of the ASA, participated in its meetings and published in the *American Journal of Sociology*. She was a friend of Jane Addams and lived at Hull House for almost a year. Because of works such as that of Lengermann and Niebrugge-Brantley (1998) and Hill and Deegan (2004), Gilman's work has been restored to sociology and is beginning to appear in some textbooks on early social thought. However, Gilman (1892) is still best remembered for her short story "The Yellow Wall Paper" in which she describes the plight of a woman losing her mind when confined to bed rest and constrained from enjoying creative activity, ostensibly in the interest of her health.

2 Addams clashed with Pullman during the 1984 railroad workers strike that erupted in violence and left 30 workers dead as Pullman refused to negotiate or accept Addams' offer of arbitration.

Gilman saw the gender division of labor as being to social structure what the labor-capital division was to Marx. However, Gilman and Marx saw the primary stratification agent differently: for Gilman it was women's lack of paid work and consequent marginalization whereas for Marx it was worker exploitation and alienation from the products of their labor. According to Gilman, "labor is human life" and "the worker is society." Women's unpaid household work was seen as a functional duty without the defining importance of men's paid work, thus relegating women to a class of dependents or parasites (1904:354). Gilman rejected the unidimensional economic concept of social class, contending that the underlying division of labor was based on both sex and economics, what she referred to as the "sexuo-economic relation" ([1898] 1998:30-42). In this relation, women were defined as dependent on men (e.g., fathers, husbands, brothers, or sons) for economic support but were denied, caste-like, economic independence in their own right. Exaggerated sex distinctions were a consequence of women having to rely on their sexuality and gender to survive in an economy that paid men directly and women indirectly or through underpaid sex-segregated work. Women who toiled the longest and hardest were paid the least, an inverse relation between work and pay embedded in the gendered division of labor. Women were "the only species in which the female depends on the male for food, the only species in which the sex relation is an economic relation" ([1898]1998:3).

For Gilman, the key to social change and equality for women was first and foremost removing barriers to women's paid employment, thus giving women economic independence. She united theory and practice in a plan for the redefinition of home, making it a place for equal empowerment between men and women. Gilman championed women's emancipation giving them the freedom to pursue work of their choice. She was also an advocate of co-parenting and spousal sharing of household responsibilities which she pointed out would require "structural and functional changes that shall eliminate the last of our domestic industries and leave a home that is no one's workshop" (Gilman 1909:605). Gilman believed that the reorganization of household management would come through cooperative organizations like the scientific care for children in professional childcare facilities, cooperative kitchens, and socialized planning in the shared distribution of resources. A Fabian Socialist, she advocated gradual, peaceful social reform over revolutionary changes and favored universal health care and a minimum wage.

Florence Kelley (1859-1932)

Having spent most of her adult life either as a resident of Hull House or of the Henry Street settlement in New York, Florence Kelley was committed to disseminating a theoretical, Marxian understanding of class inequality along with empirical data as an impetus for change. Her contributions to labor reform, the modernization of industry, feminist jurisprudence, and to mainstream sociology have been documented (Timmings 2004). Her contributions to social class have not, although Clark and Foster (2006:255) note that "a class analysis ran throughout her work, as she linked the existing conditions of life to the operation of a particular historical socioeconomic system."

Kelley was trained in the social sciences and in law and was as much a sociologist as the men to whom Page devoted his book. Like many of her male peers she studied in both the US and Europe. At the University of Zurich, Kelley studied Marx and other socialist thinkers and came to understand that poverty and misery coexist with affluence when the exploitation of workers is endemic to the economic system.[3] While she was studying in Zurich, Frederick Engels suggested that Kelley write a series of pamphlets for public education focusing on the contents of Marx's *Das Kapital.*[4] According to one of her biographers, the essay "The Need of Theoretical Preparation for Philanthropic Work" ([1887]1986:91-104) was likely intended as the first of a series of such pamphlets although she subsequently turned her writing from theory and more toward research and reform (Sklar 1986). Before releasing this essay in pamphlet form, in 1887 she gave it a test run in a speech before the New York chapter of the Association of Collegiate Alumnae (ACA)[5]. In addition to an elementary lesson in Marxism, she argued that philanthropy would soon be overwhelmed by the growing needs of individuals and families generated by the stratified organization of urban-industrial society. She described the structure of US society as composed of two diametrically opposed classes, "the smaller owning all the necessaries of life, all the means of production…the larger class owning nothing but (its) labor power" ([1887]1986:91). She

3 In 1885, Kelley wrote the first English translation of Engels' *The Condition of the Working Class in England,* first published in 1845 in German.

4 In the late 1800s pamphlets were an inexpensive and expeditious way to get information to the public for education, advertisement, or propaganda.

5 The ACA later became the National Association of University Women.

contended that capitalism creates poverty, disease, and crime as well as philanthropic organizations that treat the symptoms but not the cause of problems. She asked her audience's patience as she explained the concept of surplus value to a group of women likely hearing it for the first time. She explained "labor power" as having the unique quality of creating "surplus value" or profit, that is, the market value of a product beyond the cost of raw material and a worker's labor. Kelley identified this profit as the product of worker exploitation and "this appropriation of surplus-value, this exploitation of the workers, is the source of the poverty of the working class, of its supplying wreckage to need philanthropic attention" ([1887]1986:97). Finally, Kelley admonished her audience that acceptance of the status quo meant ignoring the real problem of an unjust underlying system while focusing on methods of treating the poor.

Kelley's first contribution to the sociology of social class was her theoretical exposition of Marx's doctrine of surplus value. A few years later, as a resident of Hull House, she set about researching the daily lives of the working poor beginning with the sweating system. She worked as a part of the team collecting data from Chicago to be included in a study funded by the Bureau of Labor Statistics on *The Slums of Baltimore, Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia* (Wright, Hugo, and Houghton 1894). Subsequently she, along with Jane Addams, oversaw data collection for *Hull House Maps and Papers* (1895). Also of sociological significance were Kelley's reports as Factory Inspector for the State of Illinois, a position held from 1893 to 1897). One of Kelley's biographers treated her factory inspector reports as an extension of her sociological-demographic work for *Maps and Papers* and the *Slums* of great cities collection (Bienen 2014:227-229). Known for her mantra of "investigate, educate, legislate, enforce," she advocated for the collection and use of scientific data to secure legislation that would have lasting impact (Goldmark 1976, Sklar 1995: 252).

Another of Kelley's contributions to social class is evident in *Some Ethical Gains through Legislation* (1905) where she expanded the concept of social class by defining what were typically assumed to be constitutionally insured *individual rights* as constitutionally insured *social rights*. This pivotal use of class as a social category broadens the meaning of rights and civil liberties in a social democracy: the right to childhood, the right to leisure, the right of every citizen to vote, and the right of consumers to purchase goods produced under safe, sanitary, and non-exploitive conditions. Further, she made these social rights integral to the needs and requirements of a functional, safe, and just society. For example, she made society's stake in the future citizenship of its young contingent on the right to childhood—the right of *all* children to grow and develop free of the exploitive practices of child labor resulting in illiteracy, sickness, malformed bodies, delinquency, and early deaths. She argued that the right to childhood was a social right because "childhood must be sacred to preparation for citizenship" (1905:10). Kelley (1905:111) linked the right to leisure with legislation restricting work hours and regulating work conditions, thus contributing "to the health, intelligence, morality, lengthened trade life, freer choice of home surroundings, thrift, self-help and family life of working people." In writings and speeches, she detailed the destructive effects of industrial labor on workers and families. "Marriages fail to occur, and families fail to be founded, because of fear of poverty...children are not born or come into life cruelly handicapped, because of the effects of industry upon the health of the mothers…" (1914:14). As a correlate of the malpractices of some industries, Kelley cited statistics such as infant mortality (1914:16).

Like Addams and Gilman, Kelley promoted systemic changes to solve social problems but also recognized the importance of incremental changes. For example, she turned attention to child labor as a means of raising awareness about the exploitations of capitalism. She began a campaign for universal healthcare by starting with children, thus opening the door to wider demands for improvements in health care for all. Kelley also mobilized consumers, especially women, to use their buying power by boycotting industries that exploited workers and children for profits. Kelley's writings and speeches were likely why the Federal Bureau of Investigation kept a file on her in which it was noted that she "has been a radical all of . . . her life" (Sklar 1986:14). However, it was also said of her, "Everyone was brave from the moment she walked into the room" (Sklar 1992:19).[6]

Lessons for Sociologists Today

The works of Addams, Kelley, and Gilman reveal systemic conceptualizations and descriptions of social class as well as methodologies producing empirical correlates documenting the effects of class differences under industrial capitalism. These women's explanations of the socio-economic class system, or the sexuo-economic system, sound more familiar today than their contemporaneous male founders' treatments of social

6 A complete collection of Kelley's papers is now available on line at Northwestern University, florencekelley.northwestern.edu

class as described by Page (1940, 1969). The women observed, researched, recorded, and publicized the plight of women, of child laborers, and of their hard-working neighbors in industries such as sewing, glass making, and meat processing. Of special concern was the plight of working women or, as Gilman pointed out, women's lack of work options and pay parity.

Kelley and Addams believed that unions, legislative action, and statute enforcement would lead to a safe, fair, non-exploitative work environment where laborers would thrive, rise, and share in the American dream. Kelley's use of class as a social category broadened the meaning of rights and civil liberties in a social democracy and blurred private-public boundaries. In speeches and writings, Kelley challenged audiences to organize and to mobilize against the exploits of capitalism as she drew attention to child labor and the absence of living wages for families. Much like Howard Becker's (1967) question, "whose side are we on," Kelley insisted college educated women ask "where do I belong?" and that they abandon the class that was "propping up a system of society which is based upon the exploitation of the working class." Further, she insisted that women, the main providers of philanthropy, decide, "Shall I cast my lot with the oppressors, content to patch and darn, to piece and cobble at the worn and rotten fabric of a perishing society?" ([1887]1986:94).

Kelley envisioned a unique brand of American socialism anchored in social rights; Addams believed in an inclusive and egalitarian social democracy incorporating elements of feminist pragmatism and of today's social interactionism, thus pushing beyond the popular concept of a democracy of individual freedoms. She believed that in every interaction with public officials, with employers and employees, with friends, and with neighbors we are participating in and creating social democracy, ideally a linking of the personal with the public good.

Predating Mills (1959), Addams connected the private troubles of daily life, such as those revolving around family, work, and housing with public issues requiring governmental action. For example, she did not follow the inclination of many to admonish her tenement neighbors to keep cleaner homes. Instead, she followed a more public course by involving her neighbors in garbage collection. By treating public garbage collection as an extension of good housekeeping, Addams demonstrated the need for combined individual and public efforts to insure healthy families and neighborhoods. Similarly, good political representation was associated with better housing and healthier, happier families. Viewing an injury to one as an injury to all, she believed it necessary that we "turn out for one another" and understand the burdens of others as well as our own (2002:7).

Addams' approach reflects feminist standpoint epistemology that seeks to understand meaning based on the social and material contexts in which people live. Lengermann and Niebrugge-Brantley (1998:1) referred to Addams and the network of social settlement women who worked with her, often in collaboration with male sociologists at the University of Chicago, as the Chicago Women's School of Sociology. This group occupied a gendered space, outside of academia, producing social science aimed at reforms influenced by feminist values (Deegan 1988; Lengermann and Niebrugge-Brantley 1998). Their collective works emphasized the social structural origins of problems. Their emphasis on using jurisprudence, or the science of law, as a medium for social reform was a reflection of their use of praxis combining theory and action. Their approach made class and social inequality a central analytic and research variable, predating by decades the sociology practiced by feminists and critical scholars of class stratification. This approach also contrasted with the early works of scholars such as Ward, Giddings, and Small whose scientific quest for a "value neutral" approach to social phenomena, including social class, was still informed by an evolutionary paradigm (Page [1940]1969). Although the contributions of these women founders to social class was known to their contemporaries, they did not achieve recognition in the field of sociology. Instead, they are found today in the annals of social work or feminist activism.

Gilman's work paved the way for intersectionality research by conceptualizing class as a multidimensional construct and by making gender a central analytic variable of social inequality. She placed all women in a shared class relative to the sexuo-economic relation in the gender division of labor. This view offered greater awareness that workers included women as well as men. Gilman's (1909, 1911) work brought to the forefront women's "invisible labor" and the direct impact of women's unpaid household and family labor on the economy because they freed men to labor for pay ([1898]1998). Gilman conceptualized a restructuring of the major social institutions through cooperative organizations and legal changes going beyond women's enfranchisement. Unlike Marx, Gilman did not advocate for revolutionary or violent resistance. Rather, she saw social change as coming from women's cooperative resistance as they created alternative organizations and promoted the feminist cultural values

of nurturing and growth. Such values, she believed, could potentially correct the course of social evolution based on masculinist tendencies such as aggression, war, and destruction. For Gilman (1911:243), women shared a common core of values capable of altering the course of societal development. However, Gilman believed that, until the fundamental economic (class) system of sex-stratification was altered, women could neither reach their full humanity nor could they realize their power to change the evolutionary course of history.

In contrast to most of their male colleagues, the three women founders used Marx in their conceptualization of social class while also providing a nuanced standpoint treatment. For example, Addams' recognized that managers were located between classes. Gilman insisted on gender as a determinant of class. Kelley, the most Marxian of the three women founders, worked to remove the barriers of inequality through her use of theory, research, and policy legislation—hardly Marxian revolutionary tactics. By working to restructure society, Addams, Gilman and Kelley offered an early form of public sociology (Burawoy, 2005) and their use of social class as an explanatory and analytical variable paved the way for its use in both quantitative and qualitative sociology.

Omission, Erasure and the Road to Recovery

Women founders such as Addams, Gilman, and Kelley are absent in today's histories of the treatment of social class in American sociology, although during their lifetimes their work received some recognition. For example, Robert Park ([1925]1967:5) often denounced the settlement women as "do-gooders." However, Park also wrote that settlement houses "became outposts for observation and for intimate studies of social conditions in regions of the city that up to that point remained *terra incognita*." Early writers on the development of sociology, House (1936:252-253) and Lundberg, Bain and Anderson (1929:268-269) did recognize women and the settlement movement as leading sociology to "pay some attention to questions relating to social classes." However, by the time Page, Gordon, and Grimes wrote their histories of social class vis-à-vis sociology the women were deceased, their works viewed as advocacy more than value free science, and their professional lives as more suitable for inclusion in social work or philanthropy than sociology. Consequently women's contributions are missing from the histories of the concept of social class and from current text books on stratification or social class. (See, for example, Beeghley 2016; Gilbert 2015; Kerbo 2012; Marger 2014). As Lengermann and Niebrugge (2007) suggest, women such as Addams, Gilman, and Kelley likely fell victims to a politics of gender, a politics of knowledge, and a politics of professionalization: gender because women lacked power or authority to be taken seriously as scholars; knowledge because their work was defined as reform or activism rather than as part of sociology's history as a science; and professionalization because these women were not working in academic settings.

Jessie Bernard's (1973) sociological autobiography, "My Four Revolutions," offers insight into the erasure of women's contributions to sociology and into their now tentative recovery of that history. The first revolution Bernard discusses began in the 1920s. This revolution was identified as sociology's turn toward quantification and empiricism, the beginning of a journey toward scientific legitimization leaving behind reformers and "do-gooders." In the 1930s a second revolution followed, propelling sociology away from its identification with the University of Chicago, thus opening it to a wider audience and different, but still largely male, stakeholders. Bernard's third revolution (late 1950s to early sixties) marked a turn toward inclusion of sociologists who were not strict value-free scientists, even some who were activists and reformers. The fourth, feminist, revolution surfaced in the late 1960s. This revolution was the most significant for Bernard and for the recent recognition of the contributions of women like Addams, Gilman, and Kelley. What Bernard saw as most significant in the feminist revolution was its potential for expanding sociology "into a genuine science of society by including women as well as men" (1973:777). This feminist revolution paved the way for women's full participation in sociology and for reclaiming their contributions to the discipline.

This process of bringing women back in began with scholarship such as that by Deegan (1988) establishing Addams and the residents of Hull House as early sociologists, and the work of Lengermann and Niebrugge-Brantley (1998), documenting women's early contributions to social theory. However, to the extent that women founders are recognized for significant contributions to the discipline today, it is likely as add-ons (e.g., tokens) to the history of sociology in introductory texts or theory. Their recognition in specialized areas such as stratification is even more limited. Seltzer and Haldar (2015:37) are among the few recent scholars to recognize Addams and her colleagues for their substantial contributions to the study of social class in their early "empirical descriptions of conditions of human suffering" and in identifying "the sources

of this misery in the structural arrangements of class society. . . ."

The work of Addams, Kelley, and Gilman challenged the status quo and drew attention to the existence of class inequalities. There is ample evidence, however, that their use of socialist and Marxist conceptualizations coupled with their insistence on social reform were barriers to the professionalization of sociology, making them vulnerable to the politics of erasure. The analysis of class, poverty, and social inequality was fundamental to their critical feminist pragmatism and standpoint orientations as was reflected in their written works emphasizing situated knowledge grounded in the experiences of women, children, and the working poor. Their collective works emphasized the social structural origins of problems. Their emphasis on jurisprudence as a medium for social reform was a reflection of their use of praxis, combining theory and action, predating the sociology practiced today by feminist and critical scholars who seek social justice and promote a reform agenda. The loss of these works to the sociological canon and to the diverse histories of sociology should not be minimized. Not only does acknowledging the contributions of these women scholars create a less distorted history of sociology and better defines who sociologists are, but also, by returning to the early roots of sociological practice, we learn from them invaluable lessons and insights regarding the creation of meaningful social change (MacLean and Williams 2012). More than 100 years ago, Florence Kelley ([1887]1986:98) asked the question that should reverberate through academia today: "Where are the teachers, men or women, who have placed themselves outspokenly on the side of the oppressed class?"

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About the Authors:

Joyce E. Williams. Ph.D. Washington University, St. Louis (1971) is Professor of Sociology Emerita at Texas Woman's University. In retirement, she is a member of the National Coalition of Independent Scholars, continues writing and publication, and has served several schools as an adjunct professor. She is author or coauthor of four books and numerous articles on race relations, social inequality, and the history of sociology.

Vicky M. MacLean. Ph.D. Duke University (1992) is Professor of Sociology, Director of Graduate Studies in Sociology, and Director of Women's and Gender Studies at Middle Tennessee State University. She is the coauthor of one book and author of articles and book chapters in the areas of gender studies, the sociology of work, the sociology of health, and the diverse histories of sociology.

The Role of Media in the Development of U. S. Policy on Disrupted Adoptions of Children

By

Madeline H. Engel

Abstract

Although U. S. citizens adopt more children than people in any other society, few realize the significant role played by media in these adoptions and the policies that govern them. This article examines the positive and negative ways in which media affect the processes of out-going adoption from the U. S. and disrupted adoption. The Internet provides a myriad of resources for prospective adoptive parents as well as for adoptees seeking to find their birth families. Social media can be helpful in these searches too, but they also may leave children vulnerable to possible trafficking and harm at the hands of pedophiles who may not be vetted in the course of transfers of custody. Thus, social media have facilitated unprotected, unregulated rehoming of previously adopted children, especially those adopted internationally. Fortunately, another medium – investigative journalism as reported in newspapers, on television and on the Internet – has exposed these problems and directly led to social changes, including new laws regarding rehoming which seek to protect the rights and lives of children. In an era in which many politicians and some segments of the population accuse the media of spreading "fake news," their positive contributions to society should be welcomed and encouraged.

Keywords: Disrupted Adoption, Media, Out-Going Adoption, Readoption, Rehoming, U. S. Adoption Policy

Introduction

Many people are aware of the importance of media, including the Internet, for the adoption experience. They know one can get information about agencies, laws and resources; they recognize that adoptees can attempt to find their birth families on-line. What the public is less likely to know is that media have played a significant role in the development of adoption policies in the U. S. Two specific issues in adoption will be used to illustrate the connection between the media and the development of policy: the international adoption of children born in the U. S. by families from other countries and the unregulated custody transfer, more popularly termed "rehoming," of adoptees either born in the U. S. or brought to the U. S. from other countries though international adoption. In terms of rehoming, the role of the media is seen as being both positive and negative.

A Model for Media Impact on the Development of Adoption Policy: Outgoing Adoption

U. S. citizens adopt more children internationally than those of any of other country (U. S. Department of State n.d., p. 3). In fact, at times they have adopted more children internationally than citizens of all other countries combined. What is less well known even among professionals in the adoption field is that for decades up to 100 children per year have been adopted from the U. S. to other countries (Avitan 2007; Engel et al. 2014; Naughton 2012).

Starting in the mid-1990s, journalists called attention to the fact that children were being adopted from the U. S. by families in Canada and several European countries including Britain, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden (Brown 2013; Corley 2005; Davenport 2004; Engel et al. 2014; Glaser 2004; Hilborn 2010; O'Neill et al. 2005; *60 Minutes* 2005; Smiley 2004; Smolowe 1994; van Hooff 2010; *World News Tonight* 2005). Journalists reporting on these outgoing adoptions noted inadequate record keeping and the absence of federal policies aimed

at protecting adoptees leaving the U. S. Almost all of the outgoing children were under the age of four, usually under the age of one, as is customary in adoption. What was unusual and disturbing was that reporters unveiled the fact that children were almost always biracial or African American.

The Hague Convention on Inter-Country Adoption

It was only in 2008 that adoptees leaving the U. S. eventually received some protection when the U.S. agreed to the Hague Convention. The Convention is a voluntary international agreement designed to reduce or eliminate trafficking in children; to make international adoption more transparent; and to protect the rights of birth parents, adoptive parents and adopted children. It gives first preference to adoption by family members of the child, or at least people in the local community. When this is not possible, preference is to go to citizens of the child's birth country; international adoption is seen as a last resort when no other resolution can be found. These priorities preserve children's rights to be raised in their own country, ethnic group, neighborhood, religion and perhaps even family.

Statistical Reporting

Even after the Hague Convention was contracted, the U. S. federal government failed to mandate the reporting of outgoing adoptions. This resulted in issues of social justice and questions of the protection of children's rights under the 50 states' different sets of laws governing adoption. Although U. S. federal law was revised in 2012 when Congress passed the Inter-country Universal Adoption Accreditation Act, compliance was an issue and reports sent to the U. S. Department of State for inclusion in its annual report to Congress differed somewhat from those forwarded to The Hague. Further disparities between official and unofficial statistics resulted from the fact that if birth parents located potential adoptive parents outside of the U. S. without the help of a licensed agency, their transactions were not necessarily reported officially. This problem should have been corrected in 2014 when the Inter-Country Universal Accreditation Act took effect and required that all inter-country adoptions comply with the same accreditation standards as Hague Convention adoption cases.

It is largely because of the media that outgoing adoption became a social issue; but even now it is difficult to ascertain how many children born in the U. S. are internationally adopted, where they go, with whom and what are the adoption outcomes. This stands in sharp contrast to "countries, such as China, that historically had extensive pre-adoption and post-adoption reporting requirements spanning several years, documenting the home, safety, education and health conditions of the children adopted from their countries" (Engel et al. 2014).

Unofficial cases rose through 2013, with a growing number of states involved and an increasing number of countries seeking children for potential adoptive parents (Illien International Adoptions 2011). A statistical advisor to the United Nations confirmed what journalists had been saying for years when he noted that there were 309 outgoing adoptions from the U. S. in 2009, only 27 of which were reported to the Department of State. Journalists continued to bring the situation of outgoing adoptees to the public's attention, trying to right the wrongs they saw in the U. S. adoption system, trying to get others involved in making the system accountable for these children through regulation resulting in protection for them (Brown 2013). For example, Sophie Brown, in a report for CNN (2013), noted that while there were at least 205 outgoing adoptions to just five receiving countries in 2010, the Department of State reported only 43 as being sent out of the U. S. to *all* receiving countries.

Impact of the Media on Rehoming Children in Disrupted Adoptions

The role of media in shaping adoption policy is also apparent in rehoming. Somewhere between 10% and 20% of adoptions can be defined as failed, otherwise known as disrupted or dissolved. Disruption occurs when an adoption ends before it is finalized and legalized; dissolution occurs when the legal ties between the adoptive parents and the child are severed after the adoption has been finalized ("Responding to Rehoming …" 2015). *New York Times* reporter, Nicholas Kristof (2013), notes that this means as many as "24,000 foreign-born children are no longer with the families that adopted them." It is also possible that a child in a disrupted or dissolved adoption is American-born, but then he or she can go into the foster care system. Kristof (2013) argues that state foster care systems are reluctant to take an internationally adopted child. Moreover, according to Kristof (2013), giving such a child to the authorities may result in municipal or state investigations into possible abandonment, "abuse or (having to pay) for the child's care until new parents can be found."

There is an excellent report in social work focusing on risk factors in adoption disruption and dissolution, which was produced in 2010 by the University of Michigan in partnership with Hennepin County (Jones and LaLiberte 2010). In terms of the child's characteristics, age, special needs, and continued attachment to the birth family are defined as risk factors for disrupted adoptions. The role of race and gender is less clear. Among the family characteristics that are important are the adoptive mother's educational level (a higher level raises the risk of disruption) and the adoptive parents' ages are negatively correlated with the risk, as is religiosity. Agency practices also affect disruption. Rehoming is less likely to occur when children are placed with adults they know, especially relatives or their prior foster parents. Similarly, caseworker consistency and provision of supportive pre- and post-adoption services may prevent the need for rehoming.

In the past, disruption and dissolution were rarely discussed in public. Agencies worried that families would be reluctant to become prospective adoptive parents, and also feared that foreign governments might limit or eliminate the availability of their children to families from the U. S. But by 2017, even a catalog from Jockey International, the men's and women's clothing company, highlighted the existence of disruptions. This company's private charity, the Jockey for Family Foundation, Ltd., exists to raise awareness and funding for post adoption services. Their catalog introduced a stuffed bear and proceeds from its sale were to help support such non-profit, private services nationally and locally (JockeyforFamily.com, home page, 2017).

Private rehoming, with no agency or government oversight, is infrequently studied in the professional adoption literature although there are some relevant articles in law journals (Jordan 2015; Huber 2008; Roman 2015). The Donaldson Institute, a major research component of the professional U.S. adoption community, did not even mention rehoming in its December 2012 report, *Untangling the Web: The Internet's Transformative Impact on Adoption*, by Jeanne Howard. Adam Pertman, then executive Director of the Donaldson Institute, acknowledged the Institute did not talk about rehoming, or even know about it (PBS *NewsHour* 2013). But in December 2013, when *Untangling the Web II: A Research-based Roadmap for Reform* by Amy Whitesel and Jeanne Howard was published, the omission was corrected.

Adoption professionals in The Center for Adoption Support and Education, Child Welfare League of America, Congressional Coalition on Adoption Institute, Dave Thomas Foundation for Adoption, Donaldson Adoption Institute, North American Council on Adoptable Children and Voice for Adoption prefer the term "unregulated custody transfer" because:

> The term "rehoming" has long been associated with pet owners seeking new homes for their animals. Co-opting this term commonly used in connection with pets to describe underground child custody transfers suggests a benign practice and should not be used in the child welfare field as we work to positively impact human lives. ("Responding to Rehoming …." 2015).

"The Reuters Study"

A major investigative report by Megan Twohey and a team of Reuters reporters brought issues involved in rehoming to the attention of the public and caused states to react quickly to the problem (Twohey 2013). Reuters' use of "rehoming," as opposed to the longer and more formal terms, "disrupted adoption" or "unregulated custody transfer," became popular in the media and, therefore, the term "rehoming" is used in the present article. The U. S. Government Accounting Office specifically credits media with bringing about its 2015 study, "Steps Have Been Taken to Address Unregulated Custody Transfers of Adopted Children," stating "recent media reports have illuminated a practice involving unregulated custody transfers of adopted children" (USGAO, Steps Have Been Taken … 2015).

The study referred to an analysis of Internet sites where adoptive parents could place advertisements seeking new homes for their children; and similarly, those seeking a child could place an ad. Usually, no money changed hands and the whole procedure was legal – a simple, notarized letter transferred guardianship from one set of parents to another. This was not always considered a new adoption, but sometimes merely indicated new guardianship.

The Adoptive Parents

The advertisements reveal the desperation of some parents and the media capitalized on the most lurid and appalling cases to make their point. In describing her 11-year-old adoptive son from Guatemala, one mother stated: "I am ashamed to say it, but we do truly hate this boy." Kristof (2013) repeated Twohey's (2013) illustration of another mother who stated she was so desperate she would have given her daughter to a serial killer.

Adoptive parents may find themselves overwhelmed

because of idiosyncratic or private troubles, including illness, alcoholism or drug addiction, infidelity, or incarceration. But more often adoptive parents turned to the Internet because of problems in the adoption system. According to Twohey (PBS *NewsHour* 2013), the parents felt the agencies through which they adopted did not provide adequate training. Those adopting internationally, which is inter-cultural, often transracial, and frequently involves children traumatized by institutionalization, are offered a minimum of a ten-hour course in preparation for adoption, while those adopting domestically are offered a minimum of a 27-hour course (GAO September 16, 2015). Twohey also reported that the parents felt the children's emotional and behavioral problems had not been disclosed or were actually denied by the adoption agency. In essence, the parents had been lied to about the problems of the child and sometimes about the child's age. When the parents struggled to deal with these unexpected problems, the agency would not or could not help them. Finally, according to Twohey, if the parents turned to their state's government child welfare system:

> …they didn't get any assistance. In fact, they were often told that if they wanted to relinquish their child to the state foster care system, they could face charges of abuse and neglect and put other children in their home in jeopardy (PBS *NewsHour* 2013).

In the absence of institutional protections in the form of agency policies or government regulations, the rehoming underground is largely lawless, leaving children "at risk for abuse and psychological damage" (Kunz 2014). Prospective parents seeking to adopt may be attracted to a rehoming website because it is low- or no-cost, as contrasted with the tens of thousands of dollars typically paid in international or private domestic adoptions. In addition, the new parents may become eligible for certain tax deductions or credits. They also like the fact that the process is quick – often under a week – as opposed to the months or years entailed in regulated adoptions. Finally, they avoid the entire vetting process, including checks on their mental health, immigration status, criminal record, home, and economic resources. Informal, unregulated custody transfer gives the undocumented and the poor a chance to adopt, but it does the same for the criminal and those with serious mental problems or records for sex offenses, including pedophilia. Unfortunately, therefore, unregulated custody transfer has the potential to turn into trading or trafficking of children.

Ads on Internet Rehoming Sites

Adoptive parents ill-prepared for the situations in which they find their families, and often left without assistance from the government or the private agencies that they dealt with, may be so desperate that they will do anything to find a new home for their adopted child. "Adoption-from-Disruption," a major easily accessible Yahoo site, was created in September 2007 to help struggling people seeking support from other adoptive families, but it also quickly became a clearinghouse for unwanted children. Reuters' reporters led by Megan Twohey completed a content analysis of over 5,000 messages on the site for the five-year period from September 2007 to September 2012 (Twohey 2013). Although the study had some methodological problems in which some cases may have been counted more than once, it certainly gave an indication of the extent of the child exchange on the Internet.

Reporters identified 261 children advertised, with some offered more than once (Twohey 2013). At the time the study was done, the children lived in 34 different states. Most of the children (at least 70%) had been born abroad; at least eight percent were born in the U. S.; the birthplace of the child was unclear in the remaining 22% of the ads. The foreign-born children came from 23 different countries, with the largest number being from Ethiopia (N = 29), Russia (N = 26), Ukraine (N= 20), China (N = 20), Liberia (N = 16), and Haiti (N =14). No more than five children came from any other country. Girls (N = 135) slightly outnumbered boys (N = 123); in three cases, the reporters could not identify the gender of the child. Most children were between the ages of six and 14, but one was only ten months old; there is no indication of their ages when they were first adopted. Many of the children were said to have problems, usually attachment disorders (N = 106). Far less often, they were described as perpetrators of physical abuse (N = 25) or victims of physical or sexual abuse (N = 12). Even in successful adoptions, children adopted internationally often experience psychological and behavioral problems (Hjern et al. 2002; Judge 2003; Lindblad et al. 73; Tieman et al. 2005; Von Borczyskowski et al. 2006; Weitzman 2003).

Once Reuters shared Twohey's findings with Yahoo, the company quickly shut down the rehoming site. Reuters identified more than 500 users of the site as "members" who posted ads over the period studied; 184 people were members just before the site was shut down. The Yahoo site was one of eight in operation at the time. In addition, *Craigslist* accepted ads for rehoming as long as there was no mention of money involved for

the transfer of custody. *Facebook* was involved too. Unlike Yahoo, *Facebook* refused to intervene. Their spokesperson stated:

> … the Internet is a reflection of society, and people are using for it for all kinds of communications and to tackle all sorts of problems, including very complicated issues (such as rehoming) (Vogt, 2013).

In criticizing this response, Vogt (2013) commented on a WNYC blog that:

> Facebook's decisions about what to censor and what to let lie are often head-scratchers….Usually the arbitrariness inherent in these decisions is silly and frustrating but not deeply consequential. Here, the difference is that actual human misery seems to be furthered by Facebook's permissiveness.

Additional Sources of Information about Unregulated Custody Transfers

In almost all cases, whatever information the Reuters' reporters had was contained in the ads. However, in some instances court records and newspaper accounts were obtained. For example, court records revealed one troubled girl from Russia was rehomed three times within six months and was sexually abused in one of the rehomed settings. Journalists tended to focus on the more memorable or sensational cases in their effort to make the public aware of how the adoption system was failing children. For example, New York Times reporter, Nicholas Kristof (2013), highlighted the report about a crippled polio survivor from China who wound up in a home with 18 children under the care of a woman with an "explosive temper." The woman confiscated the leg brace which the child needed to walk and, according to court records, ordered her to dig a hole in the backyard as a punishment for misbehavior. According to Kristof, the hole was to be her grave.

The case most frequently cited from the Reuters' expose was that of Quita, a Liberian teenager with severe health and behavioral problems. The adoptive family did not vet the people to whom they transferred her custody after their two-year struggle of trying to make the adoption work. If the parents had delved into the background of the family to whom they transferred custody of their daughter, they might have discovered the following: that child welfare authorities had taken away both of Nicole Eason's biological children; and that her then partner was serving time in a federal prison for trading in child pornography. They might have also learned that her current partner had serious health and legal problems.

Other children rehomed to the couple reported sexual abuse and having to sleep nude with the couple in their bed. A sheriff's report said "the parents have severe psychiatric problems as well as violent tendencies" (Twohey 2013). The only other so-called official document was what police described as a fake report supposedly written by a social worker after a home visit. The report actually had been written by Nicole Eason using a form she downloaded from the Internet.

Several days after transferring custody, the original adoptive mother called to check on Quita. She then discovered the girl and her new guardians had vanished. Furthermore, Quita had never shown up at the school in which she was to be registered.

Legal Considerations

When Quita and her new parents were found in another state, no charges were pressed against either adult, despite the fact that their action violated The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC). Though not specifically directed against private rehoming, the ICPC states that adopted children are not allowed to move across state lines unless state authorities are alerted. However, many people do not know about the existence of the ICPC or simply ignore it. Stephen Pennypacker, head of Florida's Department of Children and Families, acknowledged an agency often was unable to do much about ICPC violations because of the limited funding it received (Twohey 2013). So, the authorities merely put Quita on a bus alone to return to the family that had originally adopted her – and still did not want her (Twohey 2013). In January of 2011, ICPC administrators had warned child welfare authorities of the existence of underground rehomings, but this warning had no effect on the problem. Furthermore, if an unregulated custody transfer occurred within one state, there was no rule requiring court notification.

Sometimes adoptive parents turn to state agencies for help in a failed adoption. For example, in one case a family in New York State went to court to sue Spence Chapin and Cradle of Hope, the adoption agencies originally involved, for fraud. They wanted to get the agencies to relieve them of their parental responsibilities. The family argued that the agencies told them the children were healthy and well-adjusted when, in fact, they were neither. The children suffered "from serious mental disorders and are (after adoption) living in state mental health facilities" (Traster 2014). The judge, who equated private rehoming with child

trafficking, refused to vacate the adoption and ruled that the parents were not relieved of their parental rights. Judicial discretion enabled him to rule that they would have to get court approval to rehome the children even though in New York State rehoming is normally legal through completion of a notarized power of attorney form.

Judicial discretion is not the only variable in the patchwork of inconsistent state laws. Different laws govern adoptions and guardianship from state to state. Several states reacted quickly to Reuters' revelation. By 2014, five states passed laws to prevent private rehoming: Wisconsin, Colorado, Louisiana, Florida and Virginia. One year later Arkansas and Ohio also began cracking down on rehoming (Wetzstein 2015). Wisconsin's law, which has become a basic standard for such legislation, requires a petition and court hearing to decide if a transfer is in the best interest of a child. The procedure only applies to cases in which the parent delegates the care and custody of a child to another adult for longer than one year; transfer of care for less than one year requires no court involvement. Failure to file a petition may result in a fine of up to $10,000 and nine months in prison. The law also prohibits advertising, including Internet postings, "for the purpose of finding a child to adopt or to find an adoptive home for a child" (Kunz 2014). Although many other states had pre-existing idiosyncratic and disparate statutes that could conceivably be invoked to prevent private rehoming, a local newspaper specifically attributed Wisconsin's new rehoming law to the state legislature's reaction to the Reuters' study (Stout 2014). In other words, the Reuters report helped bring about and shape the model for legislation enacted to limit or totally eliminate underground transfers of the custody of adoptees.

Lawyers have raised concerns about whether criminalizing rehoming is the best solution to the problem. Zhang (2016: 29), who credits Reuters with making the public aware of rehoming, argues it may raise public awareness, encourage deterrence, and provide legal ways to terminate an adoption, while protecting the child in question. However, Zang (2016: 30) also says that criminalization may not be a serious enough punishment to be effective and certainly does not address the underlying causes of rehoming. Finally as she notes, criminalization brings costs - it may dissuade prospective adoptive parents from applying to adopt and it can disproportionately impact poorer families. Moreover, it can be disastrous for children remaining in the household if their parent is arrested, prosecuted and convicted (Zhang 2016: 31).

Social workers, who also credit the Reuters report with defining rehoming as a social problem, also have questioned the viability of criminalization, especially if it is not accompanied by further pre- and post-adoption training for parents. Laws regarding rehoming are a grey area in which states, the federal government and, at times, The Hague are all involved independently. McIntyre (2016) suggests that, at the very least, the federal government must do more to resolve the problem. McIntyre also suggests that redefining rehoming as child abuse could bring to bear the power of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA). He argues that such a redefinition would impact the states, all of which have mandatory child abuse reporting statutes. Failure to report cases of rehoming would result in a reduction of federal funds to a state. Simultaneously CAPTA could extend the national clearinghouse's role in collecting data on abuse. Finally, this Act could make use of the "national clearinghouse's training resource system to train applicable professionals on rehoming" (McIntyre 2016: 1143). McIntyre also proposed supplementary state actions in the form of Safe Haven Programs. These programs would allow parents "to relinquish their adoptive children within a certain period of time, at state sanctioned safe haven locations, such as hospitals or fire departments" (McIntyre 2016: 1142). The children could then be turned over to state agencies where they would be cared for until either being placed in foster care or adopted.

Private Agency Involvement in Rehoming

Early in the evolution of the rehoming underground, several agencies, including Christian Homes and Special Kids (CHASK), an agency originally focused on adoption and home schooling for special needs children and pregnancy counseling for their birth parents, added a program to facilitate the process of rehoming. The program was not legally authorized, did not perform home visits and did not conduct background checks. Though possibly well intentioned, it actually exacerbated a dangerous situation. For example, CHASK sent two children to Nicole Eason before her activities came to the attention of the public through the Reuters study.

More recently the Wasatch International Adoption Agency (WIAA), a private agency originally founded in 1997, in Utah, with the goal of facilitating inter-country adoptions and educating children in orphanages abroad, added a new program. Its "2nd Chance for Children" helps families who are struggling with a failing adoption. Families being considered for new adoptions must have a current home visit and background check

in the state in which they live. They are provided with school records as well as medical and psychological information. The adoption is finalized in a court of law just like any other domestic adoption. Families that are placing a child for re-adoption are able to read about prospective families and "actively participate in the matching process in order to find the right home for their child" (2nd Chance for Kids 2017).

The program's self-assessment defines it as successful in empathizing with adoptive families so they know they have done all they could to make their situation work given the resources they had. The program's self-assessment also says it succeeds because new parents have a great deal of information about the child and so are prepared to "parent a child from an adoption dissolution" (2nd Chance for Kids 2017). WIAA charges the placing family $1500 for its services. It helps the family find an attorney near home to ensure that they meet their state's requirements for placement of a child; the attorney's fees vary also from state to state. There are no external assessments of the agency's process or success and there does not appear to be a consensus among judges approving re-adoptions.

Since 2006, the Council on Accreditation (COA) has served as a national accrediting entity authorized by the U. S. Department of State to provide adoption agencies with Hague Accreditation and Approval, but in late 2018 it will conclude its role as an authorized accrediting entity. COA established a rigorous accreditation and approval process as well as mechanisms to monitor and oversee the performance of Hague Accredited agencies and Hague Approved persons. COA is not involved with agencies that are not Hague approved. Thus, COA has little or no role in re-adoption procedures.

In addition to individual agencies, there are advocacy groups that provide detailed information about legal re-adoption. One such group is Rainbow Kids (2015), which publishes checklists for prospective parents on how to determine if they are good candidates to legally readopt. The Rainbow Kids checklists also provide questions prospective parents should ask the placing agency. These include asking about the information the agency placing should provide about the child; access to pre- and post-adoption services, as well as a list of costs.

Government Publications on Post-Adoption Services

While Rainbow Kids is a private organization that targets prospective re-adoptive parents, the Child Welfare Information Gateway (2012) is a service provided by the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services. The Child Welfare Information Gateway is a congressionally-mandated and -funded information service of the U. S. Children's Bureau, Administration for Children and Families. The Gateway provides extensive information for adoptive parents in need of post-adoption services. It discusses post-adoption issues that families often encounter: the need for support depending on age and developmental stages; loss and grief; trust and attachment; identity formation; family dynamics and adoption adjustment (e.g., parents' grief over infertility); birth family connections; difficulties that result from children's early experiences (trauma, health issues, developmental delays); and school issues. Types of post-adoption services are described and sources of additional information, including websites, are indicated. These include support groups; camps; social and heritage events; therapy and counseling; respite care; as well as educational resources (books, websites, workshops, seminars and conferences). Finally, the Child Welfare Information Gateway lists private and public organizations that provide services and support groups. Suggestions are made as to how to find financial assistance to pay for the services and ways to advocate for such services if none exist. While the information is extensive, being able to find and use it requires a considerable amount of education and facility using a computer. The Child Welfare Information Gateway does not provide oversight of adoption agencies, but lists only licensed agencies and provides extensive information about print and digital adoption resources. Such resources may help adoptive parents cope with the problems they face and so make rehoming less likely to occur.

Federal Response to Data Collection Problems

In September 2015, the U. S. Government Accounting Office (USGAO) acknowledged that media reports "have illuminated a practice of unregulated custody transfers of adopted children" (USGAO 2015). In response, the GAO launched a study to examine the reasons that adoptive families consider unregulated transfers; the services that exist to support these families before they make such a decision; what is known about the prevalence of such transfers; and what actions various states and the federal government had taken to address such transfers. Clearly, government efforts should also include investigation of the accuracy of information supplied to prospective adoptive parents prior to their decision to adopt a specific child.

The GAO study reviewed relevant federal laws and state regulations. In addition its staff interviewed officials from federal and state agencies, as well as from private

adoption agencies. The staff also searched online sites for "illustrative examples of families who may be considering unregulated transfers" (USGAO 2015).

The USGAO study concluded that the parents might not be prepared for the complex problems they and their adopted children face, especially if the children had experienced lengthy institutionalization or trauma. Furthermore, parents might find it difficult to locate therapists familiar with adoption issues. Even if they can find such professionals, they may not be able to afford intensive services such as residential care. For example, a Donaldson study revealed that, in 2010, residential care in Tennessee cost $65,000 per year, while the state's annual adoption subsidy was only $4,824 (Smith 2010). These issues might lead adoptive parents to consider unregulated transfers.

Unregulated transfers occur without oversight and so are difficult to track and, as the USGAO (2015) noted, "no federal agency keeps statistics on their occurrence." But by 2015, seven states had taken steps to address the problem of rehoming, either by enacting new laws to criminalize unregulated custody transfers or by restricting advertisements for them. Other states tried to apply existing laws to rehoming. However, the USGAO was quick to note investigations were time-consuming and costly for understaffed and underfunded agencies. This echoed the comments of Pennypacker, Director of the Florida Department of Children and Families, noted above. As of 2015, the Department of State planned to revise pre-adoption training requirements and "review their policies to address unregulated transfers" (USGAO Sept 2015).

A critique of the GAO study appeared on the blog of Mirah Riben, who researches, writes about and speaks on the adoption industry. Riben is encouraged "to see any federal level of oversight of adoption," but is quick to add a generally negative evaluation of the study:

> [O]ne wonders the cost to taxpayers to have these bean-counters confirm what we knew two years ago and decide that they MAY increase the number of hours of training for pre-adoptive parents and *encourage states to do more about this very serious threat to the safety and well-being of adopted children.*

Judging from her comment about "bean counters," Riben found more value in the earlier (2013) Reuters' study than that by the GAO.

While the federal government is yet to enhance its oversight functions or correct its data collection system, there have been congressional hearings to curb private rehoming of adopted children. Rep. James R Langevin, Democrat from Rhode Island and Co-chair of the Congressional Caucus on Foster Youth, has been at the forefront of federal efforts. He was the lead sponsor of a 2014 amendment to the 2008 Protecting Adopted Children Act. The amendment would provide for pre- and post-adoptive counseling, funding for counseling for adopted children, peer mentoring for adoptive parents and staffing for a 24-hour emergency hotline. However, the bill was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on February 22nd, 2016, and has not progressed from there.

CONCLUSION

A combination of several media – newspapers, television, and the Internet, including social media – have had a significant impact on U.S. adoption policy in at least two instances: regulation of adoption of children from the U. S. to other countries and regulation of rehoming. Hopefully, this analysis will lead to a discussion among the public, politicians, adoption professionals and adoptees about the power of media to help bring about socio-legal changes that can operate in the best interests of the children and so improve the lives of adoptees. These changes might include greater transparency in adoption, more information and training for prospective adoptive parents, access to and subsidies for therapy for those adoptees who need it, and education for the helping professionals so that they can be prepared to help families confronting the difficulties of challenging adoptions. It may also suggest that reporters and investigative journalists, increasingly distrusted by politicians and segments of the public for what has been termed "fake news," can be recognized for their important work. The specific illustrations may offer some ideas as to how to harness the power of the media to help improve the U. S. adoption system, while simultaneously minimizing the negative impact other (social) media sometimes have exerted on the adoption process.

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About the Author: Madeline H. Engel is a Professor of Sociology at Lehman College, City University of New York. Her publications include five books on substance abuse, social inequality and minorities in the U. S., including two on fictional female detectives. She has also written numerous articles, including six on adoption issues. Engel teaches required introductory courses in sociology as well as electives in Juvenile Justice and U. S. Adoption Policy. The main focus of her writing and teaching is social justice and the rights of children.

Does Breaking Through the "Final Glass Ceiling" Really Pave the Way for Subsequent Women to Become Heads of State?

By

Katherine Rocha, Joseph Palazzo, Rebecca Teczar and Roger Clark

Rhode Island College

Abstract

Women's ascension to the role of national president or prime minister of any country is a relatively new phenomenon in world history. The first woman to break the "final glass ceiling," Sirinavo Bandaranaike of Ceylon (Sri Lanka today), did it in 1960, just 58 years ago. Since then, the ceiling has been broken in about 83 nations worldwide, but we still know little about what it takes for women to achieve such national leadership roles. Previous research (e.g., Jalalzai, 2013; Skard, 2015) has pointed to the importance of family connections, political turmoil, and the nature of a country's political system. But only one study (Jalalzai, 2013) provided quantitative, cross-national support for any of these observations. Our paper replicates Jalalzai's analysis, done using data from the first decade of the twenty-first century, with data from the second decade. We find that there have been dramatic changes over time. We find that family connections are now no more useful for explaining women's rise to presidencies and prime ministerial positions than men's; that, in fact, women are now more likely to rise in politically stable nation states than in fragile ones. And, perhaps most importantly, women are much more likely to ascend to the highest positions in countries where they have already broken the "final glass ceiling."

Keywords: final glass ceiling, women presidents, women prime ministers

Introduction

Following Hillary Clinton's loss in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, it was reasonable to ask about the degree to which a "final" glass ceiling really does exist on women's ascendance to the apex of political power. Clinton's Republican opponent was a flawed candidate and, while many, including that candidate, observed that she was flawed as well, there were nearly as many who claimed that she was uniquely qualified to be president. At the Democratic National Convention that nominated her then President Obama suggested, "there has never been a man or a woman—not me, not Bill [Clinton], nobody—more qualified than Hillary Clinton to serve as president of the United States of America." Given these comments, is it reasonable to believe that there were in fact extra barriers, associated with being female, that made Clinton's candidacy more challenging than if she'd been male: is there, in effect, a genuine "glass ceiling"?

In a course on the Sociology of Gender we had learned that, while such a ceiling might exist in individual countries, it could certainly be shattered. By the middle of 2018, for example, 83 countries had had a female head of government or state (see Appendix). We also knew two other things that seemed important. The first was that the number of women ascending to the role of head of government or state has increased every decade after 1960, when Sirinavo Bandaranaike, of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), became the world's first elected female leader. Three women had been elected in the 1960s; five had ascended in the 1970s; nine (some being repeats) in the 1980s; 33 gained either a presidency or prime ministerial position in the 1990s; 37 in the 2000s; and 60 in the 2010s by middle of 2018 when we began this project (Wikipedia, 2018a). The second thing we thought we knew is that, increasingly, women were ascending to presidential and prime ministerial positions in countries where there had been a previous woman president or prime minister. Having had a

woman in high office seemed to make some difference for the chances of women's future. Thus, we were aware that Theresa May was not the first female Prime Minister of the United Kingdom; Jacinda Ardern, not the first in New Zealand; Erna Solberg, not the first in Norway. This led us to wonder whether we might not now find sufficient global evidence to show conclusively that breaking of the "final" glass ceiling (i.e., access to the presidency or the position of prime minister) makes a real difference for subsequent women aspirants to a nation's top political job?

Previous Research

Cross-national research on women presidents and prime ministers remains somewhat meager and is largely based on qualitative analyses of individual cases. Michael Genovese's groundbreaking (1993) study examined seven women presidents and prime ministers, suggesting that women could rise to top positions in situations that covered the complete ideological spectrum. Indira Gandhi, for instance, who was not a feminist, claimed for her self the "title of only man in a cabinet of old women" (Jalalzai, 2013: 13). On the other hand, Gro Harlem Brundtland, prime minister of Norway enacted what many regard as a feminist agenda and appointed numerous women to cabinet posts. There have been several book-length biographies and autobiographies (e.g., Thatcher, 1995; Brundtland, 2002). There have also been article-length biographies that placed their subjects in larger regional contexts (Adams, 2008; Hodson, 1997).

Two wonderful books provide details about all of the women who had become presidents and prime ministers before 2010: Farida Jalalzai's (2013) *Shattered, Cracked, or Firmly Intact?* and Torild Skard's (2015) *Women of Power: Half a Century of Female Presidents and Prime Ministers Worldwide*. We used these two books extensively in the preparation of this article, first for the details they supply and second for their larger contextual insights. Jalalzai's book has a chapter, in fact, in which she provides what we believe to be the only cross-national quantitative analysis of the variables that are associated with women's ascension to the highest executive offices in their countries during the 2000s. The purpose of our essay is to replicate Jalalzai's analysis for the post-2010 decade, with particular focus on the salience of being in a country where a woman has already broken through the "final glass ceiling."

THE EFFECT OF BREAKING THE FINAL GLASS CEILING

There are several reasons to believe that once the "final glass ceiling" has been broken subsequent women candidates will find it easier to attain the highest executive offices in a nation. One of course is our anecdotal "sense" that this may be the case. In Bangladesh, for instance, two women, Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina, widely known as the "Battling Begums," have fought over and exchanged the position of prime minister ever since Zia broke that glass ceiling in 1991. If women in a predominantly Muslim country, our intuition tells us, can not only acquire, through election, the dominant position of executive power, but also maintain it for over 27 years, there must be something going on. Of course, the history of women in politics would, unfortunately, challenge our intuition that it has been particularly difficult for women in Muslim countries to attain the most prominent executive position. In addition to Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, Turkey, Senegal, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan and Mali have to date had female presidents or prime ministers. But we wanted to be careful about generalizing from anecdotal evidence. History records quite a few "one offs"—women (like Prime Minister Edith Cresson of France) who, so far, have been the only woman to attain high executive office in their country. So, even after nearly 60 years of women having first broken the ultimate glass ceiling, and even with the increasing number of countries in which this has been done, our intuition alone may be misleading.

There are other, more theoretically satisfying, reasons to believe that once a woman has attained the highest executive office, she has successfully paved the way for others. One has to do with what sociologists and political scientists call "demonstration effects," or the effects on individuals' behavior after having observed of the actions of others and their consequences. Once a woman has become president or prime minister, other women may be inspired to try to do so. Moreover, the social meaning of high executive office is apt to be altered, as both men and women become less likely to associate such offices with men and as beliefs in the possibilities of women as political figures are enhanced (e.g., Sapiro, 1981; Dahlerupe, 2006).

More specifically, students of women's pursuit of high office point to a number of reasons why women fail to win, or even compete. Lawless and Fox (2010), for instance, stress how the majority of women see sexism in politics, underestimate their own qualifications, fail

to be recruited by political elites, and/or doubt their chances, should they run. Partly as a consequence, women have been more likely to direct their energies to changing the world by participating in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) than into running for office (Kenschaft, Clark and Ciambrone, 2016: 262). Once one female candidate proves successful, however, party elites are likely to view women candidacies more favorably, as are voters (Jalalzai, 2013: 120).

In her quantitative analysis of women in premier executive offices around the world during the first decade of the 21st century, Jalalzai (2013) found that there was already a weak relationship between women being in such positions and another woman already having been there, other things being equal. Our hunch is that after 2010, with more women achieving high office than ever before, and with more women having done so before then, that the relationship will prove even stronger than it did in Jalalzai's analysis. In short, we speculate that *the more cracks there have been in final glass ceilings, the more women will be found to have successfully broken through them*.

We identify our hypotheses regarding other variables in the next section.

Method

We had to be a little imaginative in our attempt to update Jalalzai's (2013) analysis for women in office. But in doing so, we had a good model. Unlike most cross-sectional analysts, Jalalzai used the whole decade rather than a single year as the focus for her examination. Thus, a nation was counted as having had a woman leader if, at any time during the decade, a woman had been president or prime minister. Women whose terms had begun in the 1990s but extended into the 2000s were counted as well.

Our "women leader" variable, 2010-2018, was coded "1" if the country had a female president or prime minister at any time between the beginning of 2010 and June of 2018, when we completed our analysis; "0", if it did not. We did not count "acting" presidents or prime ministers in our analysis. We do this on grounds that we are interested in what it takes for women to get full-term leadership positions in nations, and "acting" presidents and prime ministers are far more likely than others to have had terms that ended in days or weeks. Our data for this variable came from Wikipedia (2018a). Despite Wikipedia's well-known disadvantages for academic research, it had one great advantage for ours: no other easily available source keeps as current about basic facts about the world as it does. We similarly used Wikipedia to measure our main independent variable: that is, the countries that had had female presidents or prime minister before the current decade.

Things got more complicated when we measured the control variables. Jalalzai (2013) had found that the best predictor of whether a woman led a country was whether a family member (parent, spouse, sibling, uncle/aunt) had led the country at an earlier point in time. Many of the early women leaders had, in fact, been related to such a leader. Indira Gandhi (daughter) and Eva Peron (wife) are but two famous examples. However, the variable, "family connection," requires not only that we know about the family background of women leaders during the 2010-2018 period, but also the background of male leaders for countries that had no female leaders. This raised the question: which male leader(s)? During the typical decade, the United States might, for instance, have either two or three leaders, all of whom, so far, have been male. Jalalzai is not clear about how she selected the male leader(s) about whom she garnered information. Consequently, we made the decision that we would gather information about the most recent male leader (as of 2018) or leaders (in countries that have dual executives—both a president and a prime minister). Again we relied on Wikipedia's data on which male leader(s) was (were) the most recent. Then we read Wikipedia's descriptions of all male and female leaders to determine who had had a relative (parent, uncle/aunt, sibling or spouse) who had also been a president or prime minister. If a country had two males in top leadership positions, we classified it as a country where the leader had a familial connection if only one of the leaders had such a connection. Because we needed to read more than 400 Wikipedia entries (first to find out who current leaders were and then to glean backgrounds about all leaders), we will refrain from listing all our references here. *We hypothesized that women national leaders would ascend more regularly in contexts where they had family ties than would male leaders.*

Jalalzai found that two political variables were strongly, and significantly, associated with women's ascension to executive leadership during the decade of the 2000s. We have already mentioned one variable: whether a country had a dual executive (both a president and a prime minister). In dual-executive systems, Jalalzai reasoned, women have a better chance of being elected, since there are twice as many executive positions open to them. Here again we relied on whether the Wikipedia description of a nation's political system showed that

there was both a president and prime minister present. Following Jalalzai, *we hypothesized that countries with dual executive systems are more likely to have had women leaders than those with single executive systems.*

The second political variable was a country's electoral system. Jalalzai found the presence of a multiparty electoral system to be associated with the presence of a female executive. She believed this was the case because, in both presidential and prime ministerial systems, *the presence of more than two viable parties gives women a better chance of being elected*: in presidential systems, because women gain a chance of making it into run-off elections and thereby gaining widespread recognition; in prime ministerial systems, because coalition governments give women a chance of becoming a consensus candidate. We used the Wikipedia (2018b) "List of Ruling Parties by Country" to determine whether a country had a multiparty system in 2018.

Jalalzai examined three variables that can be considered indicators of the potential supply of women candidates for high executive office: the percentage of a national legislature (the lower house, if there is more than one chamber) that is female (Women Legislators); the percentage of cabinet members or ministers that is female (Women Ministers); and the number of years women have had the right to vote (Suffrage). *We hypothesized that all three of these variables, Women Legislators, Women Ministers, and Suffrage, would be positively associated with the presence of a women president or prime minister*, even though only Women Legislators proved to have a significant association in Jalalzai's analysis.[1]

There are three more political-system variables that Jalalzai thought would be associated with women's presence in high executive office. Along with Skard (2015), Jalalzai felt that *purely presidential systems (Presidential) were less likely than most other systems to have female leaders* because successful candidates depend on a plurality of the voting public choosing them—and women need to overcome widespread prejudice. Jalalzai thought, on the other hand, that *two kinds of dual executive systems are particularly likely to elevate women candidates: those with a strong, but not dominant, president and a stronger prime minister (Strong Presidential) and those with a weak president and dominant prime minister (Weak Presidential).* [2]

There are four more variables that rounded out Jalalzai's model for predicting women's access to high executive office: the fragility of the state; the gender-related development of the country; whether the country is a nuclear power; and whether it ranks among the world's largest economies (i.e., is a member of the G-20 group of nations). Based upon their observation that many of the early women presidents and prime ministers emerged in states that were politically unstable (e.g., Gandhi in India, Isabel Peron in Argentina, Corazon Aquino in the Philippines and Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan), both Jalalzai (2013) and Skard (2015) believed that women were more likely to fill the vacuum in relatively fragile states than in ones where political institutions were more firmly set. Consequently, Jalalzai (2013) hypothesized that *countries with higher levels of state fragility are more likely to be governed by a woman.*[3]

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The final two hypotheses relate to nations' international stature. Based on survey research, Jalalzai concluded that people feel less comfortable with women than men when it comes to economic and military matters. As a consequence, she *predicted that G-20 countries and countries with nuclear capabilities would be less likely to have female executives*. Jalalzai found support only for the hypothesis about nuclear capability with her 2000s

[1] We obtained data about Women Legislators from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2018); about Women Ministers from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2017); and about Suffrage from Wikipedia (2018c).

data. However, since one of our goals is to see how things may have changed between the 2000s and the 2010s, we incorporated data on both G-20 membership (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2018) and whether a country has a nuclear capability (Wikipedia, 2018d) in our analysis as well.

We use four kinds of quantitative analysis. To describe bivariate relationships, we utilize both cross-tabulation, to show the strength of our key relationship, and correlation analysis to compare the zero-order relationships of each of the independent variables with women's presence in high executive office. To examine the controlled associations of these variables and to compare these controlled associations in our more recent time frame (2010-2018) with Jalalzai's earlier one (2000-2010), we use logistical regression, because women's presence in either a presidential or prime ministerial role is a dichotomous variable. As a further check on our findings we use forward conditional logistical regression, to determine the most economical model, given the 13 independent variables, for predicting women's presence in either role.

Table 1. Relationship between the Ascension of a Woman to the Position of President or Prime Minister and Having Had a Woman as President or Prime Minister in the Past

	A Woman ***Currently*** President of Prime Minister		
A Woman ***Previously*** President or Prime Minister	**Yes**	**No**	**Total**
Yes	56.8%	43.2%c	100%
	(25)	(19)	(44)
No	13.9%	86.1%	100%
	(24)	(149)	(173)
			N Total = 217

Notes: Chi-square = 37.0; significance < .001; Cramer's V = .41

Results

Our first question concerned the relationship between the presence of a woman president or prime minister in a country in the 2010s and the presence of a previous women leader earlier in the country's history. **Table 1** shows that, of the 44 countries that had a women leader before the 2010s, more than half (56.8 percent, or 25) had a woman president or prime minister between 2010 and 2018. In contrast, of the 173 countries that had not had a female leader before 2010, only 13.9 percent (or 24) added one between 2010 and 2018. Thus, the data indicate that women were about four times more likely to attain a presidency or prime ministerial position in countries where a woman had already done so than in countries where a woman still needed to break through this glass ceiling for the first time. **(See Table 1.)**

The rivalry that has developed between Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh is perhaps the most vivid example of the significance of the final glass ceiling's shattering, as well as other patterns pointed to by Jalalzai (2013) and Skard (2015). First, both Zia and Hasina were related to former leaders of Bangladesh: Zia was the widow of Ziaur Rahman, former president; Hasina, the daughter of Sheihk Mujibur Rahman, the first president and political leader of the country. Bangladesh is also a country with a multi-party system, and while Zia's Bangladesh National Party won a plurality of the seats in the 1991 parliamentary elections, she would not have attained the position of Prime Minister had she not been able to negotiate a coalition government with one of the other parties. After that point, the Bangladeshi electorate has gone into elections, knowing that Zia or Hasina would become prime minister.

Bangladesh thus illustrates three propositions: first, that, once the final glass ceiling is opened, women find it easier to attain top executive positions; second, that women are more likely than men to benefit from a relative who's been in high office; and third, that multi-party systems can enable women's access to the most prominent political roles in their countries.

But how do these propositions, and others, stand up to cross-national scrutiny? **Table 2** suggests mixed results. A Pearson r of .41 suggests, again, that countries that have had a previous female leader were much more likely than others to have done so during the 2010s. Moreover, a Pearson's r of .25 suggests

both a moderately-strong and a significant zero-order association between the presence of a multi-party system and the presence of a woman executive. But a correlation of -.02 suggests that, during the 2010s, women presidents and prime ministers were no more advantaged by family connections than their male counterparts. There was Sheikh Hasina, daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, of Bangladesh, but so was there Justin Trudeau, son of Pierre Trudeau, of Canada.

Some of the other variables we thought might be associated with the presence of women presidents and prime ministers proved to be so, when no controls were used. However, one of these was strongly related to it in exactly the opposite way to which we anticipated. Thus, the second strongest zero-order correlate of women's presence was the degree to which a state was fragile, but the correlation (-.32) was negative, not positive. There are still some examples of women, like Hasina in Bangladesh, who head fragile states. But, increasingly over time, this has become the exception, not the rule. Thus, Australia, Chile, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, South Korea, Latvia, Mauritius, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Romania, Singapore, Slovenia, Switzerland, and Great Britain, among other countries that the Fund for Peace classifies as relatively non-fragile states, had female leaders during the 2010s. In fact, if countries are dichotomously divided into more and less fragile states (dividing them at the median of the fragility index), about 38 percent of less fragile states had a woman president or prime minister in the 2010s, while only about 16 percent of more fragile states did so. Of the twenty *least* fragile states, ten (United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, New Zealand, Portugal, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, and Finland) had a woman president or prime minister during the 2010s.

Other variables that had a significant zero-order association with the presence of women in a top executive position during the 2010s were the presence of a dual executive (r=.14), the presence of a weak presidency (r=.21), the percentage of the legislature that is female (r=.22), the percentage of government ministers or cabinet members that is female (r=.18), how long women have had the vote (r=.26), and the gender development index (r=.20). G-20 membership was another variable that had a significant relationship (r=.12) with women's presence in an executive leadership position, but its relationship was positive, not negative as expected. Angela Merkel (Germany), Teresa May (England), and Park Geun-hye (South Korea) had occasion to attend G-20 meetings during the 2010s. Two variables that we did not find to have a significant zero-order association with the presence of a woman president or prime minister were the presence of a strong president and the holding of a nuclear arsenal. **(See Table 2.)**

Table 2. Correlation of the Presence of Women Presidents and Prime Ministers with 13 Independent Variables

Independent Variables	Pearson's r
Dual Executive	.14* (185)
Weak President	.21*** (177)
Strong President	-.05 (177)
Women in Legislature	.21*** (188)
Women in Ministries or Cabinets	.18** (187)
Number of Years Women Have Had Vote	.26**** (197)
Gender Development Index	.20** (156)
Fragile State Index	-.32**** (179)
Multi-party System	.25**** (208)
Family Connection	-.02 (181)
Previous Women President or Prime Minister	.41**** (217)
Nuclear State	.01 (217)
G-20 Member	.12*

Notes: N is in parentheses. * indicates significance at the.10 level; **, at the .05 level; ***, at the .01 level; and ****, at the .001 level.

We performed logistical regressions to determine which of the independent variables retained a significant relationship with the presence of women presidents and prime ministers when other variables were controlled. **Table 3** presents three sets of regressions: the first column shows Jalalzai's regression results for

independent variables and women leaders from 2000 to 2010; the second column shows regression results for the same independent variables and women leaders from 2010 to 2018; the third column presents a forward conditional regression for women leaders from 2010 to 2018. [4] **(See Table 3.)**

Table 3: Logistic Regressions of the Presence of Women Leaders on 13 Independent Variables

	Regression Coefficients		
	Jalalzai's Model	**Full Model 2010-2018**	**Forward Conditional 2010-2018, Final Model**
Dual Executive	2.87**	- .93	
Presidential	1.47	-.25	
Weak President	-.45	1.84	
Strong President	-.61	1.31	
Women in Legislature	06*	1.42	
Women as Ministers	-.00	.01	
Time Since Women Vote	.00	-.01	
Gender Development Index	2.37		
Fragility of State	-.01	-.02	-.03***
Multi-party System	2.07***	1.22**	1.14**
Family Connection	1.43***	.30	
Prior Women Rule	.87*	1.57***	1.60****
Nuclear	-2.42*	-1.69	
G-20 Membershi	.50	.11	
Constant	-13.2	13.5	-.63
N	(147)	(140)	(140)

Notes: Ns are in parentheses in the last row of this table. * indicates significance at the.10 level; **, at the .05 level; ***, at the .01 level; and ****, at the .001 level.

Perhaps most notable about the comparison of the 2000s and 2010s models is the diminution over time of the importance of family connections and the increasing salience of both the presence of previous women leaders and the lack of fragility in the state. The final model for the forward conditional regression for the period 2010-2018 finds only three variables having significant relationships with the presence of women as presidents and prime ministers in this period. And the variable with the strongest and most significant relationship is the one that confirms the hunch that was the springboard of this analysis: the presence of a previous woman president or prime minister.

CONCLUSION

One lesson of the current analysis is that, perhaps given the historical novelty of woman presidents and prime ministers, identifying the best predictors of their presence is challenging. What was useful for doing so during the first decade of the twenty-first century has become less useful in the second. For instance, while the presence of a family tie to a previous president or prime minister was one of the best predictors for Jalalzai (studying that first decade), it was no longer a very good predictor at all in the decade we studied. Male presidents and prime ministers were just as likely as female ones in the second decade to have had a relative who had been a previous president or prime minister.

But the instability of relationship to female leadership had already become evident in Jalalzai's analysis. Both she and Skard (2015) had noted that women's chances of becoming president or prime minister seemed to be better in relatively fragile states during the twentieth century. By the first decade of the twenty-first century (upon which Jalalzai focused her attention), however, this relationship had disappeared. And in the second decade, as our analysis suggests, it had completely changed its valence. These stable states, in should be noted, are much more likely to score high on the gender development index[5] than unstable states. Thus, we find that relatively stable states, ones that tend to value gender equality, were more likely in the second decade of the twenty-first century to have had women ascend to the position of president or prime minister than fragile ones.

Interpreting this trend must be somewhat speculative at this point. Our guess is that this outcome has something to do with two other trends, both of which our analysis provides some evidence for. The first trend is that, other things being equal, family connections have become less crucial for women's ascendance, at least compared to men's, than in the past. The second trend is that women seem to be doing better in countries with lower levels of gender discrimination (as measured

[4] Forward conditional regression does for logistic regression analysis what stepwise regression does in the case of multiple linear regression analysis. It picks out, first, the variable that has the most significant relationship with the dependent variable; then, it adds a second that has a significant relationship; and continues to do so until there is no variable among the remaining independent variables that has a relationship that is related with a significance level of the user's choice (in our case, .05).

[5] The Pearson's correlation between instability and the GDI is -.65.

by the Gender Development Index) than elsewhere. We speculate, then, that, as countries become less biased against women as high-ranking leaders, they will tend to evaluate potential women leaders, more and more, on the basis of achieved rather than ascribed characteristics.

Consonant with this speculation is the main finding of this paper: that, during the second decade of the twenty-first century, the best predictor of women's ascendance to a presidency or prime ministerial position was whether a woman had done so before. When a woman breaks through the final glass ceiling, it does seem to make a lasting impression on a country. Leaders of political parties, as well as the electorate as a whole, seem to become more comfortable with a woman in a leadership position when a woman (or women) has (have) held that position before.

We caution that correlation is not the same as causation. Whether the ascendance of a woman leader affects the level of gender equality which in turns affects the chances of subsequent ascendancies, or whether the level of gender equality affects both the first and subsequent ascendancies, or whether some other variable affects all of these others must remain a story for another day. But what does seem clear, based on our evidence, is that the shattering of the final glass ceiling is unlikely to be a one-time experience. Breaking the final glass ceiling appears to pave the way for more women to achieve the highest political offices of their lands.

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Appendix. Women Presidents and Prime Ministers by Country (as of July, 2018)

Country	*Woman/Women*	*Position*	*Year Entering Office*
Argentina	Isabel Martinez de Peron	President	1974
	Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner	President	2007
Australia	Julia Gillard	Prime Minister	2010
Austria	Doris Bures	Co-acting President	2016
Bangladesh	Khaleda Zia	Prime Minister	1991
	Sheikh Hasina	Prime Minister	1996
	Khaleda Zia	Prime Minister	2001
	Sheikh Hasina	Prime Minister	2009
Barbados	Mia Mottley	Prime Minister	2018
Bolivia	Lidia Gueiler Tejada	Acting President	1979
Brazil	Dilma Rousseff	President	2011
Bulgaria	Reneta Indzhova	Acting Prime Minister	1994
Burundi	Sylvie Kinigi	Acting President	1993
Canada	Kim Campbell	Prime Minister	1993
Central African Republic	Elisabeth Domitien	Prime Minister	1975
	Catherine Samba-Panza	Acting President	2014
Chile	Michelle Bachelet	President	2014
China	Soong Ching-ling	Acting Co-Chairperson	1968
Costa Rica	Laura Chinchilla	President	2010
Croatia	Jadranka Kosor	Prime Minister	2009
	Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic	President	2015
Cyprus	Sibel Siber	Prime Minister	2013

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Country	*Woman/Women*	*Position*	*Year Entering Office*
Denmark	Helle Thorning-Schmidt	Prime Minister	2011
Dominica	Dame Mary Eugenia Charles	Prime Minister	1980
Ecuador	Rosalia Arteaga	Acting President	1997
Estonia	Kersti Kaljulaid	President	2016
Finland	Tarja Halonen	President	2000
	Mari Kiviniemi	Prime Minister	2010
France	Edith Cresson	Prime Minister	1991
Gabon	Rose Francine Rogombé	Acting President	2009
Georgia	Nino Burjanadze	Acting President	2007
Germany	Angela Merkel	Chancellor	2005
Greece	Vassiliki Thanou	Acting Prime Minister	2015
Bissau	Carmen Pereira	Guinea-Acting President	1984
	Adiato Djaló Nandigna	Acting Prime Minister	2012
Guyana	Janet Jagan	President	1997
Haiti	Eartha Pascal-Trouillot	Acing President	1990
	Claudette Werleigh	Prime Minister	1995
	Michele Pierre-Louis	Prime Minister	2008
Iceland	Johanna Siguroardottir	Prime Minister	2009
	Katrín Jakobsdóttir	Prime Minister	2017

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Country	*Woman/Women*	*Position*	*Year Entering Office*
Indonesia	Megawati Sukarnoputri	President	2001
Ireland	Mary Robinson	President	1990
	Mary McAleese	President	1997
Israel	Golda Meir	Prime Minister	1969
Jamaica	Portia Simpson-Miller	Prime Minister	2006
Korea (South)	Han Myeong-Sook	Prime Minister	2006
	Park Guen-hye	President	2013
Kosovo	Atifete Jahjaga	President	2011
Kyrgyzstan	Roza Otunbayeva	President	2010
Latvia	Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga	President	1999
	Laimdota Straujuma	Prime Minister	2014
Liberia	Ellen Johnson Sirleaf	President	2006
Lithuania	Kazimira Danutė Prunskienė	Prime Minister	1990
	Irena Degitiene	Acting Prime Minister	1999
	Dalia Grybauskaitė	President	2009
Macedonia	Radmila Šekerinska	Acting Prime Minister	2004
Madagascar	Cécile Manorohanta	Acting Prime Minister	2009
Malawi	Joyce Banda	President	2012
Mali	Cissé Mariam Kaïdama Sidibé	Prime Minister	2011
Malta	Agatha Barbara	President	1982
	Marie-Louise Coleiro Preca	President	2014
India	Indira Gandhi	Prime Minister	1966
	Pratibha Patil	President	2007

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Country	*Woman/Women*	*Position*	*Year Entering Office*
Marshall Islands	Hilda Cathy Heine	President	2016
Mauritius	Monique Ohsan Bellepeau	Acting President	2015
	Ameenah Gurib	President	2015
Moldova	Zinaida Greceanîi	Prime Minister	2008
Mongolia	Nyam-Osoryn Tuyaa	Acting Prime Minister	1999
Mozambique	Luisa Diogo	Prime Minister	2004
Myanmar	Aung San Suu Kyi	State Counsellor	2016
Namibia	Saara Kuugongelwa	Prime Minister	2015
Nepal	Bidhya Devi Bhandari	President	2015
New Zealand	Jenny Shipley	Prime Minister	1997
	Helen Clark	Prime Minister	1999
	Jacinda Ardern	Prime Minister	2017
Nicaragua	Violeta Chamorro	President	1990
Norway	Gro Harlem Brundtland	Prime Minister	1990
	Anne Enger	Acting Prime Minister	1998
	Erna Solberg	Prime Minister	2013
Pakistan	Benazir Bhutto	Prime Minister	1988
Panama	Mireye Elisa Moscoso	President	1999
Paraguay	Alicia Puchetta	President	2018
Peru	Beatriz Merino	Prime Minister	2003
	Rosario Figueroa	Prime Minister	2011
	Ana Jara	Prime Minister	2014
	Mercedes Araos	Prime Minister	2017
Philippines	Corazon Aquino	President	1986

Appendix. Women Presidents and Prime Ministers by Country (as of July, 2018)

Country	*Woman/Women*	*Position*	*Year Entering Office*
Poland	Hanna Suchocka	Prime Minister	1992
	Ewa Kopacz	Prime Minister	2014
Portugal	Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo	Prime Minister	1979
Romania	Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă	Prime Minister	2018
Rwanda	Agathe Uwilingiyimana	Prime Minister	1993
Sao Tome	Maria das Neves	Prime Minister	2002
Senegal	Mame Madior Boye	Prime Minister	2001
	Aminata Touré	Prime Minister	2013
Serbia	Ana Brnabić	Prime Minister	2017
Singapore	Halimah binti Yacob	President	2017
Slovakia	Iveta Radičová	Prime Minister	2010
Slovenia	Alenka Bratušek	Prime Minister	2013
South Africa	Ivy Florence Matsepe-Casaburri	Acting President	2008
Sri Lanka	Sirimavo Bandaranaike	Prime Minister	1960
	Chandrika Kumaratunga	Prime Minister	1994
Switzerland	Simonetta Sommaruga	President Swiss Federation	2015
Taiwan	Tsai Ing-wen	President	2016
Thailand	Yingluck Shinawatra	Prime Minister	2011
Tranistria	Tatiana Turanskaya	Prime Minister	2016
Trinidad	Paula-Mae Weekes	President	2018

Appendix. Women Presidents and Prime Ministers by Country (as of July, 2018

Country	*Woman/Women*	*Position*	*Year Entering Office*
Turkey	Tansu Ciller	Prime Minister	1993
Ukraine	Yulia Tymoshenko	Prime Minister	2007
United Kingdom	Margaret Thatcher	Prime Minister	1979
	Theresa May	Prime Minister	2016
Yugoslavia	Milka Planinc	Prime Minister	1982

Source: Wikipedia, 2018a.

About the authors: **Katherine Rocha** is a senior at Rhode Island College double majoring in Criminal Justice and Sociology. **Joseph Palazzo** is a junior at Rhode Island College, majoring in Computer Science. **Rebecca Teczar** is a senior at Rhode Island College, majoring in Psychology. **Roger Clark** is a Professor of Sociology at Rhode Island College, where he teaches Research Methods and Sociology of Gender.

Trump and Clinton Rallies: Are Political Campaigns Quasi-Religious in Nature?

By

Mary Ellen Fernandez and Roger Clark

Abstract

Earlier social scientists (e.g., Durkheim 1915/1962; Gentile 2006; Le Bon 1895/1960; Mosca 1939/1980) have suggested analogies between political movements and religions. However, we are not aware of scholars who have explicitly looked at American political campaigns as potentially quasi-religious movements. We examined film of 2016 rallies for Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton to see the degree to which there were traces of sacralized objects, rituals and beliefs, the three defining characteristics of religions, according to Emile Durkheim. We found enough evidence to infer that both of the campaigns were quasi-religious. The two campaigns were quasi-religious to different degrees, however, with Trump and his campaign seeming to indulge quasi-religious symbolism and behavior more than Clinton and her campaign. To the degree that the quasi-religious nature of campaigns may help to understand the fervor of supporters, we think that this kind of analysis may be worth even more attention by sociologists and other social scientists.

Keywords: quasi-religious, sacralization, sacred objects, ritual, beliefs, politics as religion

Introduction

This article's origin can be traced to reading, and reflecting on, a single essay. In this case, the essay was Marci Cottingham's (2015). "The Terrible Towel and Fair-Weather Fans: Steelers Nation as a Quasi-Religion." Based on Emile Durkheim's work (1912/1965), Cottingham (2015) used a functionalist model to make the case that Pittsburgh Steelers fandom is, as her title suggests, a quasi-religion. The "terrible towel" mentioned in the title of her essay, Cottingham (2015) argues, is a sacred object for Steelers fans.

Before doing the research for this article, we paid reasonably close attention to the 2016 U. S. presidential campaigns. Therefore, we were fairly confident that both Donald Trump's and Hillary Clinton's campaign had been led by someone who'd attained a kind of cult status among a substantial portion of the American populace. This observation led us to speculate that political campaigns themselves might be seen as quasi-religious in nature. Subsequently, we read various other authors who had applied the concept of quasi-religion to sports (Brody 1979), back-to-land movements (Brinkerhoff and Jacob 1987), vegetarianism (Hamilton 2000), and conspiracy theories (Frank and Bauer 2013). Based on these sources, it seemed that the concept might be fruitfully applied to political campaigns, as well.

Over time, both major candidates for the 2016 U. S. presidency were called out for being cult leaders. This calling out was frequently done by journalists who clearly disliked the candidates or their policies, writers who were using the term "cult leader" in a pejorative sense. After the final presidential debate, for example, one conservative blogger inferred that "Clinton wants to be the leader of America's suicide cult," so dangerous were her economic, cultural, health, open borders and "vaccine" policies, among others (Adams 2016).

Donald Trump, possibly because he was the eventual winner of the election, has perhaps garnered even more sustained attention as a potential cult leader.

Commentators pointed to his cult status even during the campaign. Shortly after the Republican convention, for example, Rebecca Nelson picked up on what she saw as his messianic claim that the country was in "crisis" and that he—and only he—could get it back on track (2016). She believed that this was clear evidence that he considered himself a cult leader and found evidence that many of his followers saw him that way as well. The claim that Trump followers constitute a "dangerous cult" has persisted after his election (e.g., Aslan 2017).[1] We thought that, if analysts like Cottingham could find evidence of quasi-religiosity among fans of a football team, then we might do so among those who participated in the campaigns of both Trump and Clinton.

As we read further, we discovered that the concept of politics as religion or quasi-religion already had a substantial pedigree (e.g., Durkheim 1965 [1912]; Eliade1987 [1957]; Gentile 2006; Le Bon 1960 [1895]; Mosca 2015 [1939]). Mosca, considered a founder of modern political science, in his book *The Ruling Class* (1938/1980) suggested that political parties "ultimately are quasi-religions stripped of the divine element" (p. 283). Mosca believed that the ritualistic nature of parties and political movements is, like those of religious sects, used to manipulate the masses. In fact, Mosca (1980: 163-198) devoted a whole chapter to the similarities among "churches, parties and sects."

Historian of religion Mircea Eliade asserted in *The Sacred and the Profane* (1957/1959) that, although modern humans may see themselves as non-religious, "they still behave religiously, even though they are not aware of it" (1959: 204). This behavior, he claims, can be seen in political movements, especially writ large. Eliade points, for example, to the ways Karl Marx used various religious myths to construct his view of history. For example, Marx used the myth of the Golden Age to derive his view of the classless society. He used Judeo-Christian messianic ideology to envision the "prophetic role and soteriological [world saving] function" of the proletariat. Marx also used the myth of the battle between Good and Evil to predict the "total victory of the former" (1959: 206-207). Eliade's larger point was that even in modern, presumably secularized society, we find ourselves drawn to "little religions" and "political mystiques" (207).

Gustave Le Bon, an early social psychologist, provides a reason why. Rather than emphasizing the manipulative possibilities of political movements (and religions), as Mosca did, or the myths to which we are drawn, as Eliade did, Le Bon stressed how political movements meet the psychological needs of people. Le Bon claimed, in fact, that religion, in all its forms, stems from people's need to submit themselves to some sort of faith. This faith "may apply to an invisible God, to a wooden or stone idol, to a hero or to a political conception . . . [In all these cases] its essence remains religious" (Le Bon1960: 60). Le Bon thought that modern societies, in which traditional religions tended to lose their hold on the masses, are fertile ground for secular religions like political movements, religions that enabled "crowds" to express and focus their need to believe.

Readers of this sociological journal may recall that Durkheim, in *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1965/1915), suggested that religion has, as its functions, the elevation of people from their individual lives and connecting them to a collectivity to which they belong. Religion need not entail the presence of supernatural beings, because the divine, in Durkheim's view, was the collectivity itself. Durkheim argued that religion consists of three key elements: sacred objects or entities, ritual behaviors, and beliefs. While Durkheim did not explicitly mention in *Elementary Forms of Religious Life* that the political elements of a society sometimes bleed into the religious, it is possible to imagine, as we propose, that such elements may acquire the kinds of sacred objects, ritual behaviors and beliefs that lead them to look suspiciously religious.

To our knowledge, Emilio Gentile, was the first theorist that we know of to devote a whole book to viewing politics as religion. In fact, his *Politics as Religion* (2006) argued explicitly that a political movement or regime becomes a religion when it:

> a. [C]onsecrates the primacy of a *secular collective entity* by placing it at the center of a set of beliefs and myths . . .
>
> b. . . [I]mposes loyalty and devotion . . .
>
> c. . .[I]nterprets its political action as a *messianic function* to fulfill a mission of benefit to all humanity.
>
> d. Creates a *political liturgy* for the adoration of the sacralized collective entity through the cult of the person who embodies it . . . (138-39).

Gentile studied fascism, as a form of political religion, particularly in Italy. He concluded that there were

[1] Even Bernie Sanders, whose campaign we also examined but will not report on in detail here, drew fire for being a cult leader. Criticism sometimes came from people who actually liked him but who thought he was too self-centered for the good of party unity (e.g., Ambinder, 2016), especially as the Democratic party approached its nominating convention.

two types of politics as religion in the modern world. One was the *political religion*, which refers to the kind of sacralization of politics that occurs in totalitarian regimes. In such regimes, *political religion* sanctifies the use of violence in the fight against political enemies, among other things. The other type, *civil religion*, sacralizes politics in democratic regimes (Gentile, 2006: 139 ff.).

As far as we can tell, no one has looked seriously at political campaigns with an eye to whether they constitute quasi-religious movements. This is the goal of the current article.

Methods

We examined Youtube, and other available, recordings of five campaign rallies each for Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton during the 2016 pre-election period.[2] We selected a purposive, nonprobability (e.g., non-random) sample of the longest recordings we could find of rallies during 2016 for each candidate. Our rationale in doing this was that these recordings would give us the fullest picture of what typically went on in them. We list the campaign rallies that we watched in the Appendix at the end of this article. Tracking down the origin of certain catch phrases, rituals and beliefs manifest at the campaign rallies frequently required additional observations, notably of the 2016 Democratic and Republican nominating conventions.

We employed a mixed-method approach. Primarily, we did a content analysis of the recordings. As we watched them, we each took notes on three particular phenomena: sacred objects, rituals, and beliefs. These three phenomena were suggested by Durkheim's classic (1915/1965) work and were used by Cottingham (2015) to organized her study of Pittsburgh Steelers fans, one hundred years later. Durkheim defined sacred objects as "those which . . . interdictions protect and isolate." He said rituals were "the rules of conduct which prescribe how a man should comport himself in the presence of sacred objects." He also said "religious beliefs are representations which express the nature of sacred things and the relations which they sustain" (1915/1965: 56).

To check whether some of the beliefs expressed by the candidates were shared by their followers, and not just the followers expressing approbation at rallies, we supplemented our content analysis with statistical analyses of data about a probability sample of voters in the 2016 presidential election from the American National Election Study. [3]

Results

Having reviewed video recordings of five campaign rallies for the two major candidates—Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton--for the 2016 U. S. presidency, we are prepared to compare and contrast these recordings in terms of sacred objects, ritualistic behavior and the expression of fundamental beliefs. In doing so, we, like Cottingham (2015) in her study of sports fans' behavior, will frame these elements in terms of the degree of sacralization they evince. We believe that, in the context of campaign rallies, one cannot dichotomously classify these elements as sacred or profane, but must place them on a continuum between these two extremes.

Sacred Objects

At one level, each of the campaigns seemed to have generated literal objects that held special meaning for pilgrims to the rallies. The red "Make American Great Again" baseball-style *caps* worn often by Trump and many of his supporters may be the most easily remembered objects in the 2016 campaigns. However, the Trump campaign generated a substantial variety of other campaign-related paraphernalia—and, some of it, especially towards the end of the campaign, became a bit hostile.

In January 2016 (at Rock Hill, South Carolina), there were relatively tame *t-shirts* (saying "Make America Great Again") and *posters* (stating that "The Silent Majority Stands with Trump"). By the time of the later rallies (at the end of October and in the first week of November), the *hats* were almost as likely to have the name *Trump* written on them or an *American flag* depicted on them. The posters also became much more differentiated. These posters bore messages like "Trump-Pence," which defined the constituency of their bearers ("Women for Trump" and "Veterans for Trump"), or that implied varying degrees of anger ("Drain the Swamp" and "Trump that Bitch").

We debated about classifying people, candidates and surrogates, as sacred objects because we wanted to avoid objectifying any persons or group of people. We decided, however, that such a classification was

2 We did the same for Bernie Sanders, but discovered that, because his campaign did not last to the end of the election year, it was not strictly comparable to the other two presidential candidates We will briefly summarize our findings about the Sanders campaign at the end of the paper.

3 These data are provided online through the *Survey Documentation and Analysis* posted by the University of California, Berkeley in 2017.

unavoidable. In our defense, we reiterate that theorists like Le Bon have paved the way for doing this. Le Bon (1960: 60) suggested that religious faith "may apply to an invisible God, to a wooden or stone idol, [or] to a hero." He also pointed out that, occasionally, political candidates seem to invite such treatment.

To one degree or another, the goal of many political campaigns is to elevate people, usually the candidates themselves, to the level of sacred objects—and, in many cases, to portray others—often opponents—either as simply unholy or as devils incarnate. Trump rallies provided many examples of both efforts. At an October 31 rally, for example, Trump was introduced by former college basketball coach Bobby Knight who said he thought of Trump as "Saint Donald."

Trump did not require surrogates to point out his near mythical status. At earlier rallies, like one in Rock Hill, South Carolina, on January 18, 2016, he suggested that he, Cincinnatus-like[4], had been chosen [by himself?] to lead a movement against the Washington establishment. Trump stated: "I enjoyed my job [in real estate; on television?]; I did it well." He also implied that he would be willing to make this sacrifice (of seeking the presidency) for the people.

On the other hand, Trump was famous for vilifying opponents. Sometimes he did this with snide asides (as in the January rally where he chided his remaining Republican opponents as well as Clinton for using teleprompters and not "speak[ing] from the heart . . . and brain," as he did). At other times, he used full-on assaults. For example, in an October rally in Cincinnati, he called Clinton a "corrupt person," asserting that "She should be locked up" and that, when he became President, "I will ask my Attorney General to look into her crimes."

By the end of her campaign, Clinton's followers had also accumulated a fair number of clothing-worthy slogans and images ("I'm with her," "Hillary 2016 [with an image of Rosie the Riveter]," "Clinton-Kane," and, perhaps, most provocatively, "Nasty Woman") and poster-worthy ("USA," "Stronger Together," "I Will Vote," "Clinton-Kane," and "Love Trumps Hate") slogans.

Clinton was fairly good at tooting her own horn, but, in doing so—as when she suggested she'd demonstrated her endurance by standing next to Trump for over four and a half hours during three debates—she sometimes seemed slightly defensive. Trump had, after all, accused her of not having sufficient energy for the presidency. Perhaps trying to avoid the appearance of self-aggrandizement that Trump more clearly embraced, Clinton sometimes seemed more comfortable having surrogates sing her praises. Barack Obama did this at the Democratic National Convention in July, and at other rallies during the campaign, when he said that "there has never been a man or a woman—not me, not Bill, nobody—more qualified than Hillary Clinton to serve as president of the United States of America."

Other surrogates pointed to specific issues on which Clinton was "on the side of the angels" while Trump was on the opposite side. In a Miami rally in October, for example, Al Gore claimed, "[W]hen it comes to the most urgent issue facing this country and the world, Hillary Clinton will make solving the climate crisis a top national priority. Her opponent, based on ideas he has presented, would take us toward a climate catastrophe." In Manchester, New Hampshire near the end of the campaign, Elizabeth Warren observed, "Hillary is ready to fight for us. Are you willing to fight for Hillary?" At a North Carolina rally in October, Michelle Obama had many positive things to say about Clinton. One comment that was uniquely her own was: "First Ladies, we rock!" Surrogates like the Obamas, Warren and Gore sometimes seemed to assume the role of disciples, preaching Clinton's worthiness for high office. They often shared the stage, with Clinton while she would simply nod her head in agreement.

These shared appearances meant that Clinton spent some time returning the favor, making her surrogates look a bit saintly, while hinting that her opponent was not. Gore, she observed, had devoted much of his life fighting man-made climate change--had won, in fact, the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007. She pointed out that Elizabeth Warren and Maggie Hassan (then governor of New Hampshire, campaigning to be New Hampshire's next U.S. senator) "fight for you every day." But she also regularly tried to take luster from Trump's candidacy. For example, in New Hampshire, Clinton stated that, while Trump claimed that he "knows more than the generals, I don't think so!" Thus did Clinton, somewhat like Trump, try to paint the election as an apocalyptic battle between, if not good and evil, then the qualified and the unqualified.

Rituals

The rituals evident at these rallies, at least as much as we saw of the rallies, were largely confined to music

[4] Cincinnatus, a patrician in the early Roman Republic, was reputedly begged by his fellow citizens to give up his retirement as a farmer, assume complete control of the state, and vanquish an invading enemy. After he did all this, Cincinnatus is said to have walked away from public life for good.

played and crowd chants. Trump usually walked to and from the stage, for example, accompanied by the national anthem, the "Battle Hymn of the Republic," or, ironically, the London Bach Choir's choral introduction to the Rolling Stones' "You Can't Always Get What you Want." The latter two, at least, might have given listeners the impression they were at a church service, rather than at a political gathering. Clinton, too, might be introduced by the national anthem. Just as frequently she would walk up to Journey's "Don't Stop Believin' (Small Town Girl)," probably emphasizing her humble origins. In later rallies, Clinton also walked out to "Brave," by Sara Boreiles, a song that advocates "speakin' up" to "someone's lack of love."

For Trump, what had been simple "Trump, Trump, Trump" chants and "Who's going to pay for the Wall"/"Mexico" call and responses in January at Rock Hill morphed, by October and November, into many iterations of "Lock Her Up," "Drain the Swamp," "USA," "All Talk No Action," "Build the Wall," "Jobs, Jobs, Jobs." By the end, Trump was sharing information about his part in the creation of such mantras. At a rally in Phoenix, Arizona, on October 29th, for example, he asserted that when his people brought the "drain the swamp" concept to him, he didn't like it at first, but admitted: "Now I like it."

Clinton gave the impression of being less calculating about inspiring the chants that emerged from her galleries, but, since some of them, like "Deal Me In," mimicked lines in her speeches ("Mr. Trump accused me of playing the woman card. Well, if fighting for women's health care and paid family leave and equal pay is playing the woman card, then deal me in"), she clearly had a hand in some of them. In her later rallies, Clinton also gave her audiences time to chant this, as well as "Love Trumps Hate." Her crowds also, more spontaneously, chanted things like "Hillary, Hillary, Hillary," and "We Love You, Hillary" at the later rallies. And, of course, when Michelle Obama spoke on Hillary's behalf at various rallies, as she did at the Democratic Convention, crowds would often join in when she said, "When they go low, we go high."

Trump's and Clinton's responses to crowd chants were noticeably different. Both candidates would typically pause to acknowledge the participation, but Trump would happily stop what he was saying and walk around the stage, looking at and pointing to various crowd members, seemingly egging them on. On the other hand, while Clinton would usually stop, smile, and occasionally would seemingly admonish the crowd for getting off topic. She noticeably did the latter at her joint rally with Al Gore, when she cut the crowd short by raising her open hand, as if to say "Stop," and continued with, "This is really important."

Beliefs

One of the most daunting stumbling blocks in Cottingham's (2015) observational study of Pittsburgh Steeler fans was that observation alone is a tricky guide to understanding people's, especially football fans' beliefs. Without being able to ask questions of those being observed, the researcher cannot be sure of what they hold dear. Observing film of political rallies, on the other hand, provided us with a more reliable way of determining what convictions motivated candidates and, presumably, their followers. However, in this section, we augment our observations with data from the American National Election in 2016 to help determine how much Trump and Clinton followers did indeed differ in their beliefs.

As good researchers know, the validity of what a person says depends, among other things, on how deeply s/he believes in what is being said and whether s/he intends to be truthful (Adler and Clark, 2015: 215). Thus, the fact that Trump criticized other candidates for using a teleprompter in January 2016 rallies, and then used them himself in October and November rallies, *may not be* an indicator of Trump's flock's changing beliefs about teleprompters. Rather, one might conclude that his flock's faith in him, not his stated beliefs, could withstand such mild contradictions. In fact, at a Sioux City, Iowa, rally in January 2016, Trump famously said: "I could stand in the middle of Fifth Avenue and shoot somebody, and I wouldn't lose any voters, OK?" Yet there did seem to be some fundamental beliefs shared by Trump and his followers--beliefs that forged the loyal bond.

Trump announced his candidacy on June 16, 2015, and simultaneously announced his commitment to building a wall between Mexico and the United States. In doing so, he laid the foundation of his campaign on an anti-immigrant theme that struck a chord for many Americans (e.g., Rocha, Sabetta and Clark, 2017). Trump reiterated this theme at all the rallies we observed. This, plus the promise to bring and hold onto well-paying jobs for the working class Americans, may well account for the ironclad loyalty that seems to have bound Trump to around 40 percent of American voters both before the election and since. Some of Trump's proposed policy changes were related to these two themes or goals (e.g., abandoning trade agreements like NAFTA and

the TPP, developing the country's infrastructure, and cutting business taxes). Some proposed policies were less clearly so (e.g., rebuilding the military, taking care of law enforcement and veterans, saving the Second Amendment, appointing Justices to the Supreme Court "that will uphold the Constitution," and ending Common Core). The belief in the salience of limiting immigration and creating jobs seems to have been crucial, almost sacred, to Trump and his followers.

Towards the end of the campaign Clinton regularly argued that the government should not be making money off students (via high interests on loans) and that college and university should be tuition free for students whose families made under $125,000 a year. She also advocated raising the minimum wage, taxing millionaires and corporations, and an infrastructure enhancement program that would provide jobs. However, much of Clinton's eventual position was defined in contradiction to Trump's nativist stance and, more generally, in contradiction to his messages of exclusivity. In a rally in Grand Rapids, Michigan the day before the election, she said simply: "Anger is not a plan." She also said that the election was about choosing between "division and unity in our country."

Based on candidates' expressed beliefs, one can derive certain inferences about their followers' *probable* beliefs as well. However, enthusiastic responses by rally goers, conceivably the most fervid followers, *may not* translate into patterned differences in the beliefs of the candidates' followers. Using American National Election Study (ANES) data, we were able to determine that they often did. Based on their candidates' statements, one might expect that Trump voters would be more averse to immigration than Clinton voters. The ANES data suggest that, in general, they were. **Table 1** compares Trump and Clinton voters in terms of their openness to immigration. The ANES asked respondents: "What should immigration levels be?" Almost 46 percent (45.7%) of people who voted for Trump said they should be "decreased a lot," while only 8.8 percent of Clinton voters said this. Conversely, 10.9 percent of Clinton voters said that immigration levels should be increased a lot, while only 1.7 percent of Trump voters said they should. (**See Table 1**.)

Table 1. Trump and Clinton Voters Answer the Question: *"What Should Immigration Levels Be?"*

Response Options	Trump Voters	Clinton Voters
Increased a lot	1.7% (19)	10.9% (136)
Increased a little	2.7% (30)	16.5% (205)
Left the same	25.9% (290)	50.1% (623)
Decreased a little	24.0% (269)	13.6% (169)
Decreased a lot	45.7% (513)	8.8% (109)
Total	100% (1121)	100% (1242)

Source: American National Election Study, 2016. Note: Ns are in parentheses.

Regarding increasing the minimum wage, one might also expect that Clinton voters would be more likely than Trump voters to have supported it. The data in **Table 2** show that they were. Specifically, 83.5 percent of Clinton voters *favored* raising the minimum wage, while only 45.0 percent of Trump voters did. (**See Table 2.**)

The ANES data revealed other substantial differences between Trump and Clinton voters registered. Regarding favoring raising taxes on millionaires, a large majority (84.9%) of Clinton voters approved. In contrast, less than half (47.8%) of Trump voters did so. More than half (56.4%) of Trump voters responded that immigration was extremely or very likely to "take away jobs," while only 18.9% of Clinton voters felt this way.

The ANES did **not** ask questions that allowed tests of expected differences in attitudes on all beliefs professed by the candidates; but the tests that were possible did suggest that the beliefs of Trump and Clinton voters were so different that these voters seemed almost to belong to two different, perhaps rival, churches. For an empirical account of other attitudes and beliefs that differentiated Trump and Clinton voters, we refer readers to an article that appeared in volume three of ***Sociology between the Gaps*** (Rocha, Sabetta and Clark 2017).

Table 2. Trump and Clinton Voters' Answers to the Question: *"Should the Minimum Wage be Raised?"*

Response Options	Trump Voters	Clinton Voters
Raised	45.0% (502)	83.5% (1046)
Kept the same	45.4% (506)	14.5% (181)
Lowered	2.7% (30)	0.6% (8)
Eliminated	6.9% (77)	1.4% (18)
Total	100% (1114)	100% (1252)

Source: American National Election Study, 2016. Note: Ns are in parentheses.

CONCLUSION

Our analysis examined sacred objects, rituals and beliefs in the 2016 presidential campaigns of Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. It provides insight into how aspects of a campaign's culture undergo sacralization to greater or lesser degrees. We see, for example, how surrogates like Bobby Knight and the Obamas labored to turn Trump and Clinton, respectively, into sacred objects. We also see how Trump worked to make himself look Cincinnatus-like, if not divine.

The rituals we observed in the campaigns also struck us as differentially sacralized, or at least subject to differential attempts to seem religious in nature. In the "Battle Hymn of the Republic" and the London Bach Choir's introduction to the Rolling Stones' "You Can't Always Get What You Want," someone in the Trump campaign was certainly trying to create a sacred air to the candidate's comings and goings. It's not clear whether or not the version of "Battle Hymn" is the one sung by the Mormon Tabernacle choir in the Mormon Tabernacle; but, it could have been. The London Bach Choir's introduction to the Stone's song was clearly designed to echo inspirational classical chorale music. In using "Don't Stop Believin' (Small Town Girl)" and "Brave" to introduce Clinton, much more secular foci were evoked.

Evidently, Trump took pride in the chants that constituted notable ritualized activities on the part of his supporters at his rallies. As soon as a "Lock Her Up" or "Build the Wall" chant would begin, he would typically stop whatever he was saying and walk around. He often turned to the people behind him and let the chanting behavior run its course. Trump took credit for giving his stamp of approval to some chants, such as "Drain the Swamp." Clinton would frequently stop and smile in reaction to a "Hillary, Hillary, Hillary" chant, but, as we have mentioned, she actually discouraged crowd participation at a rally about climate change.

The beliefs espoused by the candidates, at least as evidenced in the rallies we watched, often seemed fairly fundamental, maybe even sacred in their nature and presentation. Of course (in Grand Rapids, Michigan) we observed throwaway ideas, especially, for example, from Trump, about the value of not using teleprompters. But about his two fundamental themes, he was consistent, if, given his background, apparently at odds with his own historical interests: the needs to limit immigration and to provide well-paying jobs. According to Ballesteros (2017), Trump is thought to have used immigrant labor to save money on the construction of Trump Tower. Clinton's fundamental beliefs are less easy to summarize or, perhaps, too numerous to do so quickly. Clinton frequently suggested to crowds that they look for her policy positions on her website: a site that enumerated positions on forty-one issues ranging from, alphabetically, "A Fair Tax System" to "Workforce Skills and Job Training." Our analysis of ANES data indicates that, to the extent that we could measure them, the belief systems of voters for Trump and Clinton were very different.

In general, then, both campaigns evinced, through their rallies, elements of quasi-religions, although they did so to differing degrees. Donald Trump's campaign seemed most clearly to embrace quasi-religiousness. Many of Trump's followers wore the red baseball cap with the "Make America Great Again" logo and this was by far the most obvious "thing" that followers sacralized in the campaigns. Trump seemed not at all averse to defining himself, and being defined, as a sacred object. And the rituals that played out at his rallies were, while varied, strongly encouraged and almost sacramental in nature. Hilary Clinton seemed more reluctant to embrace the sacralization of her campaign, although she did not reject it entirely.

In concluding this article, we would like to report that we did an analysis of five Bernie Sanders rallies to get added perspective on our findings. Perhaps because

of the shorter length of his campaign, Sanders followers never seemed to amass the collection of sacred objects that both Trump and Clinton supporters did, nor were their ritualized chants anywhere near as insistent as those of Trump and Clinton rally attendees. Part of the reason for the relative absence of these elements of quasi-religion may be understood by Sanders' discouragement of them. Even more than Clinton, Sanders seemed to disapprove of ritualized behavior. He would, for example, raise what seemed to be a warning hand when his followers began to chant, "Bernie, Bernie, Bernie." Even more than Clinton, Sanders gave the impression that he wanted to get back to his presentation. This behavior may either be taken as evidence that his campaign had fewer religious elements than the other two candidates or that what Sanders really valued were the beliefs (**not** the objects or rituals) of his campaign.

Limitations of the Current Study

The current study has several significant limitations. First, we could have focused on other 2016 U. S. presidential candidate campaigns. However, the Trump and Clinton campaigns were the ones of the most likely candidates to have won in 2016. Second, the degree to which our findings may be generalized to other political campaigns in American politics is unclear. It is possible that the sacred objects, rituals and beliefs described here may (in some generic way) be generalizable to other campaigns in American history. Indeed, they may be generalizable, in generic ways, to campaigns going on in other nations, both in the contemporary period and in the past. However, some specifics, like those in any exploratory study, will not be generalizable.

Third, a major limitation of the current study is its focus on easily accessible recordings of political rallies. There are not only a variety of biases that may account for variation in what off-site observers of such rallies see. Editing, the placement of cameras and the interests of the camerapersons are factors which limit the coverage of the videos of rallies. It is also likely that rallies themselves offer only limited access to the variety of ways in which political campaigns play out as quasi-religious movements, or not. To the extent that a campaign's quasi-religiousness can account for the intensity of its participants' commitment to a candidate, it may be very useful for future research to further outline what it takes for political campaigns to encourage a kind of religious fervor.

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About the Authors: Mary Ellen Fernandez is a senior at Rhode Island College, where she is a Psychology major. **Roger Clark** is a Professor of Sociology at Rhode Island College, where he teaches Research Methods and Sociology of Gender.

Cultural Attitudes towards Women in Politics and Women's Political Representation in Legislatures and Cabinet Ministries

By

Rebecca Teczar, Katherine Rocha, Joseph Palazzo and Roger Clark

Rhode Island College

Abstract

Women's representation in national legislatures and cabinet ministries worldwide has generally lagged far behind their labor force participation and educational achievements. Theories about their political under-achievement have considered three types of explanations: political institutions that limit demand for their political service; social-structural conditions that inhibit the supply of adequately prepared women; and cultural attitudes that affect both the demand for and supply of politically-interested women. Generally, the measurement of cultural attitudes has been too crude in cross-national, quantitative studies to discern much effect. Modeling our paper on the work of Paxton and Kunovich (2003), we use a direct measure of such attitudes to update and extend their research. The data we analyzed indicate strong support for the notion that examining differences in cultural attitudes is crucial for understanding variation in women's participation in both national legislatures and cabinet ministries.

Keywords: women in legislatures, women in cabinet ministries, attitudes towards women in politics

Introduction

While women have made great strides in the workforce and in attaining higher education, their progress in national political representation has been less dramatic. Thus, in 2017, although women were 47% of the U. S. labor force and 56% of college and university students (DeWolf 2017; Marcus 2017), they were just 23% of U. S. Senators, 19% of representatives in the House (CAWP 2018) and 22% of senior-level Cabinet members (Hansler 2018). The pattern in the U.S. roughly mirrors that of the world, where women were 48.5% of the labor force in 2010 (World Bank 2018a), 40% of the college and university students in 2016 (World Bank 2018b). In contrast, women were but a median of 20% of legislators in 2018 (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2018) and a median of 14% of ministry or cabinet position holders in 2017 (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2017). Women's disproportionately low representation at high levels of government remains an enduring issue throughout the world, helping to ensure gender inequality in most countries.

But the variation in women's representation in legislatures-- from 3% for Haiti to 61% in Rwanda in 2017-- and ministries--from 0% in several countries to 53% in Norway in 2017-- is at least as interesting as the low averages. What can explain it? Previous research into women in national legislatures and ministries has emphasized three kinds of explanations: political, social-structural and cultural (e.g., Tripp and Kang 2008; Krook and O'Brien 2012). The political explanations have focused on the openness of political systems to women's political participation; the social-structural ones, on the available supply of eligible women; and the cultural ones on general ideas about the appropriateness of women in politics.

We have found only one cross-national, quantitative study that has reported substantial support for the cultural explanations: Paxton and Kunovich's (2003) study of women in legislatures. These authors made creative use of data provided by the *World Values Survey* in 1995. We update Paxton and Kuvonich's study and extend it by using more recent *World Values Survey* data to study cultural effects not only on women's participation in legislatures, but also their participation in national ministries or cabinets. Our study provides

evidence that gender ideologies affect the number of women in both of these governmental entities, even when we control for political and social-structural variables that have been shown to be salient for the understanding of those numbers since the turn of the 21st century.

Explaining Women's Legislative and Ministerial Representation

We've seen that women's participation in national legislatures and ministries varies tremendously (see above). But what can explain this variation?

Political Explanations

In general, political explanations, those crediting political institutions for women's participation at the highest levels of government, have garnered the greatest support in cross-national, quantitative analyses. These explanations tend to stress how much political systems create demand, or at least opportunities, for women's participation. In particular, and with regard to national legislatures, proportional-representation systems and national quotas have proven to be the most salient characteristics of nations that have relatively high numbers of women. Proportional-representation systems, as opposed to simple plurality systems (such as those used in the U. S.), compel parties to publish lists of candidates and tend to be associated with greater numbers of seats per voting district. This may not only encourage lead party leaders to include women to balance their tickets, but allows them to head their lists with their male candidates in packages that include females. In such packages the male candidates are often thought to be the stronger ones. Furthermore, single-member districts frequently lead parties to nominate candidates similar to the previous candidate; in multimember districts, they are freer to abandon this kind of precedence (Womack 2018). Proportional-representation systems have been consistently shown to be positively associated with women's representation in legislatures (e.g., Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Tripp and Kang 2008). Another variable shown to have such correlations is the presence of gender quotas, which have quickly become a significant feature of the electoral landscape. By 1985, only 4 countries had introduced such quotas; by 2005, 55 had done so (Paxton and Kunovich 2008: 339); and by 2017, 129 countries had them (International IDEA 2018). Quotas take a variety of forms, from parties voluntarily agreeing to allocate a certain proportion of candidacies to women to national legal mandates that a certain number of seats be reserved for women. In Rwanda, for instance, 30 percent of all seats in all representative bodies are reserved for women.

Political explanations have also been advanced for women's participation in ministries or cabinets. Ministries or cabinets are created by presidents or prime ministers (or some interaction between the two). Krook and O'Brien (2012) hypothesized presidential systems, as opposed to prime ministerial systems or dual presidential and prime ministerial systems, would be more likely to yield female representation in ministries. Leaders in presidential systems may go outside the legislative body, as they do in the U. S., to find candidates for ministries, and therefore, in general, have a better chance of nominating females (in part because legislatures are largely made up of males). Prime ministers, on the other hand, often must appease please powerful parliamentary members of their own parties or coalitions and, so, generally choose members of parliament to populate their ministries. Krook and O'Brien (2012) found support for this hypothesis. One might also expect that proportional-representation systems would be more likely than others to have women in ministries, simply on grounds that they tend to be more open to diverse backgrounds of political candidates in general. Krook and O'Brien found some support for this view too.

Social-Structural Explanations

Social-structural explanations for women's participation tend to focus on why the supply of women for high political office varies from one country to another. In general, these explanations haven't fared as well, in cross-national, quantitative analyses, as their political counterparts. But two variables that have been shown to have strong correlations (by Krook and O'Brien 2012) with women's access to ministerial or cabinet positions are women's participation in the labor force and women's representation in legislatures. And it makes sense that in countries where women are already engaged in the public sphere (as suggested by their labor force participation) and the political sphere (as suggested by their representation in legislatures) women would be more likely to be eligible candidates for ministerial or cabinet position than in countries where they are not so engaged.

Cultural Explanations

Attitudes and beliefs about appropriate women's roles in society can have a large impact on both the demand for and supply of women in high political positions (e.g., Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Tripp and Kang 2008; Krook and O'Brien 2012). Public ideas about the inappropriateness of women in politics can have a negative impact on political outcomes for women (e.g., Paxton and Kunovich 2003-- even controlling for political and social-structural conditions that would suggest an adequate demand for, and supply of, women. The main problem with most analyses that assess the importance of attitudes and beliefs is that they have substituted variables like region for more direct measures. Thus, analyses have found that Scandinavian countries are more likely to have female representation in legislatures and Middle Eastern countries, less likely (e.g., Tripp and Kang 2008). Scandinavian countries tend to have had unusually progressive and feminist histories of political change even among Western nations. In contrast, Middle Eastern countries tend to have had political systems that are unusually impervious to women's participation, even when compared to other primarily Muslim nations (Kenschaft and Clark 2016: 262-272). Krook and O'Brien (2012) used indicators like the U. N.'s Human Development Index, meant to capture the degree to which a country is "developed" in a variety of ways, as an indirect measure of gender norms, presumably associated with development. It may not be too surprising that such an indirect measure showed no association with women's participation in ministries and cabinets in Krook and O'Brien's analysis.

What Paxton and Kunovich (2003) did was introduce a newly available direct measure of attitudes about women in politics. This measure was based on national surveys of attitudes conducted in the *World Values Study*, Wave 3 from 1995 to 1998. They used summaries for 46 countries of respondents' answers to questions, finding that agreement to the statement "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do" had a strong negative association with women's participation in national legislatures. Wave 6 of the *World Values Survey*, from 2010 to 2014, expanded coverage to 54 nations and yet, as far as we can tell, no researchers have investigated whether national responses to this attitudinal assertion continue to be associated either with women's participation in legislatures or with their participation in national ministries or cabinets. This paper reports our findings regarding two hypotheses:

#1: *The more a national population agrees with the view that men make better political leaders than women, the less likely are women to be represented in national legislatures.*

and

#2*: The more a national population agrees with the view that men make better political leaders than women, the less likely are women to be represented in national ministries.*

Methods

We use correlation analyses to examine the zero-order associations between independent variables and our two measures of women's representation in government. With just over 50 countries as units of analysis in our multivariate analyses involving our measure of cultural attitudes, and a relatively large number of independent variables, there are relatively few degrees of freedom for conducting simple linear multiple regression analyses. We therefore employ forward stepwise regression analyses as our form of multivariate analyses. We instructed the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences to add the most significant variable at each step of its processing until all variables not in the selected model had p values that were greater than .05.

We use easily accessible measures of women's representation in both legislatures and ministries (or cabinets). Our 2018 data on women in legislatures are from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2018). Our indicator is the percentage of seats held by women in the lower, or single, house of a nation's parliament or legislature. Our data on women in ministries are for 2017 and are from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2017). The indicator is the percentage cabinet-level seats held by women.

Wave 6 of the *World Values Survey (WVS)* was done between 2010 and 2014, yielding data on values and beliefs in 54 nations. The WVS, begun in 1981, involves a global network of social scientists, collecting information from nationally representative samples. While it does not supply data on all countries, the WVS nonetheless attempts to cover countries that are both rich and poor and are from all the world's major cultural zones. We have used the percentage of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing to the statement "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do" as our indicator of cultural attitudes about women in politics. We observed that variation in such agreement was substantial: from only eight percent in Uruguay to 86% in Egypt. Eighteen percent of U. S. respondents

agreed or strongly agreed with this statement.

As we have mentioned, quotas for women in politics have been shown to be positively correlated with their representation in legislatures (Tripp and Kang 2008). We measured the presence of a quota (coded 1= yes; 0 = no) using data from International IDEA (2018). Of the 218 countries in our sample, 128 countries had some sort of quota. Forty of the countries in our eventual sample of 54 countries (74%) for which we have data on attitudes towards women in politics had quotas.

Proportional representation systems have been hypothesized to be positively correlated with women's representation in both legislatures and ministries (Tripp and Kang 2008; Krook and O'Brien 2012). We used data on the type of electoral system employed to elect legislatures in each country provided by ACE (2017) to determine which countries employed proportional representation systems. Of the 218 countries in our sample, 80 countries employ such a system; and 24 of those in our eventual sample of 54 countries (44%) for which we have appropriate data on political attitudes did so.

We expected that women's labor force participation would be a social-structural condition positively impacting women's representation in both legislatures and ministries. Our 2017 data on female labor force participation were from the World Bank (2017).

We expected countries with a presidential system to have higher levels of female representation in ministries and cabinets than countries with prime ministerial or mixed presidential and prime ministerial system. Our data on whether countries had a presidential system were from Wikipedia entries on individual countries. Fifty-three of the 177 countries on which we could obtain information about executive systems had presidential systems, and 16 of the 52 countries (30.8%) that made it into our stepwise regression analyses did so.

Results

First, we report the results of our tests of zero-order relationships between key variables and women's participation in legislatures and ministries and then present evidence of the strongest controlled correlates. **Table 1** shows, for example, that people's agreement with the assertion "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do" has a very strong, negative association (r = -.46) with the presence of women in legislatures, even stronger that the two political variables, measuring the presence of quotas for women (r =.31) and the presence of proportional representation systems (r =.32). Similarly, their agreement with this statement has a very strong, negative association (r = -.58) with women's participation in ministries, even stronger than that with women in parliaments (.50), the presence of proportional representation systems (.31), their participation in the formal labor force (.30), and whether the nation is Scandinavian (.44). (**See Table 1**.)

Table 1. Correlates of Women's Representation in Legislatures and Ministries

	Pearson Correlation Coefficients	
	Women in Legislatures	**Women in Ministries**
Women in Legislatures	1.00*** (193)	.50*** (187)
Quota	.31*** (193)	.14 (187)
Proportional Representation	.32*** (193)	.31*** (187)
Female Labor Force Participation	.19* (177)	.30*** (172)
Presidential System	.09 (175)	.16* (170)
Scandinavia	.27*** (193)	.44*** (187)
Middle East	-.24*** (193)	-.23*** (187)
Men Better than Women in Politics	-.46*** (52)	-.58*** (52)

Notes: Ns are in parentheses; * indicates significance at .05 level; ***, at .001 level.

Our multivariate analyses involving key variables show even greater support for the contention that cultural attitudes are salient. Thus, **Table 2** shows that, in a stepwise regression involving women in legislatures, only the national attitude towards women in politics and the presence of a proportional-representation system make it into the model. Even the presence of a quota system favoring women candidates doesn't do so, when cultural attitudes towards women in politics are controlled. It is possible that such attitudes are the reason why the correlation between the presence of quotas and the presence of women in legislatures exists—it may act as an antecedent variable for that relationship. (**See Table 2**.)

Table 2. Stepwise Regression of Women in Legislatures on Key Variables

Standardized Regression Coefficients	
	Women in Legislatures
Men Better than Women in Politics	-.34**
Proportional Representation	.30*
Adjusted R-square	.26
N	(51)

Notes: Excluded variables: Quota, Scandinavia, Middle East, Female Labor Force Participation; N is in parenthesis; ** indicates significance at .01 level; *, at .05 level.

Table 3. Stepwise Regression of Women in Ministries on Key Variables

Standardized Regression Coefficients	
	Women in Ministries
Men Better than Women in Politics	-.43***
Scandinavia	.36***
Presidential system	.31**
Adjusted R-square	.53
N	(50)

Notes: Excluded variables: Proportional representation, Middle East, Female Labor Force Participation, Women in Legislature; N is in patenthesis; *** indicates significance at .001 level; **, at .01 level.

If our 2017 data help us to update Paxton and Kunovich's (2003) finding that, at the turn of the 21st century, attitudes towards women's participation in politics were associated with their access to legislatures, then **Table 3** gives us our first indication of how strongly these attitudes affect their participation in ministries as well. In fact, this association (beta = -.43) is considerably stronger for women in ministries than it is for women in legislatures (beta = -.34) and enables us, with just two other variables (Scandinavia, with a beta of .36, and presidential system, with a beta of .31) to explain over twice the variation in women's access to ministries (adjusted R-square = .53) than we were able to explain in women's access to legislatures (adjusted R-square =.26). (**See Table 3**.)

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have argued, that cultural beliefs and attitudes are an underestimated factor in views on women in politics. We used a direct measure of attitudes about women's viability as political leaders. With the data we analyzed, we were able to replicate and update what Paxton and Kunovich (2003) had shown to be true at the beginning of the 21st century: that cultural and societal attitudes continue to be strong predictors of women's representation in national legislatures into the second decade of the 21st century. Perhaps a greater contribution of our research, however, is showing that these attitudes are an even stronger predictor of women's access to ministerial or cabinet positions. To our knowledge, no previous researchers have shown that women's access to cabinet and ministerial positions is so linked to cultural attitudes.

Although political variables may be seen as measures of the demand for women representatives and social-structural variables, as measures of their potential supply, we reiterate Paxton and Kunovich's (2003) point that cultural variables affect *both* demand and supply. On the demand side, beliefs about the appropriateness of women in politics undoubtedly affect the chances that voters and party leaders choose women as leaders. On the supply side, positive attitudes undoubtedly increase women's willingness to run and/or accept nominations for office.

Our research supports earlier findings that political factors have effects on women's representation in both legislatures and ministries, independent of cultural beliefs or attitudes. Proportional-representation systems are more likely than other electoral systems (such as the plurality system used in the U. S.) to be associated with women's access to legislatures. Presidential systems, as opposed to prime ministerial or mixed systems, seem relatively more likely to elevate women to ministerial or cabinet positions. Although Donald Trump's cabinet (22% female) may have fewer women members than did Barack Obama's cabinet (30% first term) or Bill Clinton's cabinet (32%, first term) (Hansler 2018), Trump's cabinet still has a higher percentage of females than does Teresa May's cabinet (18%) (BBC News 2018) or the international median (14%). This probably reflects the greater ease with which presidents, as compared to

prime ministers, can draw from a pool of candidates outside of government.

The practical implications of our study may not seem obvious. Attitudes and beliefs are, after all, famously difficult to change—perhaps even more so than political systems. On the other hand, as recent changes in American attitudes towards gay marriage suggest, societal attitudes are malleable. Even more relevant, the dramatic upsurge in women candidates in 2018 U. S. House of Representatives elections seems directly related to a fairly dramatic change in attitudes about (and by) women following the 2016 presidential elections and the revelations about the sexual misconduct of some men in positions of power (Nilsen 2018).

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About the Authors: Rebecca Teczar is a senior at Rhode Island College, majoring in Psychology. **Katherine Rocha** is a senior at Rhode Island College double majoring in Criminal Justice and Sociology. **Joseph Palazzo** is a junior at Rhode Island College, majoring in Computer Science. **Roger Clark** is a Professor of Sociology at Rhode Island College, where he teaches Research Methods and Sociology of Gender.

"Smoking Evolved?" Perceptions and Use of JUUL Products Amongst College Students[1]

By

Ty Meka

Abstract: In recent years, there has been a surge in the number of electronic-cigarette users in the United States. One brand, in particular, has been on the forefront of society's attention. JUUL products have come to dominate the e-cigarette market and seem to be especially popular amongst youth. The popularity of JUUL is cause for concern, due to the relatively easy access to this product and the associated adverse health effects of nicotine on youth. Additionally, the expansion of e-cigarette use through JUUL has certain parallels to the tobacco industry's marketing strategies in the past. Through a survey conducted on an eastern college campus, the author explores perceptions and use of JUUL. The survey provides data that can be added to the current body of literature surrounding e-cigarettes and youth. The lack of education of youth on JUUL products is a cause for public health concern that this paper addresses.

Keywords: JUUL products, youth, health effects, college students, tobacco industry

Introduction

In the past few years, the United States has seen a rise in the use of electronic cigarette products. While there is a wide array of e-cigarettes, one product, in particular, has been on the forefront of society's attention. That product, which is rapidly becoming a household name, is called JUUL (pronounced "jewel"). JUULs can be seen in the hands of many, allowing people to emit small clouds of smoke seemingly wherever they are. JUULs are frequently seen on college and high school campuses and have been the subject of many news headlines in recent months. The controversy surrounding this product is notable, making for an intriguing topic of study.

What is a JUUL?

Initially created by PAX Labs in 2015, JUUL is a type of electronic-cigarette device. In the summer of 2017, JUUL Labs, Inc. became a new entity from PAX Labs which now oversees the production of JUUL products (JUUL Labs, Inc. 2018). A JUUL has a similar appearance to a flash drive and consists of two main pieces. One is referred to as a 'JUUL device.' This piece consists of a heating mechanism and a battery that is rechargeable via a USB port. The second piece, known as a 'JUULpod', is a cartridge that fits into the JUUL device, and which contains 'E-liquid' (JUUL Labs, Inc. 2018). The 'E-liquid' is a salt-based nicotine formula that is heated to produce the vapor users inhale. In addition to nicotine, the 'E-liquid' contains chemical components, including propylene glycol, glyercine, benzoic acid, and various flavorings (JUUL Labs, Inc. 2019).

To appeal to a wide array of users, 'JUULpods' come in a variety of flavors and concentrations. They also come in different strengths-- either 3% or 5% nicotine by weight (JUUL Labs, Inc. 2019). Flavors range from traditional smoking tastes like menthol, mint, and Virginia tobacco, to less conventional ones, such as mango, fruit, and cucumber.

Popularity Amongst Youth

There is no doubt that the popularity of JUUL ha been

[1]The author thanks Martha Gardner, PhD. for her continual support and mentorship throughout the creation of his paper.

on the rise. Since 2017, JUUL sales have been greater than those of any other e-cigarette manufacturer, and the sales gap is growing. JUUL sales alone account for over half of the e-cigarette market share (Herzog & Kanada 2018). With a number like this, questions arise as to which demographic groups are contributing to the sales. In terms of overall youth e-cigarette use, in 2017, the National Youth Tobacco Survey reported that 11.7% of high school students and 3.3% of middle school students, a total of over 2.1 million youth were e-cigarette users (Bach 2018). In 2018, usage was even greater. Amongst high school students, there was a 78% increase (from 11.7% to 20.8%), and a 48% increase for middle school students (from 3.3% to 4.8%) (Cullen et al. 2018). The total number of youth e-cigarette smokers in 2018 was over 3.6 million.

As concerning as these values are, there is speculation that they may not tell the whole story because there is conflicting terminology over how JUUL use is described. Whereas some refer to it as e-cigarette use or vaping, the popularity of this product has led to the creation of a new verb, 'JUULing' (Huang et al. 2018). A study conducted by the Truth Initiative helps to highlight this point: 34% of participants referred to the product as a JUUL, whereas 63% called it an e-cigarette or a vaping device (Willett et al. 2018). Because of this difference in terminology, the number of youths who are e-cigarette users is likely higher than estimated.

There are a variety of reasons why young people, under the legal purchasing age of 21, are using JUUL products. Perhaps the most significant is the inclusion of flavorings in the 'JUULpods'. As opposed to a general tobacco taste, flavored e-cigarettes are preferred by youth e-cig users by over 70%, and they are highly associated with first time use (Harrell et al. 2016). Eight out of 10 (81%) of young e-cigarette users cited flavors as being their primary reason for use (Villanti et al. 2017).

Also, increasing attraction of Americans, especially youth, to new technology has played a part in the current rise of e-cigarette use. There is a risk factor that public health researchers refer to as 'technophilia.' Technophilia is defined as a positive orientation towards a new technology, a characteristic that is increasingly common in the current youth generation (Barrientos-Gutierrez et al. 2018). Today, many teens are typically interested in getting their hands on the newest technology and devices. The study conducted by Barrientos-Gutierrez et al. (2018) demonstrated that technophilia was indeed correlated to g e-cigarette use among youth. Technophilia, in combination with a diverse assortment of flavors, can be enough of a draw to lure in people who are not current or former smokers to try JUUL products.

Health Effects

The rise of youth e-cigarette smokers is of concern for several reasons. Foremost, the product is intended to be a safer alternative to cigarettes for current smokers (JUUL Labs, Inc. 2019). In the hands of people who are nonsmokers, especially youth, adverse health effects can occur as a result of JUUL smoking. Although e-cigarettes are known to have fewer of the carcinogens typically associated with cigarettes, JUUL still contains nicotine. This chemical alone poses a wide array of health concerns, particularly amongst young users.

The 1988 Surgeon General's report stated definitively that nicotine is an addictive substance (US Department of Health and Human Services 2014). Therefore, smoking JUUL increases the possibility that youth who have never smoked before can become addicted to the product, making JUUL use a potential gateway for further addiction or cigarette use. In fact, adolescents are more likely than adults to become addicted to nicotine, due to differences in the reward centers of their brains (England et al. 2015). Nicotine use has also been correlated with other poor health outcomes. Particularly relevant to youth is that nicotine produces adverse effects on the central nervous system during adolescence.

Although not strictly comparable to humans, rodent studies have shown that nicotine exposure has much more significant effects during adolescent development than at other times in their lifespan (US Department of Health and Human Services 2014). The main consequences of nicotine exposure in rodents include reduced size and number of cells in the cerebral cortex, midbrain, and hippocampus. These brain areas are associated with a variety of functions, such as auditory and visual processing, higher thought processes and decision making, and emotion and memory control (US Department of Health and Human Services 2014). The effects of reductions in these areas can be long-lasting. They are also correlated with problems in both cognitive function and overall development.

The other chemicals involved in e-cigarettes are typically viewed as non-toxic in low levels and safe to consume. However, it is not possible to say conclusively that these other chemicals are incapable of generating long-term, negative health effects. For example, heating

and inhaling the 'E-liquid' may cause adverse problems that have yet to be seen. Similar to how cigarettes were not initially viewed as a harmful habit, it is possible that future research will demonstrate that using JUUL products is much worse for health than initially believed.

A Familiar Road?

For those who are versed in the history of the cigarette industry, some parallels to the current state of e-cigarettes stand out. An examination of the course of cigarette smoking in the United States since the 1960s reveals a trend among adults that contrasts with that of youth. There has been a steady decrease in the number of adult cigarette smokers, which differs from the trajectory of smoking amongst high school aged youth. Specifically, there was a significant spike in the percentage of high school and middle school smokers in the 1990s, followed by a subsequent drop and continual decrease (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2016). These statistics raise the questions of what exactly caused the rise in youth smoking during that time period and the decrease afterwards.

During the 1990s, big tobacco companies utilized several strategies, although denied at the time, which appealed to youth. Most notable was the Joe Camel campaign from R.J. Reynolds. This campaign featured images of a suave cartoon camel that smoked cigarettes (Brandt 2009). Another example was the Marlboro Man, a rebel cowboy of sorts, used by Philip Morris to promote one of their brands (Brandt 2009). The tobacco industry used these and other ads to portray smokers as youthful and independent (Pampel & Aguilar 2008). This type of marketing strategy made cigarettes seem attractive to youth and contributed greatly to the increase in young adult smoking rates in the 1990s.

Today, it appears that the causes of the rise in e-cigarette smoking may be quite similar to those of traditional cigarettes from roughly 30 years ago. Whether this increase is directly or indirectly the fault of companies like JUUL Labs is worth considering. The modern-day version of Joe Camel ads may be those on social media. The official JUUL account on Twitter and Instagram, JUULvapor, was responsible for a large number of posts in 2017, when the popularity of JUUL really started to surge. This growth in popularity that JUUL saw while other e-cigarette providers faltered can be attributed to marketing strategies used by JUUL Labs (Huang et al. 2018). Although the company states on its website that their product is for adult smokers, the use of social media advertisements seems to suggest otherwise (JUUL Labs, Inc. 2019). This marketing campaign would have more directly reached and appealed to youth, who are the principal users of these platforms. Similar to the cigarette companies of the past, the words of JUUL Labs may not match the actions that they are taking.

During the subsequent drop in youth smoking that took place after the rise in the 1990s, a large number of internal tobacco industry documents became public, thus exposing the intentions of the tobacco companies. Philip Morris, for example, was found to be directly targeting young smokers, despite the company's public position that this was not the case (Johnson 1981). Bans on advertising, tobacco taxations, and anti-tobacco efforts were largely successful in reducing the number of youth smokers. Healthcare providers and school programs helped to provide information on the dangers of smoking and also offered cessation advice (US Department of Health and Human Services 2012). Measures such as these may also be useful in assisting with reducing the current surge of e-cigarette use.

Recent News

Over the past few months, JUUL has dominated headlines across various news outlets. Their popular electronic cigarette device has been a controversial topic. The heightened attention to JUUL has its roots in late July of 2017, when the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) put a plan in place to decrease nicotine addiction in future generations, a plan which included a framework for regulating e-cigarette devices and lowering their nicotine levels (US Food & Drug Administration 2017). The FDA developed this plan further and, in April of 2018, released a statement about improve-ments to the plan. This second statement was centered on reducing youth access to e-cigarettes, and specifically cited JUUL as having sold their products to youth illegally. Warning letters were issued along with a request for information to JUUL Labs for documents that might shed light on the high youth consumption of their products. The FDA was seeking documents such as marketing and research reports (US Food & Drug Administration 2018). The FDA issued its most notable warning letter a few months later. On September 12th of 2018, the letter received by JUUL Labs was similar in that it requested the company to take steps to address the rate of youth use. However, this letter also included the stipulation that company had 60 days to produce a detailed plan as to how they would address the problem

(Gottlieb 2018). By setting this deadline, it appeared that the FDA was quite serious about insisting that changes occur at JUUL Labs.

Soon after receipt of this letter, JUUL Labs CEO, Kevin Burns, released a public statement affirming JUUL's commitment to preventing underage use and their eagerness to comply with the FDA (Burns 2018). Burns' statement left out the steps the company would take to make headway in decreasing the rate of youth use. Weeks later, in November, JUUL announced that the company would suspend sales of some of their flavored pods in stores and terminate social media promotions (Kaplan & Hoffman 2018). The company would stop stocking their mango, crème, cucumber, and fruit flavors, while continuing the sales of their mint, menthol, and tobacco flavors (Truth Initiative 2018). Even so, these products can still be purchased online from their website with age-verification. While this move made it seem like JUUL Labs was being responsive to the demands outlined by the FDA, it still raises questions as to how effective these changes will be. This voluntary action may not be enough.

Another interesting development occurred a month later, in December, when JUUL Labs made a deal with Altria Group, Inc. Altria is one of the world's largest tobacco companies, and maintains control over Philip Morris USA, the makers of Marlboro (Altria 2018). Altria paid JUUL Labs nearly $13 billion in exchange for a 35% stake in the company (Kaplan & Richtel 2018). Until this point only parallels could be drawn between the trajectory of JUUL and the plight of big tobacco companies in the past. Now, however, the two became integrally linked. After the decision to cease social media advertising and remove some flavored pods, it appeared that JUUL might comply with the FDA, and set their sights on a better public health initiative. However, JUUL now possesses the resources to further combat the FDA regulatory imposition. Regardless of the true intent of the deal, from a public-relations stand point, this agreement will hurt JUUL (Kaplan & Richtel 2018). Most recently, the FDA has continued its offensive by accusing JUUL Labs of going back on their promise to keep e-cigarettes away from minors while engaging in backroom financial agreements with Altria (Kaplan 2019). The magnitude and effect of this new business agreement waits to be seen.

College Survey

Student perceptions and usage of JUUL products were measured through a survey conducted on MCPHS University's Boston campus in the spring of 2019. This survey shows how successful JUUL's efforts have been in reducing youth access to their product, as well as increasing awareness among the students surveyed. The survey also provides greater evidence for the popularity of JUUL among youth, along with information about the knowledge they have of the product.

A sample of 109 students, ranging in age from 18 to 27, was used. The sample was obtained by going into a range of classes at MCPHS University and asking interested students to participate voluntarily. Those students who provided a name and email address received a closed link to the survey. Of the students who participated, four did not provide their age. One hundred fell within the traditional undergraduate age range of 18-22 and comprised the sample.

The majority of respondents were female (78%), which is characteristic of MCPHS University's roughly 70% female student body. The sample represented a variety of academic programs and majors offered by the university. In order to complete the main body of the survey, it was necessary for respondents to have at least a relative familiarity with JUUL products. One hundred participants met this criterion and were included in the data analysis.

Amongst the students surveyed, 64.0% responded that they had used a JUUL product. More males (77.3%) than females (60.3%) had previously used a JUUL. Usage differed slightly by age. Specifically, 72.7% of the 18 year olds surveyed, 66.7% of 19 year olds, 69.0% of 20 year olds, 52.6 of 21 year olds, and 54.5% of 22 year olds report having used a JUUL prior to the survey.

As stated previously, JUUL products are intended to be a smoking cessation device. However, of the 64 individuals who had used a JUUL product, only nine were former smokers. Therefore, 85.9% of JUUL survey respondent users were not using JUUL as an alternative to conventional cigarettes. Their usage may have been due to a lack of knowledge about JUUL in general, as only 50.5% correctly identified that JUUL products are not intended for people who are not current smokers.

Looking into the reasons behind first-time usage, a few that stood out. The most notable finding was that 50 students said they first used a JUUL product because a friend or family member was using one. This finding lends support to the idea that people around youth can play a direct or indirect influence on e-cigarette use. Eight participants said that the flavor options played a role, and 14 cited that that they had wanted to try a

new technology. These reasons reinforce the previous literature that has claimed these were influencing factors in youth e-cigarette use. Only four individuals said their first-time use was because they wanted to try an alternative to conventional cigarettes.

In terms of classification, 85 participants referred to JUULs as e-cigarettes. About 12% of students did not consider JUULs to be e-cigarettes via a close-ended question. Therefore, rates of youth e-cigarette smoking might actually be higher than currently reported. If some students do not consider their JUULs to be e-cigs, then they are less likely to report e-cigarette smoking, making the number of youth smokers appear lower than what it truly is.

Regarding other perceptions that college students have of JUUL products, the large majority surveyed was aware that these products contain nicotine (94.8%) and are addictive (90.7%). There was some uncertainty as to whether JUUL products contain tobacco, as 15.5% believed incorrectly that they did, and 17.5% were unsure. Despite the relatively high proportion of participants who had tried a JUUL product, there were questions about their safety. When asked if JUUL products are safe to use, in their opinion, 69.1% responded no.

DISCUSSION

The survey yielded some interesting findings. The large majority of students were familiar with JUUL products, and a sizeable portion had tried smoking JUUL themselves. Both men and women had tried the product at similar rates. Regardless of both age and gender, the college students surveyed seem to use JUUL products at high levels, even though many are not former smokers.

Prior research has demonstrated that flavoring and 'technophilia' played major roles in first-time use of e-cigarette products. While this survey supported these factors as having influence on the decision of students to try JUUL products, one specific factor stood out. Fifty participants cited that their first use was because a family member or friend was already using. This finding warrants more research into the effect of familiarity of JUUL products through the household and in social settings on smoking behavior. Perhaps an indirect sort of peer pressure may also be playing a role.

Participants' attitudes towards, and perceptions of, JUUL products raises some questions. For example, nearly 70% of survey participants believed that JUULs are not safe. This seems to be a high percentage, especially given how many students had reported using them. The number of people who had faulty perceptions of the product was also concerning. Just over half of the participants were aware that JUUL products are not intended for those who are not former smokers. While a relatively high percentage was aware that JUUL products contain nicotine and are addictive, the number of those who cited JUULs as addiction causing was slightly lower. This lends support to the fact that there is a portion of students who are unaware that nicotine is addictive. Given that this survey was conducted at a health science school, there is speculation that the number of youth members who know that JUUL products are addictive is actually lower than what was reported. There is also a general lack of knowledge in terms of the contents of a JUUL, as demonstrated by the number of people who believed that they contained tobacco.

This survey has a few limitations. First, because it is based on a convenience sample, the students surveyed may *not* represent the student body at MCPHS University or the entire universe of college students in general. On the same note, college students alone are not representative of all youth. Second, the sample size is small. Because the sample is both small and non-random, the results should *not* be generalized to all youth or all college students, but merely used to suggest possible trends.

CONCLUSIONS

In the hands of former smokers, JUUL products can be highly beneficial in aiding in smoking cessation. Unfortunately, these products are becoming increasingly common amongst youth, and are being utilized by a population for whom they are not intended. Young people who are not current smokers may be ignorant to the harm that nicotine poses to them, and unaware of its addictive properties. This potential lack of knowledge may increase the possibility that young people will use JUUL.

In reviewing the rise of JUUL products, it becomes clear that there are a lot of factors at play. It would be remiss not to acknowledge the potential benefits of JUUL products. It is necessary to consider whether conventional cigarette smoking rates amongst youth would be higher if JUULs did not exist. This may very well be the case, as one recent study has demonstrated an inverse relationship between vaping and conventional cigarette smoking (Levy et al. 2018). It is possible that,

if JUULs were never created, the rate of youth cigarette smoking would be higher than it currently is.

However, higher e-cigarette smoking rates are still a cause for concern. Although JUUL Labs publicly claim their product to be a public health measure, aspects of their marketing, especially marketing strategies that target youth, seem to undermine this goal (Huang et al. 2018). Greater action needs to be taken by the FDA and other governing bodies to prevent further damage by JUUL Labs, Inc. Some may argue that the harm has already been done because JUUL Labs dominate the e-cigarette industry and has penetrated the youth market by utilizing social media and by getting enough of a following to spread their popularity by word of mouth.

Nevertheless, it is still possible to create a plan to decrease the number of young JUUL users. To see what can be done to do so, a look back at the 1990s is helpful. As discovered by the decline in smoking among youth that took place then, tactics such as educational measures, restricting access, reducing flavorings, and other interventions were effective (US Department of Health and Human Services 2012). Currently, the FDA is working to reduce young people's access to JUUL products, as well as limiting the flavorings. Although these tactics are beneficial and should perhaps even be stepped up, they alone may not be sufficient to lessen the impact that JUUL has on today's youth.

Overall, JUUL Labs needs to assume more responsibility for the health of the general public. This is particularly true because of JUUL Labs' public claims that JUULs are meant to help smokers to quit. Based on students' perceptions of e-cigarettes from the survey conducted at MCPHS University, those studied lack knowledge about the risk of JUUL products, and indicate that, among those surveyed, a high percentage of young people have tried this product. Possible educational campaigns should take into account these perceptions and actions. If they do, they could go a long way toward ending smoking on all fronts.

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About the Author: Ty Meka is a graduate of MCPHS (Massachusetts College of Pharmacy and Health Sciences) University. He holds a Bachelor's degree in Premedical and Health Studies, with minors in American Studies and Health Psychology. Ty grew up in Watertown, Connecticut, and currently resides in Boston, Massachusetts.

Reducing Health Disparities Among Low Socioeconomic Status Hispanics in the United States

By

Johnathan Tran
MCPHS University

Abstract

Hispanics comprise a large proportion of the U. S. population. However, most Hispanic workers are employed in low-wage jobs that lack occupational benefits including health care. As a result of an adverse labor-centered life, the health of many underserved Hispanics is poor; they suffer inequities both in their access to, and the quality of, medical care available to them. These disparities exist on many different levels ranging from the individual level to the level of government policies. This paper reviews and analyzes the barriers and risk factors that affect the health disparities of large portions of the U. S. Hispanic population. These barriers include personal beliefs, affordability of health care, cost of living, low education, limited access to transportation, living in hazardous environments, and nearly inescapable poverty. Realizing that healthcare disparities are a multifaceted issue, the author uses the Social Ecological Model (SEM) of health to understand risk factors to good health and bring attention toward mitigating them. The author also discusses interventions consistent with the components of the Social Ecological Model - individual, interpersonal, organizational, community, and policy level, that aim to reduce and ultimately eliminate the inequity in access to quality of health care for underprivileged and underserved Hispanic communities across the United States.

Introduction

Health is well known to be one of the greatest contributors to quality of life, and although not mentioned in the Constitution, according to the World Health Organization (WHO), good health should be regarded as a fundamental human right (Ghebreyesus 2017). However, the reality is that there exists an immense disparity in health and health care among various segments of the U. S. population, especially minority groups. Health inequity is defined as an individual's unequal or complete lack of access to essential health services based on certain discriminatory factors including race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status (SES), education level, and more. Health disparities have resulted in increased numbers of preventable deaths.

This paper investigates the presence and effects of health disparities among the Hispanic populations of the United States and examines current solutions for these inequities that have been effective and ineffective in addressing the health care needs of this population. The author uses The Social Ecological Model of Health (SEM) to understand these health disparities because this model is arguably one of the most effective approaches for tackling health issues on a large scale.

The U. S. Hispanic population is an important group to investigate because they are the largest minority group in the nation with projections that they will make up 29% of the country's population by 2060. Hispanics are also the nation's youngest minority group with 32% of them younger than 18 years old and 26% between 18 and 33 years old (Raymond, 2017). Furthermore, Hispanics often face some of the highest rates of obesity and the lowest rates of reproduction. They also suffer from immense health inequity, health outcomes, and undesirable living conditions (Raymond 2017). Thus, it is necessary to explore and solve the issues that the low SES Hispanic population faces, and in understanding how to reduce disparities in such a large population,

perhaps it will be easier to branch off and expand our interventions, using previous success as a benchmark.

The U. S. Census Bureau defines the term Hispanic as referring to the "region, not the race, of any person whose origins are of Mexico, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Central or South America—or in some other Hispanic origin country. Areas conquered by the Spaniards were considered part of a region originally called Hispania, which is where the term Hispanic likely derived" (Wolfe 2019). It is important to note that the entire Hispanic population should **not** be viewed as disadvantaged, although it is critical to understand that there are large numbers of disadvantaged Hispanics in the U. S. For example, 33% of Hispanic youth live in poverty (APA, 2016).

Literature Review

Health disparities among Hispanic communities are rooted in risk factors that make many individuals more likely to face health inequality. Important risk factors include income/SES, educational level, environment, occupation, and personal beliefs. These multi-dimensional risk factors reinforce the use of the SEM to observe and analyze health disparities and the need to approach solutions from different angles.

Individual-Level Risk Factors

Some of the health disparities that exist for Hispanic populations are consistent with their cultural attitudes, beliefs, and a fear of health care. Non-Hispanic physicians are often confused or skeptical when they hear their Hispanic patients explain their use of "folk healing" with a native healer/shaman, through a ritual called "curanderissmo" instead of seeking treatment from a western doctor (Juckett 2013). Other types of folk healing include herbalists called "yerberas" and physical therapists called "sobradores." All illnesses are viewed in religious terms as a "sickness of the soul" or tainted by an evil spirit (Juckett 2013).

Another interesting risk factor in the health disparities among male Hispanics is "machismo." Machismo refers to Hispanic men's culturally-defined sense of masculinity that puts pressure on men to avoid seeking preventative medical care because seeking care may be viewed as a sign of weakness (Bryner 2009). The influence of personal beliefs on health is evident in studies by the American Sociological Association. These studies reveal that Hispanic men, on average, lose five years of life expectancy. Hispanic women, on the other hand, are reported by physicians to have difficulty approaching providers due to immense stress and hardships related to childcare, work, and lack of social support (Valdez et al., 2011).

Interpersonal-Level Risk Factors

A study done by the University of Wisconsin reveals that a language barrier often exists between Hispanic patients and their health care providers, since not all physicians speak Spanish, and communication is critical when providing health care (Valdez et al. 2011). Hispanic patients tend to seek providers who are also of the same ethnicity because they find it difficult to relate and be comfortable with non-Hispanic providers. However, only five percent of the physicians in the U. S. are of Hispanic origins (Valdez et al. 2011).

There is also a certain level of provider incompetence regarding Hispanic culture(s). Some patients find it difficult to relate to, and be comfortable with, providers who perceive them in stereotypic terms (Valdez et al. 2011). In addition to a less patient-centered quality of care, many Hispanics also face long wait times or miss their doctor's calling hours due to the patient working multiple jobs. With financial burdens in the way, it becomes increasingly difficult to take action on individual health or even take time off to schedule a doctor's appointment (Valdez et al. 2011).

Organizational-Level Risk Factors

Despite the rates of employment being in favor of immigrants with less education (Waters 2015:4), education itself is also an important social factor that greatly affects health and health care disparities because lower education contributes both to lower income and a decrease in health literacy. Health literacy is important. Research shows that 34% of Hispanics lack accurate health information and access and rely on their local clinics for critical information, including accurate translation of health information into Spanish (Valdez & Posada 2006: 18). In general, Hispanics are the least educated segment of the U. S. population (Joint Center 2004:4). The Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System shows that 14% of the adults do not have a high school diploma. Hispanics without a high school education are statistically three times more likely to die before they reach age 65, compared to Hispanics who have completed a college education (Woolf & Braveman 2011:2; Joint Center 2004: 4). Hispanic adults with less than 12 years of education are expected to live

approximately seven years less than those with sixteen or more years of education (Woolf & Braveman 2011:2). Every additional year of education Hispanics achieve, on average, results in their having approximately three more years added to their life expectancy (Woolf & Braveman 2011:2).

Many Hispanic immigrants arrive in the U. S. with skills that make them favorable for certain occupations, thus forcing them to choose between a steady work-centered life or pursuing more education, with the former being the option taken by the majority (Waters 2015:3). However, those who do pursue education tend to excel in academics and become meaningful contributors to the U. S. workforce and, consequently, to the health of the Hispanic community (Waters 2015: 3). In the end, education is important for health because it provides the information and skills needed to solve problems. However, educational institutions in impoverished areas may not provide either the necessary or the best education.

Community-Level Risk Factors

In analyzing health disparities, it is critical to also consider the living conditions and the circumstances set by the environment, particularly among low-income communities. One common misconception is that unhealthy behaviors are a product of personal decisions. However, further evidence points towards stronger influences that are seen in the areas in which people live and work (Woolf & Braveman 2011:3). For example, choosing a healthy diet is quite difficult for low-income households because healthy foods and supermarkets are often too far away. In contrast, fast food is both locally available and cheap.

The environment plays another crucial role in health disparity because access to transportation is a variable dictated by location. Many essential health services, clinics, and hospitals are out of reach for disadvantaged communities where they are perhaps needed the most (Woolf & Braveman 2011:3). Additionally, low-income communities heavily discourage physical exercise. This is especially true in Hispanic neighborhoods where residents feel less safe due to high crime rates or to a lack of crosswalks, signs, and traffic safety. Therefore, they may not choose the option of walking or biking to work, clinics, parks, and supermarkets (Woolf & Braveman, 2011:3). Hispanic immigrants new to the U. S. tend to live in the same residential areas as previous waves of Hispanics, despite the living conditions these impoverished communities impose, the reduced access to healthy food options, and weaker educational systems for their children (Waters 2015:5).

Policy-Level Risk Factors

Income is a significant social determinant of health and health care disparities. Among Hispanics, income is a powerful indicator of a household's ability to afford health care and other important health services. Despite having the highest rates of labor workforce participation, Hispanic families have the highest rates of poverty in the U. S. (Joint Center 2004:4; Valdez & Posada 2006:16).

Hispanic adults between the ages of 18-35 are five times more likely to report poor levels of health compared to households that are above the poverty line (Woolf & Braveman 2011:2). The National Longitudinal Mortality Study reveals that low-income Hispanic individuals around the age of 25 have an average life expectancy between 50-55 years of age (Woolf & Braveman 2011:2).

Earnings for Hispanic immigrants are heavily stratified by race and ethnicity and are also the lowest of all immigrants with this disparity in income (Waters 2015:4). Hispanics in general have the lowest rates of insurance in the U. S. and are working low-wage jobs that don't offer health insurance or employee benefits (Valdez & Posada 2009:16). The U. S. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality estimated that a third of Hispanic Americans lack health insurance coverage (Valdez & Posada 2006:17). Lack of access to health care and health literacy may eventually lead to self-medication as the cheaper alternative, which may lead to risks of antibiotic resistance or overdose.

Interventions

Again, the Social Ecological Model is fitting for analyzing health disparities among Hispanic populations because it reveals and underlines the fact that health disparity is a multifaceted issue that requires a multitude of interventions in order to effectively reduce health inequality in the many dimensions where it is prevalent. The SEM consists of the *individual level* concerning personal beliefs and attitudes, the *interpersonal level* focusing of relationships with others, the *organizational level* relating to the effects of institutions and organizations on an individual, the *community level* introducing the entire network of organizations and resources of an individual's environment, and *the political level* revolving around governments and policymaking.

Individual-Level Interventions

As stated previously, individual-level risk factors result from personal beliefs and attitudes concerning individual health care and the personal barriers that discourage or are completely out of people's control. Individual-level barriers and risk factors can hinder the quality of, or access to, health care; these factors include resources such as transportation, health care affordability, and costs of living, as well as behavioral individual-barriers such as fear, lack of confidence, commitment, and religion. Lower SES Hispanics do not have the financial capability to afford and maintain a car along with its many bills and often must rely on public transportation as their means of reaching their health institution.

Research shows a significant difference in access to transportation among Hispanics in rural areas compared to any other minority group. Sixty percent of Hispanic patients fear that transportation could be a leading cause of missing their treatment/appointments (Syed et al. 2013).

An impactful intervention addressing this individual-level barrier can focus on providing free or reduced-fee transportation funded by health care institutions for their patients. Alternatively, if transportation to health facilities is still beyond patients' reach, providers could travel to patients for examination or drug delivery. A mobile clinic could also be organized in rural areas where health facilities are sparse.

Success with these interventions has been seen with Denver Health Medical Center, which has recently partnered with the transportation company Lyft to aid in transportation between homes and hospitals, showing significant improvement in patient health (Situ 2017). For difficult places to reach via transportation, the hospital provides mobile health and medication delivery as well; these mobile clinics are 40-foot, state-of-the-art trucks that can travel to disadvantaged neighborhoods and provide care to those who need it the most (Situ 2017). Additionally, Calvert Health CARE clinics now offer home consultation and visits from providers to patients unable to pick up medication, arrive at their appointments, and need information about their health and medications (Situ 2017). The main limitations observed in current interventions are the sparsity of such programs and the need for further integration into the most rural areas where they are needed most.

Information about available transportation programs can be sent to patients by health care institutions either via letter or electronically. A blanket mailing or email runs the risk of offering a transportation service to patients who do not necessarily need it. This concern can be addressed by analyzing patients' addresses from those who have submitted a request for transportation and prioritizing patients who are located the farthest distance from the hospital. Eligibility can be based on the amount of safe walking distance and the level of neighborhood safety regarding violence and traffic; patients in the poorest and most dangerous situations would be the most eligible.

For other individual-level barriers such as *machismo*, media can be used to dispel these social norms. For example, advertisements can show the significant benefits for Hispanic men who seek treatment compared to those who do not. Advertisements can show Hispanic male patients with a hospital gown being happy or doing masculine activities such as fixing a car (Bryner 2009). To successfully target Hispanic patients' trust and attitudes towards health and medical care, interventions need to be culturally tailored for them and show empathy for their values, beliefs, and histories that relate to and can potentially affect their health. A sense of mutual respect reinforces better patient attitudes and trust in the care that they are provided as well as boost their self-efficacy (Mitrani 2009; Juckett 2013).

Interpersonal-Level Interventions

Interpersonal-level interventions are where a lack of empathy and cultural sensitivity to Hispanic patients' beliefs and attitudes usually occur. An intervention addressing these issues can approach them from two directions, one centered around patients and the other focusing on the providers. For patients, integration of a peer-mentor program that reinforces confidence and exercises certain skills in communications and physician expectations may help Hispanic patients increase their self-efficacy and feel more autonomous about their ability to take their health into their own hands. For providers, additional training mandated by medical boards or even self-assertion emphasizing on practicing patient feedback and reducing ethnic biases would be a valuable intervention for reducing and eliminating health inequity that exists on the patient-provider level (Valdez et al. 2011).

Studies indicate that mindfulness training for providers has been showed to reduce their levels of stress and negative emotions. Reducing both is important because physical and emotional burdens often attribute to unequal or missing treatment of patients (Burgess 2009:6). These same studies, however, have shown

promising improvements in the quality of care of peer-mentored participants, showing higher levels of patient engagement and the number of questions asked during physician visits, coupled with provider-feedback. A study by Chin (2007:12) revealed that when exercising these interventions, patients exhibited very similar levels of controlled diabetes as patients who are admitted into specialty clinics.

When finding patient-participants for the intervention program, participants can be recruited based on physician data that shows which patients have the lowest frequency of health check-ups, indicating potential patient-provider conflicts or barriers. Provider-participants can be identified with similar methods, with the focus centered around areas with non-Hispanic providers and a high number of Hispanic patients with poor health, which anticipates potential cultural or linguistic barriers.

Other interpersonal-level interventions include having bilingual Spanish speaking staff, allowing longer visits for those without English proficiency, setting up evening office hours to accommodate those who have unfavorable work shifts, and offering patients medical and dietary literature with Spanish translations (Juckett 2013).

Organization-Level Interventions

Since nearly 30% of the workforce will be Hispanic in origin by 2050, and that many of the jobs at which Hispanics will likely work will be low-wage, it is crucial for organizational-level interventions to address work institutions and the need for employee benefits and health insurance (Rook 2016).

Fast-acting and reasonably high-level health coverage is both needed and important. Even if employees have health insurance however, lack of effective coverage will still result in some Hispanic workers choosing to pay bills rather than pay attention to their own health (Rook 2016).

Another important employee benefit is paid leave. Paid leave is particularly important because low-income Hispanic workers prioritize financial needs and tend to choose work over health, if their financial burdens depend on it. Thus, by having paid work leave, they will be better able to focus on their health rather than having to choose between the stress of work and their health. Doing this is important because stress itself also contributes to poor health (Rook 2013). Therefore, having an organizational-level intervention committed to workplace and employee benefits, such as health insurance and paid leave, would greatly reduce health disparities for many low SES Hispanic workers. Participants for this intervention could be assembled relatively easily considering it will provide the crucial benefit of employer-paid or employer-supported health insurance.

Community-Level Interventions

The community must be addressed to reduce health care inequality. The community includes the totality of the institutions, geography, networks, and resources that contribute to health. Transitioning from employee benefits and institutional-level interventions, occupational health and safety are necessary priorities for community-level interventions.

Hispanic workers are exposed to greater risks of work injuries than any other group, including the risk of injury from transportation to work, workplace violence, and physical hazards (Gany et al. 2014). Furthermore, workers are less likely to report work injuries due to the lack of employee benefits and the fear of losing work (Gany et al. 2014).

As a community intervention, workplaces can provide better safety measures for manufactures and industries where there is hazardous machinery. These are types of occupations common amongst Hispanic workers. Also, using community-based programs that educate laborers would also contribute greatly to health disparity. A few such programs have already been successfully implemented in cities such as Chicago where an Interfaith Workers' Rights Program educates Hispanic workers on workers' rights, occupational health and safety, and worker compensation (Gany et al. 2014).

Another community-level intervention can focus on youth of Hispanic backgrounds in the community. Outside of the environment itself, its people can also make a difference for their collective health if they work collaboratively. It is important to understand that simply educating the community is not enough and that educational programs tend to be effective only as a one-time reform. Renewal of these programs and their educational benefits will work best if their importance is stressed throughout each generation; thus, a community focused around educating and nurturing proactive Hispanic youth would ensure better community health.

Studies published in the *Journal of Adolescent Health* explain how youth engagement alongside familial support and advocacy, had a positive impact on their health status (Raymond 2017). Keeping in mind that Hispanic youth form the largest component of this population than in other ethnic groups in the U. S., their

collective efforts and engagement as community leaders and educators would make a dramatic improvement in the health outcomes of their communities (Raymond 2017). Moreover, it is important to educate and mentor Hispanic youth about health education as they have the chance to improve upon the health disparities that their parents face as the youth themselves approach adulthood.

Policy-Level Interventions

When considering policy-level interventions, it makes sense to use the Affordable Care Act (ACA) as a benchmark for those in the future. With the advent of the ACA, the number of uninsured Hispanics dropped from 41.8% to 30.3%, providing nearly 4 million people with health insurance (Raymond 2017).

Future interventions can strive to improve where the ACA lacked -- to provide health insurance coverage for new and undocumented immigrants. Some states, such as California and New York, have already begun this initiation by waiving the five-year waiting period for new immigrants and provides them with health insurance using local funds (Raymond 2017).

Suggestions for other policy-level interventions include policies offering tax credits or health savings accounts (HSA) for small employers so that they may have the means to offer health insurance coverage to their employees. An alternative is to have policies directly provide tax credits to individuals who are not sponsored by their employers (Valdez & Posada 2006:9).

Another possible, although ambitious, intervention is to form a task force of members of the Hispanic community at the national level to propose a strategic *action* plan that would be budget neutral and focused on reviewing and analyzing all current healthcare programs available to Hispanics and restructuring, redirecting, and reallocating funds where health disparities are most prominent in order to reduce inequities (Valdez & Posada 2006:8).

Suggested Indicators to Evaluate the Effectiveness of Specific Interventions

Individual-Level Indicators: Physician data on the health outcomes of Hispanic patients, including the number of new and return visits to health facilities, can be analyzed.

Interpersonal-Level Indicators: Provider feedback results can be analyzed along with survey data collected from patients asking them about their provider experiences. Data from reports on patient interactions can also be used.

Organizational-Level Indicator: Health of workers can be observed after they have received and used employee benefits for a specific length of time; for example, at least 18 months.

Community-Level Indicators: The fatality rates of Hispanic workers can be observed to see if occupational education and safety have improved. Health outcomes of individuals in the Hispanic community, based on provider reports, can also be used to see if youth engagement has had any effect on the community's health and education.

Policy-Level Indicators: National studies of Hispanic health can reveal if health outcomes and disparities have improved after certain health reforms take place. Similar to the studies identified in this article, a well-designed survey of a national-level, random sample of the Hispanic population would be an effective technique for measuring the differences in the quality of health and health care. Furthermore, increases in the number of medical diagnoses and hospital admissions in Hispanic communities could show a reduction in health disparities over time.

However, it is necessary to consider that increases in diagnoses and hospital admissions do not necessarily imply that people are becoming more ill and, as a result, have poorer health outcomes than before. With deeper analysis, increases may mean that Hispanic patients who represent prevalent, undocumented diseases and injuries are finally reporting, admitting, and acquiring the medical care and attention that they need.

llustration of One Community Level Intervention

Because I wanted to engage in, and better understand, real-life applications of the proposed community-level intervention focusing on Hispanic youth, I became engaged as a youth mentor and health educator in the projects of a local community organization called Sociedad Latina. Founded in 1968, the goal of this organization is to nurture the next generation of Hispanic youth leaders, work to eliminate the destructive cycle of poverty, improve access to health services, and increase educational and career opportunities for communities of all cultures (Sociedad Latina 2019).

Sociedad Latina has a well-organized approach to Hispanic social issues. They break their approach into

four main components. The first is civic engagement, in which youth develop leadership abilities to help move themselves and others in their communities towards improving racial inequities, health, and education. Second is the educational program at Sociedad Latina. Hispanic youth are guided throughout their educational career from middle school to college, creating a first generation of more highly educated students. Third, Sociedad's workforce development program helps prepare Hispanic youth for careers in which Hispanics are underrepresented -- health services, STEM, and entrepreneurship. Fourth, in the arts program, Hispanic youth engage in a wide variety of arts through which they learn, embrace, and promote Hispanic culture and traditions (Sociedad Latina 2019).

Over the years, impact reports demonstrated that Sociedad Latina had powerful social influences over Boston's Hispanic community. Their civic engagement program reports that 89% of its youth become peer and community educators who work to address social challenges and disparities. Over 4,500 community participants were involved in the community actively pressing for change (Sociedad Latina 2019). The health education program (a part of the civic engagement branch), helped increase health literacy for over 1000 youth and parents who reported better knowledge of nutrition, sexual education, tobacco use, and alcohol consumption as a result (Sociedad Latina 2019). The education and workforce development branches helped 97% of their youth graduate from high school and 84% of these youth admitted either into college or into full-time, well-waged jobs (Sociedad Latina 2019).

Current progress and future projects with Sociedad continue this tradition. Through surveying students from over 500 public schools and partnering with Boston Public Schools, Sociedad Larina aspires to encourage more educational reform. With Massachusetts spending one third of the state's budget on education, Sociedad Latina, along with Boston superintendents, have worked together to formulate a better public-school system. Since data revealed that distance was a significant factor in poor attendance and, consequently poor grades, Sociedad Latina (2019) addressed key aspects including safety of location (avoiding heavy traffic areas) and convenience of location (where students are not too far from school) to create new schools. Progress in the health education program includes program plans for a bilingual nutritional education program for adults in the local community (Sociedad Latina 2019). Finally, plans for the workforce program include hospital internships in the Longwood Medical Area, entrepreneurship training with business colleges, and continuing to help students get into college.

Sociedad Latina is a great example of a community-level intervention against health disparity. They address not only community-level risk factors but also all levels of the SEM. The civic engagement program reduces health disparity by improving health literacy, removing personal barriers, and pressing for action at the policy level. The workforce development program helps fight against health disparity by tackling the variable of income by preparing Hispanics for higher-paying jobs in which they are currently underrepresented. The education program helps to improve the other mentioned social determinant of health by helping students become more competitive for college. Research shows that higher life expectancy and better jobs (and thus higher income) are affected by one's educational level. Lastly, the art program promotes Hispanic culture and heritage. This program serves as a reminder to celebrate Latin American cultures and to showcase the importance of Hispanic youth in bringing attention to health inequities in communities where health disparities exist.

CONCLUSION

The Hispanic population reflects a great disparity in health and health care. The need for change is especially crucial for three reasons. First, the gap in socioeconomic status is increasing and is difficult to reduce, especially in a capitalist country. Thus, there will be increased disease burden, greater medical spending, and widened disparities (Woolf & Braveman 2011:6). Second, today's youth are the future's adults. They will grow up in a world of overly expensive health care, making them potentially the first generation in history to live shorter lives than their parents (Woolf & Bravema 2011:4). Third, the budgets and finances for these interventions that promote education and deliver opportunities for better employment are either facing budget cuts or vulnerable to complete elimination (Woolf & Braveman 2011:4).

In sum, disparities in the health of the Hispanic population are a multifaceted issue that requires considerable effort and strategic approaches like the SEM. The true limitation of both health and health care disparity interventions is not having the resources to address them at all. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that society should abandon working toward positive changes. If anything, it is a sign that we need to work even harder, be more proactive about the health and health care opportunities of disadvantaged

and neglected minority groups. As a society the U. S. needs to strive to provide and improve both the access to, and the quality of, medical care for all its residents.

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About the Author: Johnathan Tran is a 4th year pre-medical student at MCHS University. His personal experiences, including volunteering and interacting with members of the Hispanic community, have inspired him to concentrate his career aspirations on helping underserved and neglected communities. Johnathan's education continues to provide him with an understanding of the sciences and medical research, as well as the public health concerns of the Hispanic population. Johnathan hopes to gain further experience and knowledge through seeking opportunities with current health professionals and community leaders. Ultimately, he wants to apply the skills and knowledge he acquires to mitigate and alleviate human suffering due to infectious diseases and chronic illnesses.

Coming Apart: The Changing Relationship between Drug Overdose Deaths and Opioid Prescriptions in the United States

By

Cassandra Ferrara and Roger Clark

Abstract: The United States is in the grip of a drug overdose epidemic, with drug overdoses now taking more lives than suicides, motor vehicle accidents, gun shootings or homicides. We know from research that overdose death rates from heroin and fentanyl surged far ahead of those from prescription opioids after 2010. In this paper, we hypothesize that this change has resulted in a declining correlation between opioid prescription rates and overdose drug deaths among the states since 2010. And we find that, while there were, generally, increasingly strong positive correlations between opioid prescription rates and drug overdose deaths among the states between 2006 and 2010, there have been vastly decreasing correlations ever since then. This pattern implies a possible need for state-level policymakers to shift their focus, from curbing opioid prescription rates to ensuring access to addiction treatment for individuals already facing addiction to opioids.

Keywords: drug overdose crisis, prescription opioids, heroin and fentanyl, medication-assisted therapies

Introduction

In 2017, Americans suffered 70,236 deaths through drug overdoses (CDC 2019), considerably more deaths than they did through any of the following: suicides (nearly 45,000), motor vehicle accidents (40,100), gun shootings (15,549), homicides (17,284) or suicides (nearly 45,000) (Giaritelli 2018). This number was also considerably greater than the 58,220 Americans who died during the Vietnam War and more than four times the number (16,689) who died from drug overdoses in 1999 (Lopez, 2019). It is not hyperbole to say that the U.S. is in the grips of a drug epidemic. But it is also not an overstatement to say that if state agencies are to devise adequate measures to fight this epidemic, they will need to understand its nature and causes. This paper sheds some light on those causes.

If one marks, as some have (e.g., Okie 2010; Quinones 2015), the takeoff of the steep rise in death rates due to drug overdoses as the early 1990s, then, clearly, a major factor in the drug epidemic was the increased medical use of opioids. Until just before the 1990s the medical community had assumed that opioids were highly addictive and to be avoided (Quinones 2015: 15ff). But this attitude changed and a new, relaxed one was reinforced in part by the aggressive marketing of Oxycontin by Purdue Pharmacy after 1995 (Lopez 2019; Okie 2010). A flood of evidence shows that this marketing was a major cause of the initial increase in drug deaths (Hadland et al. 2019).

Of course, the enormous increase in the number of prescription opioids did not occur in a social vacuum. Numerous scholars (e.g., Case and Deaton, 2017; Case and Deaton, 2015a; Case and Deaton, 2015b; Stiglitz, 2015) have pointed to the despair that resulted from job opportunities lost to technical innovation and outsourcing as well as the declining marital fortunes of many Americans (Cherlin, 2009; Kenschaft, Clark and Ciambrone 2016) since the 1980s. This despair led to an unusual potential for many to use and misuse prescription opioids when they became easily available. When the radically increased supply of prescription drugs like Oxycontin met the radically increased despair of many Americans, the drug epidemic took off in earnest.

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considerably greater than the 58,220 Americans who died during the Vietnam War and more than four times the number (16,689) who died from drug overdoses in 1999 (Lopez 2009). It is not hyperbole to say that the U.S. is in the grips of a drug epidemic. But it is also not an overstatement to say that if state agencies are to devise adequate measures to fight this epidemic, they will need to understand its nature and causes. This paper sheds some light on those causes.

If one marks, as some have (e.g., Okie 2010; Quinones 2015), the takeoff of the steep rise in death rates due to drug overdoses as the early 1990s, then, clearly, a major factor in the drug epidemic was the increased medical use of opioids. Until just before the 1990s, the medical community had assumed that opioids were highly addictive and to be avoided (Quinones 2015: 15ff). But this attitude changed and a new, relaxed one was reinforced in part by the aggressive marketing of Oxycontin by Purdue Pharmacy after 1995 (Lopez 2019; Okie 2010). A flood of evidence shows that this marketing was a major cause of the initial increase in drug deaths (Hadland et al. 2019).

Of course, the enormous increase in the number of prescription opioids did not occur in a social vacuum. Numerous scholars (e.g., Case and Deaton 2017; Case and Deaton 2015a; Case and Deaton 2015b; Stiglitz 2015) have pointed to the despair that resulted from job opportunities lost to technical innovation and outsourcing as well as the declining marital fortunes of many Americans (Cherlin 2009; Kenschaft, Clark and Ciambrone 2016) since the 1980s. This despair led to an unusual potential for many to use and misuse prescription opioids when they became easily available. When the radically increased supply of prescription drugs like Oxycontin met the radically increased despair of many Americans, the drug epidemic took off in earnest.

This simple description of the causes of the great rise in drug overdose deaths between, say, 1999 and 2010, when the opioid death rate rose just under 300% and the opioid drug sales rose by just over 300% (Lopez 2019) had at least a couple of policy implications. On the demand side (or why folks were in the market for opioids) there seems to be an implicit call for better social supports: for more satisfying employment opportunities and for family assistance. As far as we can tell, few states seem to have included such policies explicitly as part of their efforts to tackle the drug overdose crisis. On the supply side, one might have expected greater efforts to regulate the supply of prescription opioids and the predatory marketing. In this regard, by 2015, states have had a better record, with 31 states adopting policies to educate prescribers about prescription drug misuse, 22 to educate pharmacists, 26 establishing guidelines for safe opioid prescribing, and 23 providing requirements for prescriber use of prescription monitoring programs by 2015 (Wickramatilake et al. 2017).

But the major causes of the phenomenal rise in drug deaths since 2010 seem to have been quite different from those of the pre-2010 period and this change may have major implications for policy. Between 2010 and 2017, overdose death rates from natural and semi-synthetic opioids such as Oxycontin increased only modestly, going up by less than 15%, while deaths from heroin increased four times, from 3,000 to 15,000, and deaths from synthetic opioids (like fentanyl) increased nine-fold, from 3,000 to 28,000 (Glickman and Weiner, 2019). The 43,000 deaths in 2017 due to heroin and fentanyl-like opioids constituted about 57% of the drug overdose deaths that year.

The reason why this change is significant for policy makers is that, if prescription drugs are no longer a major cause of the drug overdose epidemic, policies aimed at curbing the supply of prescription opioids may actually lead to increased deaths among the group of people already at risk for overdoses. In the absence of available prescription opioids, these people may feel forced to substitute more dangerous, and illegal, drugs (like heroin and fentanyl). Glickman and Weiner (2019), for example, distinguish between policies that "focus on reducing the *demand* for opioids—for example, by improving access to medication-assisted treatment" and policies that are aimed at "reducing the *supply* of opioids—for example, by increased monitoring and regulation of opioid prescribing." They argue that, given the drugs (heroin and fentanyl-like products) that seem to be driving the drug overdose epidemic today, putting more emphasis on the former policies makes sense.

However, this shift in focus assumes that prescription opioids are no longer a major driver of the epidemic. This is the issue we address in this paper. We examine the correlation between the opioid prescription rate and the drug overdose rate among the 50 states over the period 2006 to 2017. Based on our reading of the recent history of the drug overdose epidemic, we hypothesize that the correlation between prescriptions and drug deaths will have risen before about 2010 and may have declined thereafter.

Methods

Data about opioid prescription rates, both at the national and state levels, are from the Centers of Disease Control (CDC) in 2018. These data are available from 2006 to 2017. They are based upon information drawn from a sample of about 50,000 pharmacies every year, information about prescriptions for buprenorphine, codeine, fentanyl, hydrocodone, hydromorphone, methadone, morphine, oxycodone, oxymorphone, propoxyphene, tapentadol, and tramadol. They do not include products used for colds or coughs.

Data about drug overdose deaths, again at national and state levels, are from the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) in 2019. For purposes of comparison with the opioid prescription data, we use data from 2006 to 2017. KFF (2018) in turn received the data from the National Vital Statistics System.

Our initial analysis simply depicts the relationship between the overall opioid prescription rate and the drug overdose rate by year for the U. S. as a whole. However, our key concern is with the relationship between the two rates among the 50 states for each year between 2006 and 2017. We use the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) to calculate those correlations. Finally, we examine whether there might be lag periods that would improve the predictive capacity of opioid prescription rates for drug overdose deaths among the states.

Results

In Figure 1 we examine the relationship between opioid prescription rate per 100 and the drug overdose rate per 100,000 for the U.S. between 2006 and 2017. This figure shows that between 2006 and 2010, the relationship was generally positive: as the prescription rate increased so did the drug overdose rate. This result is consistent with findings from many other sources (e.g., Kolodney et al. 2019; Lopez 2019; Paulozzi et al. 2011; Volkow et al. 2014), most of which view prescription opioids as driving the overdose epidemic until at least 2010.

What Figure 1 also shows, though, is that soon after 2010 there was actually a negative relationship between the opioid prescription rate and the drug overdose rate, at least at the national level. This "coming apart" has been seen to be associated with two new developments. On the one hand, many states introduced policies, as we mentioned above, to make opioid prescriptions less likely to lead to addiction. In doing so, they likely engendered the decline in prescriptions depicted in the figure. On the other hand, those already addicted to opioids gained access to illegal opioids, like heroin and fentanyl. Such illegal drugs, because of their potency, were even more likely to lead to death (e.g., Economist 2017a; Economist 2017; Glickman and Weiner 2019). (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1. National Opioid Prescription Rates per 100 Persons and Drug Overdose Death Rate per 100,000 Persons for the Years 2006-2017



But just because the opioid prescription rate and the drug overdose rate at the national level have come apart does not mean that the correlation no longer exists at the state level. And it is at the state level that important drug policy is made. It is still possible, for instance, that those states that have the highest opioid prescription rates have the highest drug overdose rates and that the prescription rates remain a major cause of variation in drug death rates. After all, there remains huge variation in the prescription rates, with Alabama pharmacists (with a prescription rate of 107.3 per 100 persons) filling almost three times more prescriptions per person than those in Hawaii (37 per 100) (CDC 2018).

There also remains huge variation in the drug overdose death rates by state. However, there has also been considerable change in the rank ordering of states in terms of drug overdose death rates between 2006 and 2017. This change occurred more among states with the highest death rates than those with the lowest. Table 1 shows the five states with the highest and the five states with the lowest drug overdose death rates in both 2006 and 2017. One notable feature of the Table 1 is how little the composition of the states with the lowest

rates changed over the 11-year period. This would be especially true if North Dakota's rate in 2006 had not been unavailable in 2006. (Its rate, 4.8 per 100,000, was the lowest in the country in 2007.) Another remarkable feature of Table 1 is how relatively little the rates for the states with the lowest rates increased between 2006 and 2017. Iowa's rate of 11.5 drug deaths per 100,000, for instance, did not change at all between 2006 and 2017. A third significant feature of this table is how relatively much the rates for the states with the highest rates increased during the period. West Virginia's rate of 20.4 per 100,000 in 2006 almost tripled to 57.8 per 100,000 in 2017. A fourth notable feature is how the geographic concentration of the states with the highest rates changed between 2006 and 2017. In 2006 three of the five states (New Mexico, Utah and Nevada) lay west of the Mississippi River. But by 2017, none did, and the four with the highest rates (West Virginia, Ohio, Kentucky and Pennsylvania) formed a contiguous corridor of drug overdose deaths up the middle of the region east of the Mississippi. Many observers (e.g., Economist 2017b; Botelho et al. 2017) believe the eastward movement of the drug scourge has resulted from the location of the two major heroin markets in the United States. One, lying east of the Mississippi, predominantly receives a white heroin from Columbia. White heroin is sufficiently like the crushed pain pills that addicts grew used to during the first decade of the century that it made the switch from those pills to heroin a relatively easy one—and in turn made the switch over to fentanyl an easy one as well. A brown heroin market, pushed by Mexican suppliers, largely prevailed in states west of the Mississippi and "probably deterred many painkiller addicts from trying the drug (i.e., heroin), and has kept synthetic opioids at bay" (Economist 2017b). (See Table 1.)

In any case, the tremendous variation by state in both opioid prescription rates and the drug death rates means it was still possible that the two could have remained highly correlated after 2010. In fact, however, the correlation between prescription rates and drug death rates for the 50 states declined greatly since 2010. Figure 2 shows that the correlation (Pearson's r) plummeted dramatically from a high of +.65 in 2010 to +.11 in 2017 and did so essentially monotonically. (See Figure 2.) Moreover, Figure 3, which graphs the R-squared values (multiplied by 100) for each of these correlations, depicts the dramatic reduction in the amount of variance in the

Table 1. States with the Highest and Lowest Drug Overdose Deaths Rates in 2006 and 2017

(Rates are Per 100,000 Residents)

States with **Highest Rates** in 2006	States with **Highest Rates** in 2017
New Mexico 21.8	West Virginia 57.8
West Virginia 20.4	Ohio 46.3
Utah 19.1	Pennsylvania 44.3
Nevada 18.1	Kentucky 37.2
Kentucky 17.4	New Hampshire 37.0
States with Lowest Rates in 2006	**States with Lowest Rates in 2017**
South Dakota 5.1	Nebraska 8.1
Nebraska 5.4	South Dakota 8.5
Minnesota 5.9	North Dakota 9.2
Hawaii 6.4	Iowa 11.5
Iowa 11.5	Montana 11.7

Source: Kaiser Family Foundation Data (2019)

drug death rates across states that can be predicted (or explained) by opioid prescription rates: from 42% in 2010 to 1% in 2017. (See Figure 3.)

Figure 2. Correlations of Opioid Prescription Rates and Drug Death Rates by State for the Years 2006-2017



Figure 3. Percentage of Variance in the Drug Overdose Death Rate by State, Explained by the Opioid Prescription for the Years 2006-2017



We note that by correlating the drug overdose death rate with the opioid prescription rate in any given year we have not necessarily captured the appropriate lag period between the two variables. Further analysis indicates that correlations were substantially increased when a lag of anywhere between two to four years was employed, but that the lag period that maximized the correlation between the drug overdose rate and the opioid prescription rate depended on the particular year. Figure 4, however, captures the amount of variance explained when a four-year lag was used—the lag that maximized the correlation for the greatest number of the years under study. Even using the four-year lag, though, it is clear that the amount of variance explained by the opioid prescription rate has dropped substantially since 2010—from about 42.4% in 2010 to about 6.5% in 2017. We do not have data at this point for 2018 or 2019, but we think it is very likely that even with the lag the variance explained by the opioid prescription rate would hover just above zero percent. (See Figure 4.)

Figure 4. Percentage of Variance in Drug Death Rate Explained by Opioid Prescription Rate 4 years Earlier



CONCLUSION

The major contribution of this paper is the finding that very little of the current variation in recent drug overdose death rates among U. S. states can be attributed to variation in states' opioid prescription rates. This is a marked change from the beginning of the decade when more than 40% of that variation could be explained by the prescription rates alone. This result might have been expected, given the dramatic change in the kinds of the drugs that are most implicated in opioid-related deaths between 2010 and 2017—a change from prescription opioids to illicit heroin and fentanyl-like drugs (e.g., Botelho et al. 2017; Glickman and Weiner 2019; Scholl et al. 2019). But the decline in the variance explained in state drug overdose rates by state opioid prescription rates was not a necessary implication of the increase in the significance of heroin and fentanyl. Despite a general decline in the opioid prescription rate in the U.S. since 2010, it was still possible that this rate could be highly correlated with the drug death rate among the states. But we find that it is not.

Care is needed when deriving policy implications from any single empirical study. But we feel the suggestion made by Glickman and Weiner (2019)—that at least some

states may want to moderate policies that would curb the supply of prescription opioids and upgrade efforts to improve access to medication-assisted treatments—makes sense for at least three reasons. First, the supply of prescription opioids is not strongly associated any longer with the drug overdose rate—the finding of this paper. Second, curbing the supply of prescription opioids may actually compel those addicted to prescription opioids--whether obtained legally or not—to turn to more dangerous alternatives like heroin and fentanyl. Third, the evidence that policies aimed at reducing the supply of prescription opioids actually reduce drug deaths is at best equivocal, and some of it suggests that such policies have led to the substitution of heroin for prescription opioids among those already addicted to those opioids (e.g., Paulozzi et al. 2014; Alpert et al. 2018; Pitt et al. 2018).

We are not entirely comfortable with the part of Glickman and Weiner's argument that would have all states disinvest in stemming the supply of prescription opioids to their people. Especially in states, like Nebraska, South Dakota and North Dakota, where drug death rates remain low, reducing the supply of opioid pain relievers that are not absolutely necessary should reduce the number of people who develop new opioid addictions. However, evidence from our analysis (and that of others) makes us feel relatively confident that greater investment in stemming this supply in states where addiction rates are high would be misplaced. Given that the number of people who already die from drug use disorders is so high in states like Ohio, Kentucky, West Virginia, Pennsylvania and rural New England, we feel that policies aimed at the treatment and functional recovery of addicts deserve additional support. Volkow et al. (2014) write of three kinds of medication-assisted therapies (MATs) for patients with opioid addictions: methadone, buprenphine and naitraxone. They also speak of the substantial underuse of all three of these medications as of 2012, when a National Survey on Drug Use and Health estimated that only about two of every five Americans declaring an opioid dependency received a MAT for his or her opioid addiction. It is likely that such a survey underestimated the number of people with addictions and therefore overestimated the percentage that was receiving treatment.

One limitation of our study is the absence of any controls for the relationship between opioid prescription rates and drug overdose rates. Bivariate analyses can be suggestive but cannot be considered definitive. Unfortunately, data about some of the most plausible suppressor variables—such as the heroin and fentanyl use rates by state—are simply unavailable at this point in time. It may be that future drug use surveys will give us some handle on plausible suppressor variables. However, at this point such variables remain elusive.

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About the Authors: Cassandra Ferrara is a student at Rhode Island College studying Sociology. **Roger Clark** is Professor of Sociology at Rhode Island College, where he teaches Research Methods and the Sociology of Gender.

Reflections on *Daring Greatly: How the Courage to be Vulnerable Transforms the Way We Live, Love, Parent and Lead*

By

Ann Marie Palmisciano

I first discovered the book ***Daring Greatly: How the Courage to be Vulnerable Transforms the Way We Live, Love, Parent and Lead*** by Brené Brown, PhD, LMSW (Penguin-Random House, 2012), when I viewed Dr. Brown's two-part lecture series (Oprah's Life Class) on the topic of vulnerability on Oprah Winfrey's television network (OWN). In these talks, the author speaks from her personal place of vulnerability, revealing that she intended to keep her work and career "small." Dr. Brown's TED talk, viewed by millions on the Internet, went viral, however, propelling her into un-anticipated, un-intended fame. ***Daring Greatly...*** continues to be Number 1 on the ***New York Times*** Best Seller list. Brown, who has dedicated the last decade of her life to studying, analyzing, and reflecting upon the theme of vulnerability, awakens a nation's conscience. She taps into a universal yearning, a hunger to connect, a longing to be heard, understood, and validated.

In this book, Dr. Brown begins a necessary, relevant, and healing conversation, especially in our times. At its root is the observation that we are social creatures. Although **Daring Greatly…** has some weaknesses, it also contains treasures worth exploring.

The book title was inspired by an iconic speech, entitled 'Citizenship in a Republic," that Theodore Roosevelt delivered in Paris, France on April 23, 1910. Roosevelt's speech, which Dr. Brown uses to open her book, was about the courage to persevere in the face of failure and adversity and "to dare greatly" (Roosevelt 1910). We can choose to keep our world small or have the courage to dare greatly and be vulnerable. She reminds us that:

> "Vulnerability is not weakness, and the uncertainty, risk, and emotional exposure we face every day are not optional. Our only choice is a question of engagement. Our willingness to own and engage with our vulnerability determines the depth of our courage and the clarity of our purpose; the level to which we protect ourselves from being vulnerable is a measure of our fear and disconnection." (p. 2)

Daring Greatly… has a wonderful inter-disciplinary appeal with poetic, political, spiritual, philosophical, and sociological dimensions. For example, vulnerability is a *process* a spiritual *practice*, what Brown calls "living *Wholeheartedly*," or an "authentic life." Vulnerability is born from, and thrives in, a place of empathy and compassion and is the polar opposite of pity, selfishness, sympathy, and entitlement. Choosing vulnerability means embracing the risky, bumpy journey of a seeker-what Silvia Plath called in ***The Bell Jar***, a search for "the unvarnished truth." Brown recognizes that vulnerability is *earned* over time, like trust, loyalty, and friendship. These are not gifts to be taken lightly or given away like free samples in a supermarket.

In focusing on the theme of vulnerability, Dr. Brown has her finger on the pulse of loneliness, isolation, and despair. With the skills of an archeologist, she excavates the human need for social engagement, interaction, connectedness, thereby, "bridging the gap" of what Mary Daly (1984) calls "the diaspora of women."

Dr. Brown discusses "armor" and the "arena." "Armor" refers to the walls we put up to protect ourselves from failure, rejection, and emotional harm. The "arena" is the context in which people practice vulnerability. Men and women face being vulnerable in radically different, diametrically-opposed, contexts. In a sexist and racist society, the glaring imbalance of power based on gender, racial, and other social differences determines how vulnerability can flourish, or continue to be unexpressed, 'go underground' like the protagonist in

Ralph Ellison's (1952) ***Invisible Man***. Like women, men also suffer from "practicing vulnerability." Traditionally, boys have been taught, from an early age, to repress tenderness, sensitivity, love, and emotion. They are told that "big boys don't cry." Unfortunately, an inability to recognize the depths of gender discrimination clouds the lens through which we perceive the spiritual and psychological costs of "practicing vulnerability." Dr. Brown recognizes that "practicing vulnerability" can sometimes lead to a broken heart but never to abandoning *Hope*. She realizes that, in the end, one's choice to be in the "arena" is not only worth it but also necessary for human growth, evolution, and consciousness.

In ***Daring Greatly…***, Dr. Brown distinguishes between "shame" and "guilt." She perceives shame as unhealthy, fruitless "self talk." In contrast, "guilt" serves as a sort or moral compass, keeping our values and ethics in check. Dr. Brown views guilt as a potentially positive map to guide one's life. Analyzed within the context of sexism, however, I disagree with her view that guilt can be healing and productive. In contrast, guilt functions to keep women stuck in vicious cycles of self-blame. I think that excessive guilt stunts women's minds like the bonsai tree in Marge Piercy's iconic poem, "A Work of Artifice" (1999). Although there are nuances between "shame" and "guilt," in my opinion, both distract women from feminist freedom.

A sociological strength of Brown's work is her observation on the importance of what she calls "self talk." "Self talk" is how we talk to ourselves, the unedited 'script in the head,' what we tell ourselves about our self esteem, self worth, confidence, and bravery. If, for example, women see ourselves as courageous survivors, "self-talk" opens the door to living, realizing, and actualizing that reality. In short, what we name ourselves, we become.

One of Dr. Brown's gifts is her seamlessness between data (quantitative) and countless hundreds of interviews (qualitative). Working in the grounded-theory methodology allows the interviews to speak for themselves. At the same time, recognizing this need for balance, objectivity, and neutrality is, in itself, a kind of a lens.

I also appreciate Dr. Brown's passages on "perfectionism." She reveals "perfectionism" as a false, narcissistic concept, a false construct. Brown clearly recognizes the deep divide between perfectionism and striving for scholarly excellence. Striving for excellence occurs not in spite of our flaws but because of them. Our shortcomings are our finest teachers. In almost subliminal ways, this observation leads to understanding the differences between (hurtful) criticism versus the joy of critical thinking.

There are certain weaknesses in ***Daring Greatly….*** One weakness is that vulnerability lacks agency. It is not a neutral word or understood in a vacuum. Rather, vulnerability is contextual, "loaded." A second weakness is that Dr. Brown fails to recognize that, in a male-dominated society, women are groomed, coached and rewarded for being vulnerable. Exposing our salted wounds under patriarchy carries great spiritual and emotional risk, making women proverbial moving targets. Here are my wounds. Hurt me here. Third, Brown's use of the terms "folks," "us," and "people" to refer to both men and women masks the reality of sexism/patriarchy/gynocide. Thus, the dangers of sexism, racism, and classism go unrecognized. In an odd statement (intended to be humorous?) Brown proclaims "I am the patriarchy" (p. 95).

Despite its weaknesses, ***Daring Greatly…*** is a book that will inspire most readers from beginning to end. Some will find it a challenge to read. In either case, reading this book is, undoubtedly, worth the effort.

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About the Reviewer: Ann Marie Palmisciano earned her B. A. degree in Sociology and Political Theory from Providence College. Under the direction of Professor Mary Daly, she completed an M. A. in Political Theory and Feminist Philosophy from Boston College. Ms. Palmisciano also earned a second Master's Degree, an MTS (Master of Theological Studies) in Feminist Spirituality and Black History, from Harvard University. She is currently finalizing her manuscript of poems, entitled ***psalms for Sophie***, which is a tribute to her mother.

Book Review of *Being Grandma and Grandpa: Grandparents Share Advice, Insights and Experiences*

By

Roger Clark

Just over 6 years ago my daughter-in-law gave birth to my first grandchild. I was thrilled, of course, but also a bit apprehensive. Most of my own personal role models for grand parenting had lived at some distance from their grandchildren and only a couple of them had developed what I would call vital and significant relationships with their grandchildren. My own grandparents (oddly, my mother's father had married my father's mother after their respective spouses died) had lived 100 miles away and, while I knew them well enough to respect and be fond of them both, my vivid memories of them were few in number. And I wanted to develop a deeper relationship with my grandson than either of them did with me.

I would have been less anxious, I believe, if I had been able to lay my hands on ***Being Grandma and Grandpa: Grandparents Share Advice, Insights and Experiences*** (Emily Stier Adler and Michele Hoffnung. Grand Publications: 2018. ISBN: 9780-692-13223-4; $20). This new book is full of wisdom for new grandparents, for grandparents who've been at it for a while, but would like to establish better relationships with their grandchildren, and perhaps especially for grandparents who live at some distance from their grandchildren but would like to establish an emotional closeness with them.

Not your usual "how to" book authors, Adler and Hoffnung ground their advice in the results of interviews with 224 grandparents. Theirs is a non-probability sample of 156 grandmothers and 68 grandfathers. Grandfathers tended to be more reluctant to respond than grandmothers, perhaps because they were, on the whole, somewhat less active grandparents than grandmothers. (Full disclosure: I was one of the grandfathers they talked with.) The authors realize their sample may not be representative, acknowledging that their respondents may generally be atypically-engaged grandparents. But such engagement is no bad thing for gaining insight into the ways of those who grandparent with pleasure, the likely goal of most readers. As social scientists and grandparents, Adler and Hoffnung bring expertise to their data and a passion to their writing. ***Being Grandma and Grandpa…*** makes for an enlightening and stimulating read.

Perhaps the key piece of advice that bubbles up: if you want to establish a good relationship with your grandchildren, maintain or establish a good one with their parents. This probably means recognizing that challenging parental authority is, in almost all cases, a losing proposition. What one grandmother said of her daughter-in-law might be said of any grandparent/parent relationship, "with daughters-in-law you need to watch what you say. I learned this very quickly and now I keep my nose out of things." The authors point out that this does not mean that a grandparent cannot establish "grandparent rules" when you have been asked to provide childcare. But it does mean not giving unwanted advice . . . at least not too frequently.

The compensations for such restraint are almost inevitable. This is largely because parents almost always need outside resources to parent successfully and one of the most precious resources is their own parents or stepparents. One of the useful things about this book is that Adler and Hoffnung do *not* rely simply on their own interview respondents, but also manage to confirm many of their insights with research based on even more representative samples, sometimes involving parents rather than just grandparents. Thus, when they suggest that parents need their own parents as resources, they are able to cite a British survey that found that almost two-thirds of parents cited their own parents as the most supportive people or helping agencies in their lives.

Grandparents who live close to their grandchildren, for example, are often called upon to provide childcare. This care is more likely to be requested of, and given by, relatively young grandparents, studies show (where relatively young, I'm happy to report, includes those of us in our early 70s). But most grandparents give it happily . . . up to a point. And Adler and Hoffnung provide advice about what one should do once that point is passed: establish boundaries. But this advice is, as is practically all advice in the book, nuanced, often qualified by recognition of individual circumstance. One grandfather, for instance, suggests that his need for boundaries is greater than his wife's when he says, "I don't want to feel like a 'doormat' and have the grandkids dumped on me every time they want to go somewhere. I think parents need to be sensitive to this. I'm the one who says 'no' to them more often– no candy, etc. I've noticed that my wife is more of the 'good cop' and won't deny them things."

But for grandparents who live at some distance it's not so much a matter of establishing boundaries as it is of overcoming the boundary of distance. And it's grandparents who live at such distances who may be most helped by *Grandma and Grandpa*. My grandparents did not have access to FaceTime or Skype or ustyme (another video chat program that also provides access to a "library of e-books and games that can be used for shared reading and play"). But they happened to be wealthy enough, even in the 1950s, to afford some of the other things suggested by Adler and Hoffnung's respondents: e.g., visits or joint trips.

In fact, one of the book's nine chapters (Chapter 8) is completely devoted to grandparenting at a distance. Chapter 2 discusses variations in the grandparenting experience, including grandparenting when either the grandparents or the parents undergo, or have undergone, divorce and when grandchildren are adopted. Chapter 4 reflects on how grandparents need to adapt as grandchildren age and their interests change. (What? My grandson won't drop everything just to be with me when he becomes a teenager?)

Two core chapters (Chapters 7 and 8) focus on the benefits of active grandparenting—for the grandchildren, the parents and the grandparents—and the ways to be an active grandparent—including helping out parents, with their permission. The grand finale (Chapter 9) identifies resources for grandparents. I have already consulted several of the websites listed recommending grandparent/grandchild travel destinations.

Adler and Hoffnung have limited the scope of their project to grandparents who live independently and are *not* the primary caretakers of their grandchildren. I happened to run into a woman at my doctor's office while I was reading their book, a woman who had just taken over the care of her unmarried son's infant girl, and I thought to myself, "This is someone who could use a few tips not provided by ***Being Grandma and Grandpa…***" Perhaps someone reading this volume of ***Sociology between the Gaps*** will engage in the study that generates those tips.

But for those of us who have the potential to reap from grandparenting what one of Adler and Hoffnung's respondents called "the joy of parenting . . . without the day-to-day responsibility and oversight," I highly recommend ***Being Grandma and Grandpa….***

About the Reviewer: In addition to being a Professor of Sociology at Rhode Island College, where he teaches Research Methods and Sociology of Gender, **Roger Clark** is also a devoted and loving grandfather.

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Film Review of *The Farewell*

By

Emily Stier Adler

"The Farewell" (2019), based on writer and director Lulu Wang's experiences and those of her extended family, is a gentle and often funny film covering many sociological topics. Chief among them are the cultural practices around serious illness, caring for the elderly, the place of food in family gatherings, expressing emotions, cemetery and burial rituals, and the Chinese-American immigrant experience.

Opening with the message that the film is "based on an actual lie" the film focuses on Billi (played with charm and grace by Awkwafina), a millennial New Yorker who left the northeastern Chinese city of Changchun as a six-year old. Billi remains close to her grandmother although she has not returned to China for a visit. Nia Nia (Mandarin for paternal grandmother), Nia Nia's sister and her children and many other relatives stayed. As the film opens, Nia Nia's sister is told about Nia Nia's illness -- stage 4 lung cancer. The central issue is whether to tell Nia Nia about the diagnosis. The doctors and hospital honor the family's decision to keep the information from Nia Nia. Except for Billi, all agree that Nia Nia *not* be told she has only months to live. One family member tells Billi that while Billi thinks one's life belongs to one's self, it does not. Instead, one's life belongs to the family. The family has a duty to carry the emotional burden of a family member's illness so that the person can have joy in her final days.

This Chinese tradition is in direct contradiction to Billi's understanding of the American practice of telling the truth about illness. Billi questions the family, asking if grief should be allowed expression and the dying given a chance to say farewell. The family is adamant that they will not tell Nia Nia and, in order to visit before her death, the family gathers in Changchun for a (faux?) wedding of a cousin who lives in Japan.

Billi ignores her parents' request to stay home for fear she has become too American to hide her emotions and give away the secret. Showing up at Nia Nia's house at first Billi's grief is as apparent as is her joy seeing Nia Nia and rediscovering her homeland and kin. The strong emotional bond among all family members and Nia Nia is clear even as they keep the truth from her.

For her part, Nia Nia never learns the seriousness of her illness and we see her as energetic and competent despite some symptoms. She does her morning exercises and organizes the elaborate wedding banquet for extended family and friends, happy to be in control and having her two sons and their families with her for the first time in decades.

In addition to the central issue of how to deal with serious illness, the film covers other cultural practices. In one scene, the family visits a cemetery to pay respect to Billi's deceased grandfather. Traditional Chinese customs including professional mourners who weep loudly while accompanying family mourners are depicted. Nia Nia and the family gather around the grave, burn things as a sacrifice, say some prayers, leave food the grandfather liked and debate about leaving a lit cigarette as he had been a smoker.

Food sustains immigrants on their real and cultural journeys and helps them bridge the gap between the familiar and unfamiliar (Kershen, 2002). In Changchun, Billi and her family eat familiar food and, as in many cultures, engage in many conversations around a table. In many scenes the family talks over food at home, in restaurants and at the wedding banquet with huge crabs and other delicacies in abundance at each meal. The wedding banquet is especially elaborate with a great many friends and relatives in attendance and a great deal of eating, drinking and smoking. Emotional

karaoke and toasts complete the banquet.

Billi's return to China and the large extended clan she doesn't remember after years of living in a small nuclear family in New York illuminates the immigrant experience. Neither fully Chinese nor fully American, Billi must accept her divided identity as a Chinese American and learn to be herself. The differences in cultural values are apparent in the comment made by an uncle. He says that in China, one's life is part of the whole while Americans pursue individual happiness. Billi and her parents seem to exhibit "shifted identity" (Liu, 2015) where cultural identity is constantly negotiated and reconstructed as a sort of alternating identity, rather than blending their cultural identities together. This kind of identity is favored by many immigrants as they navigate bicultural environments to fit in different contexts (Liu, 2015).

In one cultural shift, Billi offers to stay behind to take care of her grandmother rather than leaving her in the care of Nia Nia's sister and niece. But her offer is rejected and Billi returns to America and her own work with her grandmother's blessing. Nia Nia tells her "Your mind is very powerful. You will succeed."

"The Farewell," largely in Mandarin with subtitles and an all Asian cast, speaks to the specific as well as to the universal. Billi and her family share love, face leaving home and saying goodbye to Nia Nia probably for the last time. Although Nia Nia is this family's matriarch, we are all touched by their experiences.

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About the Reviewer: Emily Stier Adler is Professor Emerita of Sociology at Rhode Island College. She continues to teach the Sociology of Aging and does research on a variety of topics including retirement and grandparenting. She and psychologist Michele Hoffnung are the authors of ***Being Grandma and Grandpa: Grandparents Share Advice, Insights and Experiences*** (2019) available in paperback and as an ebook.

Film Review of *Poms*

By

Josephine A. Ruggiero

"Poms" (2019) is a movie about coming to terms with serious illness, achieving an unfulfilled dream, and forming meaningful relationships with others, old and young. This offbeat comedy/drama from director Zara Hayes and screenwriter Shane Atkinson, stars Diane Keaton as Martha, a frail-looking but strong-willed retiree who has been given a terminal cancer diagnosis.

This film begins with Martha advertising an estate sale of items she has set up an alleyway in the large, unnamed city where she has lived in the same apartment for 46 years. She is relocating to Sun Springs, a retirement community in the state of Georgia. The move is, apparently, part of Martha's last hurrah. She has no children or other relatives with whom to spend her last days; so, Martha is relocating to a sunny environment to live out the rest of her life among strangers.

If she is hoping to be alone, however, Martha has chosen the wrong setting. From Vicki (played by Celia Weston), the Southern belle head of the retirement community, to Sheryl (played by Jackie Weaver), Martha's overly friendly sometimes pushy, neighbor, to Officer Karl (played by Bruce McGill), the head of security, someone is always around watching the activities and the comings and goings of the retirees.

After noticing that Martha is trying to hole herself up in her house, Sheryl decides to encourage Martha to be more social. She begins by trying to draw Martha into an illicit poker game at Sheryl's house next door. Martha declines but then is annoyed at the noise from next door when she is trying to sleep. After Martha complains to Karl about the noise at Sheryl's house, Sheryl and the other poker players sneak over to Martha's place to hide from Karl. Along with Sheryl and the other poker players comes Ben, Sheryl's high school-aged grandson, who secretly lives with Sheryl. Martha refuses to join the game a second time and goes to bed leaving the poker players to their game in her living room.

Soon after Martha moves in to Sun Springs, Vicki tells Martha that everyone in the retirement community must join at least one club. If members do not find a club they like, they can apply for permission to form a club of their own. Sheryl stops by Martha's place one afternoon and notices Martha's old cheerleading outfit in a box in her living room. In a pivotal scene in the movie, Sheryl learns that Martha wanted to be a cheerleader in high school. Martha had done the training to be on her high school cheering squad but decided to drop out of the squad in her senior year to care for her ill mother. So, Martha never got to be a cheerleader in high school. Sheryl views the cheerleading outfit that Martha could have thrown away years before, but did not, as an unfulfilled dream of Martha's. She tells Martha that it is not too late to realize her dream by starting a cheerleading club at Sun Springs. Sheryl also tells Martha she will help with the club if Martha agrees to teach Ben how to drive. Martha agrees reluctantly and the two set out to find six other women to participate in the new club.

Things do not go smoothly for either Martha or the prospective cheerleading club. After some plot twists and turns, Martha and Sheryl finally end up with a total of eight members. However, except for Martha, the other women interested in the club are klutzes who will need a lot of practice to improve. Martha remembers many of the cheerleading drills she learned in high school and sets out to teach them to the women. Vicki and some of the other members of the application committee try to stop the cheerleading club from forming and, subsequently, from practicing in a building at Sun Springs.

Sheryl, a substitute teacher at Ben's high school, comes up with an alternate plan for a practice venue. Unfortunately, she does not tell Martha and the other women that they will be practicing their routine *after* the high school cheerleaders practice theirs at a school-wide rally. It comes as no surprise to viewers that the older women are rattled and mess up some of the cheers. Cloe, a student in Sheryl's class and a high school cheerleader, captures everything on her cell phone and sends the video to the other girls on her squad. The teenagers think it is amusing that the older women want to be cheerleaders at their ages. Another high school cheerleader sends the video to the internet where it goes viral. The older women are devastated. Sheryl is angry. When Cloe tries to apologize, Sheryl convinces her to coach the women after school so that they can improve their drills.

Cloe agrees reluctantly. Her coaching and the club's hard work pay off when the women enter a cheerleading contest for performers who are 18 years and older. Once the contest organizers find out that the women are much older than 18, they try to disqualify them from participating in the contest based on their ages. Martha argues that the women meet the age criterion of being 18 plus. Officer Karl backs Martha up and implies that police action for age discrimination could follow if the contest organizers prevent the women from performing.

The contest organizers acquiesce. The women's flawless performance on stage stuns both the judges and the audience. Through persistence and hard work, the cheerleading club turns their initial failure into success. They challenge the stereotype about older people "being over the hill" after they retire.

Although this film has gotten mixed reviews in the press because of obscene or profane language and some sexual comments Sheryl makes, both adults and older teens should find "Poms" worth seeing. From a sociologist's perspective, a number of sociologically-relevant qualities are embedded in the plot's twists and turns. First, this film challenges stereotypes about older people on several levels by showing viewers that aging is a normal part of the life cycle. "Poms" makes the point that the interests of retirees, including having close relationships—especially of the women as they bond with each other during cheerleading practices, breaking the rules sometimes, and doing fun things, are not so different from the interests of younger people.

However, the sad reality is that many older people in the U.S. are *not* adequately prepared for outliving their parents and grandparents by decades. As young workers, they look forward to retirement some day and hope to retire to travel and a leisurely life; but living an independent, healthy life in which retirees make choices about where and how they live is not the case for all older people (See Hannon 2016). Regarding finances in retirement, Josephson (2019) reports statistics that show "around half of American households have no retirement savings at all and, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), around 29% of households age 55 and older have neither retirement savings nor a pension."

Fortunately, Martha seems to have planned sufficiently well for retirement. Unlike Martha, however, many retirees count on Social Security benefits being enough to get them through retirement. However, Social Security was only intended to *supplement* people's monthly incomes from all sources during retirement. Living well as we age requires accumulating enough capital, including savings, investments, and a pension, starting as early as one's 30s.

Second, the socialization process in western societies does *not* prepare people adequately for death and dying. Death is an unknown and people tend to fear the unknown. In traditional societies, people rely on faith, religious affiliation and extended family to help them deal with the unknowns. In contemporary, secularized societies, many fewer people are grounded in faith, religious affiliation/ritual, or strong extended family ties.

Third, like Martha at the beginning of the film, the lack of loved ones and the onset of serious illness can leave older people feeling isolated or detached from others. Even those in good health may think that making new friends later in life is not possible or just too hard. "Poms" contradicts such assumptions by showing that meaningful interaction with others is essential to the quality of our lives *at every age*.

Fourth, the film includes an inter-generational element: Cloe and Ben develop new insights about the older women with whom they interact. After getting to know the women well and coming to care for them, Cloe says that she now has many grandmothers. Early in the film when Martha is teaching Ben to drive, he tells her that his classmates think he is weird because he lives with his grandmother in a retirement community. By the end of the film, Ben realizes his relationship with his grandmother is special because she has taken on the important role of raising him, a role that his parents *should be* playing in his life but are not. As the film progresses, both teens grow as individuals. Ben becomes more confident as he demonstrates his music-mixing skills which provide the background for the

club's performances. Cloe meets the challenges and expectations of her new roles as coach and mentor to the older cheerleaders. The teens' personal relationship also blossoms as they interact with each other to support the women's practices and performances.

"Poms" ends on a positive note, leaving film viewers thinking that people are never too old to be loved and valued and they can fulfill dreams at any age, especially with help and support from friends. Martha fulfills her cheerleading dream before she dies and forms important, sustaining relationships in the process. After she passes, the club continues their cheerleading performances in Martha's memory and to raise awareness about ovarian cancer. Not only has Martha achieved a dream important to her personally but she has also left a legacy for other women at Sun Springs to enjoy.

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About the Author: Josephine A. Ruggiero is Professor Emerita of Sociology at Providence College. During her four-decade long teaching career there, she taught Research Methods, Social Statistics, Social Change, Applied Sociology, Introduction to Sociology, Internships for Women's Studies and sociology students, and Independent Studies.

Leap of Faith: My Sons' Adoption Stories, the Journey Continues

By

Janice G. Schuster

"…belonging comes in all shapes and sizes, visible and invisible, hidden and made, chosen and found." (Sentilles 2018: 32)

BACKGROUND

There is an ongoing need for families to provide foster and adoptive homes for children who are currently in state custody. In federal fiscal year 2015, for example, there were 10,283 children in the Massachusetts foster care system, with 6,245 of them entering in that fiscal year alone. In the United States, there were 427,901 children in foster care during fiscal year 2015, with 269,499 of them entering in that year alone.

When I compared Massachusetts' foster care statistics with those for the U. S. in general, I noted four similarities. First, the average length of time children spent in foster care was 20 months both in Massachusetts and in the United States overall. Second, the percentage of children who were in foster care for five or more years was nearly the same in Massachusetts (5%) as it was in the United States (6%). Third, males (52%) slightly outnumbered females (48%) in foster care both in Massachusetts and in the United States overall. Fourth, the racial breakdown of children in care in Massachusetts was similar to that of children in care in the United States: 47% of the children in Massachusetts foster care were white, whereas, in the United States overall, 43% of the children in care were white. In Massachusetts 53% were African American, Hispanic or Latino, Asian, of multiple races, American Indian/Alaskan Native, and Pacific Islander, and in the United States in general, 54% were of those races. (AFCARS Report for FY 2015 and Children in Foster Care Waiting for Adoption by Race and Hispanic Origin).

In 2018, the Foster Parent Ambassador from the Department of Children and Families (DCF), Brockton office, sent a letter to Pearl Street United Methodist Church, among other faith-based groups, to "…let people know of the ongoing need to identify families to care for children in need of foster and adoptive placements…We are always in need of foster families to help care for these children who cannot remain at home because of parental abuse or neglect." (Allen 2018). The need is also emphasized on the DCF website: "Children are sometimes temporarily placed in foster care because their parents aren't able to give them the care they need…There's a need for foster parents across Massachusetts, from all diverse backgrounds." (Department of Children and Families website, https://www.mass.gov/foster-care).

In addition to parental abuse and/or neglect, dire economic constraints, and other factors, the drug abuse crisis in Massachusetts also contributes to the need for foster and adoptive families. "Some of the youngest victims of the opioid drug abuse epidemic are children who need safe and nurturing homes. Social workers describe the need for more foster families as urgent and critical…The number of children in foster care with the state Department of Children and Families has gone up 38 percent from 2012 to 2017 statewide…" (Myers 2017).

UPDATE

In my previous Point of View essay (Schuster 2015), I wrote about my family's experiences adopting our two sons, Kirk and Jordan. I had two goals in writing

that first essay: to encourage anyone interested in adoption to explore doing so through the state foster care system and to share my family's positive adoption experiences. My husband, Tim Southern, and I went through the adoption process in Massachusetts to bring Jordan and Kirk into our family. Based on my family's experiences, I believe that adoption through the state foster care system can be an overall positive experience. However, prospective adoptive parents of a child or children who has/have been adopted from the foster care system should expect realistically to encounter at least some challenges along the way. These parents should have appropriate post-placement services lined up in anticipation of possible issues.

In this follow-up to our family's story I provide an update on how our sons have been doing in the three years since I wrote my original essay. Kirk is now 24 years old and Jordan is 21. My husband and I are very proud of how productive our sons have become since we adopted them at ages 3 and 2 respectively. Regarding milestones, both Kirk and Jordan have continued their education after high school and both are working in professional positions. Both young men are trying to be independent, which we encourage; but we also want them to know that we will always be available if and when they need us. Kirk and Jordan exhibit good judgment for the most part. When they are considering something that we feel is not in their best interest, we try to give them objective advice; then we let them make their own decisions.

Kirk and Jordan take responsibility for their mistakes and seem to be open to learning when things do not go as planned. An example of this happened last year when Kirk was training for his new position at Core Medical. Kirk admitted to his supervisor that he had made a mistake in calling a prospective client. Kirk did not try to blame anyone else for his mistake, and he told his supervisor that he wanted to learn and do better. I am proud of the maturity he exhibited.

KIRK: Kirk graduated from high school in 2012. He was in his third year at Plymouth State University (PSU) in Plymouth, New Hampshire, in 2015 when I wrote my original Point of View piece. Kirk had average high school grades. However, he was accepted at PSU for two reasons: He did well on the SATs, and the PSU football coach recruited him to play on the team. During his freshman year at PSU, Kirk wrote a paper on finding his birth family. That paper was the basis for his Point of View essay which was published in Volume 1 of ***Sociology between the Gaps*** (Schuster-Southern 2015).

At PSU, Kirk studied Business with a concentration in Marketing/Sales. He struggled with academics but worked hard. When necessary, he asked for help or advice and took the help and advice that he received seriously. Kirk spent five years as a PSU student and successfully completed all but three courses required to earn his degree. He fell behind in earning his degree mainly because he changed his major during his sophomore year.

Kirk was allowed to participate in commencement at PSU in 2017, even though he had not finished all his degree requirements. In January 2018, he completed one of the courses online. He is currently (summer of 2018) enrolled in another online course. Kirk's goal is to finish the remaining course and to receive his degree by the end of 2018.

While in college Kirk worked as a sales person for Vector Marketing, which sells Cutco knives. He worked at an office during the summers of 2013 and 2014. He managed his own offices, in Acton, MA (2015), and Plaistow, NH (2016.) As the office manager, Kirk was responsible for finding and negotiating leases for office space; hiring and training salespeople and office staff; overseeing all office operations; and doing some selling.

Kirk matured greatly during his time with Vector. The company taught him appropriate business behavior and attire, time management skills, how to set and achieve personal and professional goals, and the importance of following through. He has applied those skills both to his college studies and to his current sales position.

Kirk is currently living in Manchester, NH, and started a new full-time sales position at PC Connection, Inc. in Merrimack, NH, in July 2018. He spent a year working as a salesperson at Core Medical, a medical headhunting firm, and left that position in June 2018. At Core Medical, he recruited nurses to work on temporary assignments. The position was stressful and demanding, but he worked hard and tried to develop skills and relationships that might help him in future sales positions. Kirk was awarded "Employee of the Month" at Core Medical during his sixth month of employment there. The award is an indication that the company recognized his hard work and achievements. Kirk has a very mature attitude, including a strong desire to be financially independent and to plan for his future.

Kirk has been in a serious relationship with his girlfriend, Cassie, for over four years. They live together in Manchester, NH. She finished her degree at Plymouth State University in 2016, and holds a very responsible

managerial position at a rental car company.

I believe they are planning to get married in the future. However, Tim and I know that they need to be ready for that step. Both of them have student loans, and we think it would be prudent for them to wait to get married until they can pay off at least some of their debt.

Tim and I are very careful not to mention our hope that they will wait to marry until they are in a more secure financial position to Kirk, since we do not want him to feel pressure from us in this matter. Also, we believe firmly that he and his girlfriend need to make their own decisions. Currently, Kirk is concentrating on finishing his degree and on learning as much as he can from his current position, both of which will enable him to move on to another position in the future.

JORDAN: Jordan graduated from high school in the same year that I wrote my original POV essay. He struggled with several issues during his senior year. In early 2015, Tim and I began to see a family counselor because we wanted to be able to help Jordan more effectively than we felt we were doing on our own. Coincidentally, Jordan's birth mother, Michele, passed away soon after we started seeing the counselor. Our counselor gave us valuable advice about how we could help Jordan successfully cope with such a profound loss. Jordan had been in touch with Michele several times a year, and we had met her several times as well. We encouraged his relationship with her, and I think he felt he had just started to get to know her at the time of her death. The counselor suggested several questions that we should ask in order to try to minimize the surprises that Jordan might experience during the services, etc., following Michele's death. We already had a good relationship with Jordan's birth sister, Jessica, so I contacted her. She willingly and openly answered all of the questions that the counselor had recommended we ask. These questions included: Does Jordan have any birth siblings that he does not know about who might show up at his birth mother's wake/funeral? (No) Will his birth father be there? (Not likely and no, he did not show up.) Will it be an open casket (No, due to cremation) Will Jordan be mentioned in the obituary as a survivor? (Yes) Will he stand with his siblings in the "receiving" line at the services? (Yes)

We attended Michele's wake and service with Jordan, sitting in the background and trying not to interfere with his interactions with his birth siblings. He knew that we were there to support him in his loss and grief. Tim and I were concerned about Jordan experiencing such a great loss at a time when he was already struggling. We talked with Jordan frequently about how he was doing after Michele's death, and he seemed to be doing pretty well. He also had the support of the wonderful guidance counselor at his high school, for which we were very grateful.

Jordan was not interested in attending college. He initially expressed interest in joining the military after high school. We wanted him to explore all of his options before he decided whether the military was the best option for him. We were not surprised when Jordan told us that he wanted to attend a technical school. He had always been interested in mechanics and how things work. Tim and I were enthusiastic in our support of his applying for admission to Universal Technical Institute (UTI) in Norwood, MA. Jordan was accepted and began his studies in August 2015. He lived at home and commuted back and forth to class. In December 2016 Jordan earned Associate's degrees in auto and diesel mechanics with Director's Honors.

We were proud when UTI selected him to continue his studies in Cummins diesel engines and power generators at the UTI campus in Phoenix, AZ. Jordan started at the Phoenix campus in January 2017. He graduated in July 2017 from the Cummins Technician Program.

In April 2017, when he was home from Phoenix for a visit, Jordan interviewed for and was offered a position at South Shore Generator in Wareham, MA. He started his position there in August 2017. After Jordan successfully completed his 90-day probationary period he was assigned to work with a company truck. This first position gave him a paycheck and a sense of independence.

In July 2018, Jordan started a new position as a generator service technician at Electronic Environments Infrastructure Solutions in Marlboro, MA. To find his current position, he took advantage of the lifelong career placement service offered to UTI graduates. Jordan believes that his current position will offer him opportunities to learn new skills and to advance in the company.

Jordan spends his time mainly working and socializing with his friends. We are happy that he lives with us at home, but we also encourage him to save money so that he can eventually live on his own.

PERSONAL INSIGHTS INTO OUR SONS' ADOPTION SUCCESS

Many factors have contributed to our sons' successful adoption and to their becoming productive young adults. These factors include the following:

- **Neither Kirk nor Jordan had a history of neglect or abuse.** To our knowledge, neither of our sons was abused, neglected, or abandoned in his birth home. Both boys had loving birthmothers who, despite their best efforts and good intentions, were not able to care for them. The lack of abuse or neglect gave the boys a positive foundation for the time they spent in foster care and for the years afterwards.
- **Kirk's foster home placement.** Prior to his adoption, Kirk was in a single foster home placement from the age of one year to three and one-half years. We believe that Kirk's foster mother gave him the stability that influenced his later physical and emotional development positively.
- **Kirk's birthmother.** We believe that, during his first year of life, Kirk's birthmother made many sacrifices to care for him in her home. Her prioritizing his needs over her own, combined with the stability that his foster mother gave him up to age three and one-half, contributed to both Kirk's lack of attachment issues and to the development of his healthy sense of self-worth.
- **Kirk was involved in our family's decision to adopt Jordan.** Kirk had been with us for 18 months and was completely settled into our family at the time he first met Jordan. Kirk was excited when we told him about our interest in adopting Jordan which would mean that Kirk would have a little brother. As the boys grew up, Kirk served as an important role model for Jordan. Jordan still looks up to Kirk and consults him when he has an important decision to make or when he simply wants to get Kirk's opinion about something.
- **Jordan's first few years in our family were difficult.** The instability that Jordan experienced in living in many foster home placements prior to joining our family caused him to be immature and resistant to any kind of change. We were as patient as possible and always made it clear to him that he was our son permanently; no tantrum or misbehavior was going to change that.

Tim and I brought a number of strengths into the process of raising our sons. These strengths include:

- **Being consistent in how we interact with them.** We treat the boys with respect and include them in decision-making for the family. We try to listen actively to them and to take their opinions, preferences, and feelings into consideration.
- **Being engaged proactively in all aspects of our sons' lives:** Both Tim and I attended all of our sons' sporting events. We were aware of what they were doing in school and helped them whenever possible. We were familiar with their friends and their friends' parents. We tried to be available whenever they needed to talk or needed support of any kind.
- **Making a serious effort to get to know their birth families:** Tim and I met most of the members of both boys' birth families. We also made a serious effort to get to know them and still enjoy a strong, positive relationship with members of both birth families. Equally important, we never said anything negative about their birth families and when they decided to search for their birth heritage, we encouraged them to do so.
- **Helping our sons make good decisions:** From the time our sons were little, when they needed to make a decision, we helped them identify their options and then let them make their own decisions whenever possible. We deliberately did not step in and solve their problems for them but instead encouraged them to think critically and to make the decisions themselves. I believe the result is that now, as adults, although they respect our opinions when we suggest what we think is their best option, they do not expect us to intervene.
- **Spending a lot of family time together:** From the time Tim and I adopted our sons, we spent a lot of time together as a family, including evenings and weekends after school/work was done. We attempted to make it quality time as much as possible, but we also believed that just being together was important, even if all of us were doing different things. Now that he is an adult and lives 90 miles away, we try to touch base with Kirk at least weekly. We see Jordan frequently, since he lives with us.

  We try to get together as a family for lunch or dinner at least monthly. Usually this means that

Tim, Jordan, and I drive to meet Kirk at a location that is convenient for him. Kirk knows that his girlfriend, Cassie, is always welcome to join us as well. We are happy to drive the distance in order to spend some time with Kirk (and Cassie when she is able to join us), and we are also pleased that Jordan joins us when we plan a family lunch or dinner.

- **Seeking help from counselors when necessary:** Tim and I did not hesitate to seek help from professional counselors either when we felt we could improve our parenting skills or when we thought that something happening in our lives warranted outside help. In addition, the boys participated in counseling as they were growing up whenever we felt it would help them. We felt that seeking help from counselors was especially important given that we are an adoptive family with unique circumstances and stressors.
- **Loving our sons unconditionally and communicating that to them frequently:** Perhaps the most important factor in our successful adoption experience was that we made it clear to the boys that our love for them was unconditional and that nothing they did (or could do) would change that. They certainly made mistakes and got into trouble when they were growing up, but they knew that, no matter what, we will always love them.

Both boys know that we are available whenever they need us. Kirk does not normally initiate contact with us unless he has a question or needs something, but he is always open to communicating when we contact him. We try to discuss relevant topics with Jordan as they arise. We have found that it helps to have a brief initial conversation first in order to let Jordan think about the issue and then to broach the subject later instead of expecting him to discuss it on the spot. Years ago a friend who had raised four children told us that humor is very important when interacting with young people. So we try to use humor whenever it is appropriate in interacting with the boys.

CONCLUSION

We are optimistic about our sons' futures. They are on the right paths to be successful in various aspects of their lives including work and social relationships with peers. Tim and I consider our sons' willingness to communicate openly and honestly with us and to make the time to participate in family dinners to be two important indicators of our continuing good relationship with them.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Janice G. Schuster serves as Commons Librarian, Research, Education and Collections/tenured Associate Professor at Providence College's Phillips Memorial Library. She earned a B.A. degree in German and a Master of Library Science degree from Indiana University in Bloomington, Indiana. At Pearl Street United Methodist Church in Brockton, Massachusetts, she serves as lay leader, communion steward and member of the leadership team, as well as chair of the Staff Pastor Parish Relations committee. Janice is a leader with Brockton Interfaith Community (BIC) and has served in the past as BIC board president, vice president, and secretary. She has published on the topics of adoption, livable communities, electronic resources, serials, and government documents. She can be reached at Janice.Schuster@providence.edu. For additional information, go to: http://works.bepress.com/janice_schuster/